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Abstract





Strategic default has been the achilles heel in academic finance for decades. By definition, whether
a default has occurred due to strategic motive is unobservable. Moreover, a household has only
so many avenues of conducting a strategic default. I use the context of commercial mortgages
as property value as well property cashflow co-determine the default decision of these borrow-
ers. I tease out the different strategic aspects of default from the ones emanating from liquidity
constraints. The recent advances in Deep Neural Network (DNN), the advent of big data and the
computational power associated with it has enabled me to disentangle the motive of default.
Also, agency conflicts of brokers during origination of a mortgage loan and the moral hazards
thereof has been documented based on the soft information about the borrowers. However, there
have been few, if any paper, which retains the soft information about the borrowers, post origina-
tion, during the life of the loans. There has been a plethora of research about the biases generated
towards foreclosures and other adverse outcomes post securitization for the last decade. But the
soft information about the borrowers obtained by the brokers have been lost during the pooling
process in securitization and there have been famous papers on the loss of information during the
securitization process which happens at arms’ length from the original lender. I bridge this gap
by using novel data on proprietary call transcripts (textual data) between borrowers and servicers.
I am also in the process of procuring audio files which can capture mood, content, tone of these
communications.
My dissertation documents the use of machine learning (ML) techniques in commercial and
iv
residential real estate to answer long-standing questions, which could not previously be answered
due to paucity of data and computational resources. In the first chapter, I run a horserace of Deep
Neural Network with other ML models and parametric models to provide a new identification
strategy to disentangle liquidity-constrained default and incentives for strategic default. The second
chapter attempts to answer the most pressing current socio-economic issue in the United States.
Specifically, I compute the social, racial and dollar cost of the CARES Act and find these adhoc
policies are as expensive as direct payment of $2,000 to households, if not worse. Finally, in the
third chapter I create a novel framework to ingest quantified time-varying soft information from call
transcript text data about borrowers in ML models on hard information. I alleviate the information
asymmetry between the borrowers and issuers, increase mortgage market efficiency and mitigate
the conflict of interest between master servicers and special servicers.
There has been recent literature on the applications of supervised, unsupervised and reinforce-
ment learning in mainstream academic finance. But, very little work is done in the highly illiquid
opaque real estate literature using the cutting edge methods in Machine Learning. I take a fresh
look at some of the long-debated questions in the literature using some of the machine learning
techniques. I am also able to able to use the current COVID-19 pandemic as an exogenous shock
for robustness check in most of my current research.
v
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CHAPTER 1
DEEP LEARNING FOR DISENTANGLING LIQUIDITY-CONSTRAINED AND
STRATEGIC DEFAULT
We disentangle liquidity-constrained default and the incentives for strategic default using Deep
Neural Network (DNN) methodology on a proprietary Trepp data set of commercial mortgages.
Our results are consistent during the severe Financial Crisis (2008) and the plausible economic
catastrophe ensuing from COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021). We retrieve the motive of default
from observationally equivalent delinquency classes by bivariate analysis of default rate on Net
operating income (NOI) and Loan-to-Value (LTV). NOI, appraisal reduction amount, prepayment
penalty clause, balloon payment amongst others co-determine the delinquency class in highly non-
linear ways compared to more statistically significant variables such as LTV. Prediction accuracy
for defaulted loans is higher when DNN is compared with other models, by increasing flexibility
and relaxing the specification structure. These findings have significant policy implications for
investors, rating agencies and the overall mortgage market.
1.1 Introduction
We reconcile the long-standing debate between two competing theories of mortgage default using
Deep Neural Network (DNN) as an alternative identification strategy disentangling competing mo-
tives that produce observationally equivalent results (see Indarte 2020 for Regression Kink Design
approach). Riddiough 1991 claimed that mortgage default in triggered by life events that reduces
borrower cash flows. Foster and Order 1984 opine that default is caused by negative equity (when
option to sell the home in the future is worth less that her loan obligations) as borrowers treat their
homes like a financial asset. We create a framework in which both of the above can be observed,
and more importantly strategic default can be disentangled from liquidity-constrained default. The
advent of large scale use of DNN and the computational resources for handling big data has enabled
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us to address this central research question, impossible even ten years back. Identification strat-
egy has been defined in the literature, vis-a-vis uniqueness for parametric models in economics.
DNN, with sufficient tuning, can provide a unique non-parametric model which serves the same
purpose as canonical identification strategy in a high-dimensional setup. The variable importance
(in terms of marginal contribution) of the economically meaningful variables is consistent even
during dire economic conditions, ensuring the stability of the non-parametric model and providing
a pseudo-identification strategy.
Although defaults are observed, one cannot observe the strategic element of a default as the
strategic defaulters are pooled together with borrowers who cannot afford to pay. 1 But, to the
best of our knowledge, none have been able to disentangle who defaulted strategically (which
can lead to spatial clustering of default) and the intent to default strategically (which can lead to
aggregate contagion). 2 Although, moral hazard is time-invariant, but the incentive of a borrower
for moral hazard needs to be triggered. This is just one special case among the several elements
of strategic behavior we document. We use several key covariates, e.g., Net Operating Income,
Appraisal Reduction Amount, Prepayment Penalty Clause, Balloon Payment at Maturity, Non-
Recoverability, etc. to identify when moral hazard is triggered vis-a-vis higher order non-linear
interactions during severe stress in the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Contemporaneous LTV is a proxy for a single default trigger based on property value. Our
model incorporates another crucial trigger based on contemporaneous property income (NOI). 3
Net Operating Income (NOI), a key indicator for an investment property’s financial standing, is
the income from the property after subtracting the operating expenses and vacancy losses (before
principal and interest payments, capital expenditures, depreciation, and amortization). The vari-
1Bajari, Chu, and Park 2008 estimate the probability of strategic default via a structural model of double trigger,
namely, both cash flow and negative equity considerations. Similarly, in a survey of a sample of U.S. households,
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2013 use survey to ask a direct question about a person’s willingness to default across
different severities of negative equity, keeping the level of wealth and other individual characteristics constant, thereby
separating contagion effects from sorting effects, by asking questions about social and moral aspects of default.
2Ganong and Noel 2020 try to identify the reason for default from life-events and adverse cashflow events in the
context of Residential Mortgages
3This is in line with Foote et al. 2009: when equity is negative but above a threshold, default occurs with negative
income shock, although our context is commercial real estate (CRE).
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ation in the ability to service debt, measured by Debt Service Coverage Ratio, i.e., DSCR =
NOI
ScheduledPayment
provides the identification strategy in disentangling liquity-constrained and strate-
gic defaulters. Commercial Real Estate (CRE) borrowers with NOI > 0 & DSCR < 1, do not
have the ability to service the debt obligation in a given month as they are liquidity-constrained,
whereas, CRE borrowers with NOI > 0 & DSCR > 1 have the immediate available liquidity,
but may choose to default strategically. 4
We list the possible combinations of LTV and NOI that can disentangle Liquidity-constrained
Default and the incentives for Strategic Default behavior in Figure 5.1. For a given Loan-to-Value
(LTV) bucket, if default rate monotonically increases in Net Operating Income (NOI), we call
those defaulters strategic, as their ability to pay increases with NOI but they still increase their
default rate. When LTV > 1, the borrower is insolvent and Default Rate increases with NOI
in the Bivariate Heatmap in Figure 5.2b. In fact, DNN algorithm can identify the threshold of
NOI∗ (percentile 6.5 in Trepp data) which disentangles the cases (1) and (2) in Figure 5.1. When
LTV ∗(0.82) < LTV < 1, the borrower passes on the NOI risk to the lender to maintain equity
and there is high default across all borrowers, in anticipation of the abrupt jump to insolvency
(LTV > 1) in the event of appraisal reduction. When LTV ∗∗(0.6) < LTV < LTV ∗(0.82), there
is no risk of negative equity, hence the borrower negotiates the loan and strategic default starts
from low NOI∗∗ (percentile 4.0 in Trepp data) in Figure 5.2b which disentangles cases (3), (4)
in Figure 5.1. In the LTV bucket LTV ∗∗∗(0.2) < LTV < LTV ∗∗(0.6), the borrower default rate
is very low as there is neither liquidity-constraint (interest payment is mostly complete) or any
incentive for strategic default. When LTV < LTV ∗∗∗(0.2), the loan is close to maturity, hence
all borrowers default at a significantly higher rate, due to change in underwriting standard towards
maturity or the inability refinance while balloon payment is looming. NOI∗∗∗ can be assumed to
be (percentile 0, since all borrowers are strategic defaulters and hence case (6) in Figure 5.1 is
4Institutional details on Property Type: We assume that property owners manage properties in isolation and do
not cross-finance. This is reasonable to assume for investment-type, ring-fenced properties. Some property owners
are more constrained for financing than others, e.g., some industries face shock independent of real estate market and
suddenly have trouble repaying debt on their buildings. It is reasonable to assume for consumption-type properties
held directly be user-firms. In this case, the differences between industries could provide variation in ability.
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mostly not realized.
The importance of these strategic (contractual) variables is captured only in DNN, which can-
not be captured in Multinomial Logistic Regression, Lasso, Ridge and even in Distributed Random
Forest and Gradient Boosting Machine, as evidenced by the higher ranking of NOI over statisti-
cally significant LTV vis-a-vis variable importance tables. 5 We then test the robustness of this
higher ranking of NOI over LTV, by leaving out other strategic contractual features (year month,
prepayment penalty, balloon payment, occupancy, appraisal reduction, etc.) one at a time. We
further test the robustness of the ranking order of NOI over LTV during the Financial Crisis of
2008 by training the DNN on data from 1998-2006 and testing on 2007-2008 data. We further test
this order during COVID-19, the current ongoing pandemic and find the exact same results. This
proves beyond any doubt, that NOI (and other contractual features mentioned above) are more
important than LTV, even during the dire economic circumstances.
There are often situations in which there are no or few good quasi-natural experiments. 6
We exploit the massive proprietary data set on commercial mortgages from Trepp to disentangle
liquidity-constrained default (from lack of Net Operating Income (NOI)) from defaults motivated
by strategic behavior, as evidenced by default rate increasing monotonically with increasing NOI,
for certain LTV buckets. The context of commercial mortgages borrowers is appropriate to docu-
ment strategic default as these borrowers are institutions 7 and not households. 8 The commercial
borrowers are savvy businessmen and hence their delinquency behavior is possibly much more
P&L - oriented 9 based on mortgage contractual features (prepayment penalty clause, balloon
5This could be because: (i) High NOI implies Low Cap Rate for value-added or opportunistic properties compared
to core properties; (ii) debt yield from the frothiness of local market; (iii) market cycle channel; (iv) income deficiency
related to occupancy.
6Differences in Differences require an exogenous treatment and parallel pre-trend, Regression Discontinuity De-
sign requires randomness around one observable characteristic, Instrumental Variables require rigorous explanations
on plausibility and ruling out alternative channels, etc.
7In an institution, the responsibilities for payment of debt obligation are diffused. The blame for non-payment is
not bourne out on one person, but on the institution. Hence there is agency conflict and real possibilities to discern
strategic behavior.
8Ganong and Noel 2020 find only 3% strategic default for households. Also they define a default as strategic only
when the property is under water.
9Our definition of strategic behavior is not the same as bourne out of strategies in game theory, but is more in
line with the mortgage default literature. The Profit and Loss (P&L) is summarizes the revenues, costs, and expenses
incurred during a specified period, and hence P&L management becomes important for businesses from a strategic
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payment indicator) and financial constraints, such as Net Operating Income (NOI), emanating
from the unbalance in terms of the amount and time lag between cost of funding and income cash
flows, and much less from macroeconomic conditions, supply and demand in the local geography.
We contribute an alternative and new DNN approach (see drawbacks and inconsistencies of the
other causal mechanisms described in Black, Kim, and Nasev 2012).
Our paper uses big data with medium frequency to alleviate concerns raised in Manski 2004.10
We overcome the challenge and observe beliefs 11 and actions in the same data. We implore this
novel DNN approach which is much more accurate and robust than Survey measures of (intended)
actions and inferring beliefs 12 from actual actions, which assumes that beliefs affect actions. The
DNN model can calibrate the thresholds across key variables like NOI, LTV, etc. beyond which
there are sharp changes in borrower behavior. The flexibility of not having a pre-specified structure
to a model helps us capture univariate and bivariate visualizations of the impact of nonlinearity and
higher order interactions.
Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift 2018 create of a Bartik instrument by interacting lo-
cal exogenous industry shares (differential exposure to common shocks) with national industry
growth rates. Our DNN model can seamlessly exploit the heterogeneous shares of property-type
and measure the differential exogenous exposure to the common COVID-19 shock. The variation
in cashflow (NOI) from lessee to borrower across property types provides the exogenous hetero-
geneity across local geography. We no longer need to argue about the plausibility of the identifying
assumption, as the flexible nature of DNN provides an alternative identification strategy that is so
robust that it weathers 2008 and current crisis from COVID-19 ongoing pandemic.
Beyond the identification strategy from several variables in this big data setting, our DNN
viewpoint.
10Beliefs are essential in appreciating the inter-temporal decisions regarding financial choices. The traditional
benchmark has been rational expectations based on all (publicly) available information, but has scanty evidence in
data (Manski 2004).
11The key questions of active research are how beliefs are formed, how different beliefs affect behavior and what
are the implications in macroeconomic models and asset pricing.
12We contribute to the growing literature of time-inconsistent beliefs or time variation in average beliefs. Giglio
et al. 2019 conduct a variance decomposition of beliefs by heterogeneous individual fixed effects, which cannot be
explained by observable demographic characteristics. Our paper extends the literature on wealth redistribution between
optimists/pessimists (Geanakoplos 2010), which is a model with constant difference in beliefs.
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methodology also extends the scope of ”Frailty Model”13. DNN not only captures latent time-fixed
macroeconomic effect but also loan specific idiosyncratic effects beyond what has been captured in
prior literature in Commercial Mortgages. We include 29 variables from Trepp in our DNN model
along with state-level macro variables like unempoyment, GDP growth and 2-Year & 10-Year
treasury rates and recently created indices. These 33 variables capture the loan-specific unobserved
effects and the macroeconomic variables proxy for unobserved common latent variables. Morover,
using the DNN, we can capture the highly non-linear interaction among the covariates. We conduct
a horse racing among all the models based on misclassification errors for 7 delinquency classes and
conclusively show that DNN has the hightest accuracy of prediction along with Gradient Boosting
Machine (GBM) in Table 5.4. Since GBM is a greedy algorithm, the variable importance is not
robust (in Figure 5.10b) and hence we choose DNN (in Figure 5.10c) as the best model due to it’s
interpretability along with the accuracy of prediction.
Our findings capture the interplay of borrower behavior, various risk triggers and the overall
mortgage market. They significantly differ from the findings of Campbell and Dietrich 1983,
Cunningham and Capone 1990, Deng 1999, Elul et al. 2010, Foote et al. 2009, Heimer and Imas
2018, Heimer and Simsek 2019 and others. These prior studies have used loan-to-value ratio, loan
age and other loan level variables, as major predictors of borrower behavior. We test whether by
adding macroeconomic variables, we can delve into the realm of omitted variable bias found in
all hedonic models. We extend the literature on hedonic models by systematically different macro
variables which are exogenous in the hedonic regression model beyond the characteristics (used
as covariates) and can explain a lot of the unobserved effects Childs, Ott, and Riddiough 1996.
Other than 2Yr Treasury Rate and State Unemployment Rate, the macroeconomic variables do
not directly affect the strategic delinquency behavior and timing. National interest rates, e.g., 2-
Year and 10-Year Treasury rates impact occupancy of commercial properties directly, as well as
through state-level GDP. The unemployment is also captured at the state level. The local State
13Duffie 2009 created an MCMC methodology that updates the posterior distribution of unobserved risk factors
based on Bayes’ rule whenever defaults cluster at a given point in time. In the event forecasting literature, such
a dynamic unobserved covariate’s effect is termed ”frailty”. Yildirim 2008 disentangle the probability of long-run
survivorship and the default timing using a mixture model.
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level Unemployment Rate in urban centers and occupancy of lessees in commercial properties are
highly correlated, because the lessees are the job-creators locally. We claim that all of the above
can be captured by NOI, since both occupancy and unemployment rates affect the NOI from the
property, as is bourne out of the variable importable in Figure 5.10c where NOI is much higher in
importance and internalizes the effect of local unemployment and occupancy through non-linear
interactions among these variables.
We also add more broadly to the literature on neural networks. Shallow neural networks have
been used in areas of financial economics. Bansal and Viswanathan 1993 use neural networks to
estimate the pricing kernel. Hutchinson, Lo, and Poggio 1994 devised the use of neural networks
as a nonparametric method of option pricing. Brown, Goetzmann, and Kumar 1998 use neural
networks to predict stock markets. Swanson and White 1997 conduct macroeconomic forecasting
vis-a-vis neural networks. Lee, White, and Granger 1993 construct tests to capture nonlinearities
observed in time series models with the advent of neural networks. Granger 1995 and Kuan and
White 1994 study the nonlinear nature of financial time series via neural networks. Khandani,
Kim, and Lo 2010b and Butaru et al. 2016 investigate a plethora of machine learning models for
estimating financial default. Recent applications of DNN in financial economics include Klabjan
2007 who model market movements. Heaton, Polson, and Witte 2017 use DNN for portfolio
selection. The purpose for a deep learning model is bourne out of the need to have transparency
and accountability Albanesi and Vamossy 2019.
1.2 Commercial Real Estate Vs Household Finance
The residential real estate bubble from 2004 (emergence) to 2008 (burst) has generated an enor-
mous volume of literature and also relevant policy prescriptions. Surprisingly, the price impact
on commercial real estate (potential bubble) has been ignored in comparison. Since the inception
of securitization as a means of financing commercial real estate (CRE) mortgages from 1998, the
sophisticated B-piece investors have been outbid beyond sustainable long-run fundamentals, over
time (from 2004) by investors who ”originated to securitize”, thereby, resulting in decline in un-
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derwriting standards in CRE (Levitin and Wachter 2012). Despite some overlap in multi-family
property type, Commercial and Residential Real Estate (RRE) is markedly different markets and
hence has attracted dissimilar government (e.g., GSE) intervention. One specific difference we
will focus on in this paper is the unobservable strategic default behavior of commercial mortgage
borrowers, which is different from the residential counterpart due to the nonlinear relationship
between multiple property level financials and the mortgage terms. In particular, our goal is to
disentangle liquidity-constrained default and the incentives for strategic default based on the Debt-
Service Coverage Ratio, a.k.a., DSCR. The the ability to pay is turned on when DSCR ≥ 1 but
the willingness to pay and motives for strategic default demonstrate the need for a Deep Neural
Network (DNN) methodology.
Non-recourse RRE and CRE have an implicit put-option structure equivalent to the repurchase
of the loan with the value of the property as the strike, wherein the borrower can meet the debt
obligation by the surrender value of the property. This is the theoretical reason for the LTV being
the primary driver of default behavior in previous literature (e.g., Ambrose and Jr. 2012, Ambrose,
Capone, and Deng 2001). Since RRE is both investible and consumable, tax-deduction acts as an
incentive, and the foreclosure and recourse laws act as disincentives for strategic default for house-
holds. Although the individual CRE loans are much bigger in size compared to their residential
counterpart, the partially amortizing structure, defeasance, yield maintenance clauses discourage
refinancing and/or curtailment, and hence CRE is exposed to strategic default, where the borrow-
ers may choose to stay in 90-120 days delinquency bucket strategically, not being liable to be in
foreclosure and not having to be REO. We see a huge surge in these loans in this delinquency
bucket after 2008 Financial Crisis in Figure 5.4.
Commercial mortgages, at least the ones which are securitized into a Commercial Mortgage-
backed Security (CMBS), are generally used to finance properties which have a stream of income.
Therefore, a borrower’s default decision depends on not only the asset value (i.e., borrower equity)
but also the property liquidity (i.e., property income). Hence, a rational borrower, with a negative
equity position, should not default when the net cash flow from property income is positive and
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enough for debt-service, i.e., NOI > 0 & DSCR > 1. So, a model for a rational borrower’s
default decision is co-determined by both property value and property income. Commercial mort-
gages are partially amortizing (7-12 year term and 25-30 year amortization schedule), i.e., a balloon
payment is due when the mortgage matures. Borrowers generally refinance the current mortgage to
fund the balloon payment, which may be strategic, towards maturity due to increased interest rates
or the underwriting standards having tightened, even for a borrower making payments on time.
The lender makes a judgement about the riskiness of the borrower in terms of continued pay-
ment towards a loan obligation and underwrites the risk vis-a-vis the mortgage rate in Figure 5.5.
Although, the lender is well aware of the reputation and past loan repayment behavior of the bor-
rower, the type of the borrower is noisy and hence this leads to adverse selection. The lender
makes an actuarily fair take-it-or-leave-it offer, adding some risk premium, to the borrower at
origination. Moreover, there is competition among borrowers in the same business of leasing
income-producing commercial properties. Due to the search friction for the lessee in Figure 5.5,
there is considerable uncertainty about the NOI coming from the lessee’s rent payment. The bor-
rowers have no bargaining power in terms of loan pricing, but they could use the act of strategic
delinquency as an insurance policy against the premium they had to pay at origination via the
mortgage rate. We assume that act of strategic delinquency of some borrowers can be captured by
the first-order stochastic dominance of the cumulative default rate (higher default rate for strategic
defaulters than liquidity-constrained defaulters) of the bad-type over the good-type, for different
buckets of LTV in Figure 5.2b. There could be moral hazard from the lessee in Figure 5.5, in terms
of continued rent payment and servicers are used by the borrower as a commitment device, since
the lease is not negotiation-proof.
The commercial lender (debtholder) and the commercial borrower (equityholder) enter into
a contract (firm) for the business of leasing/renting out the property to a lessee. The prospect
of debt renegotiation increases the expected payoff to shareholders in default, and induces them
to anticipate the timing of default by strategic default (Favara, Schroth, and Valta 2012), hence
increasing the bargaining power of the commercial borrowers (equityholders in this context). There
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is a subtle difference between firm strategic default and the strategic default of the CRE borrower,
as the CRE borrower usually have different LLCs for each property and hence their strategic default
is more property-centric, specifically in terms of the rent payment from the lessee in the property.
Our results indicate that the effects of property income, prepayment penalty clause and balloon
risk are significant to assess total credit risk.14 The estimation of the economic parameters is a
nontrivial problem, given the massive sparsity and the paucity of CMBS data from a historical
perspective. The empirical mortgage literature identified a linear combination of variables for the
commercial mortgage credit and prepayment risk including creditworthiness and free cash flow
of the entity, current leverage ratio, loan age, interest rates, and CMBS indices (e.g. Furstenberg
and George 1969, Curley and Guttentag 1974, Campbell and Dietrich 1983). The commercial
mortgage performance data, however, tell a different story. The presence of nonlinear effects
obviates the need for a more general form but it is difficult to identify all the factors and their mutual
interactions. Instead of specifying a functional form for commercial mortgage performance, we
include all possible factors and let the data dictate the model, which also allows for highly non-
linear interaction terms between factors. Since, our data set is nationally representative, the pooled
model computes an estimate of aggregate default risk in the commercial mortgages especially well
for 2007-2009. Our estimation result provides a ranking of individual commercial mortgages in
terms of their delinquency behavior and can be aggregated to a systemic measure of default risk in
the commercial sector.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first motivate a toy theory model in
Section 1.3, provide details on the big data in Section 3.2 and provide descriptive statistics and
conduct rigorous exploratory analysis to give an idea of the trends in data. In Section 1.5, we
motivate Naive Bayes, Multinomial Logit & Ordered Logit, in Section 1.6 Distributed Random
Forest, Gradient Boosting Machine models and provide empirical results and list the deficiencies
in each of them. In Section 1.7, we describe the DNN model and motivate how the DNN model
14The simultaneous inclusion of four significant risks: market, credit, prepayment (Christopoulos, Jarrow, and
Yildirim 2008) and liquidity (Ambrose and Sanders 2003) makes CMBS modeling extremely hard intractable. The
CMBS loan pool tranche cash flows and corresponding allocation rules, the prepayment restrictions and the prepay-
ment penalties are heterogeneous across the various CMBS trusts.
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can alleviate most of the issues in the earlier models. We also point out the key findings of the
paper in this section and how they differ from the earlier literature. We test robustness of NOI and
LTV order during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic in Section 4.1.1 and document industry-level
heterogeneity. In Section 3.6, we provide concluding remarks followed by references.
1.3 A Simple Theoretical Motivation
We provide a simple model framework, in line with Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009, to
motivate that the ”Optimists” (or Strategic Defaulters) would prefer to maintain a consistently
higher LTV during the good portion of business and economic cycle. They will then have the
option to strategically default in the future. Whereas, ”Pessimists” (Non-Strategic or Liquidity-
constrained Defaulters) would prefer to continually reduce LTV, in anticipation of different forces
increasing LTV in the future and also to alleviate the consequences of default in the event they are
liquidity-constrained. This differential behavior across the cohort of borrowers will price in their
heterogenous beliefs (π) in the expectation of occupancy of the property. The differential behavior
of these two types of borrowers across different LTV buckets are explained in Figure 5.2b, based
on NOI and based on other variable interactions in the other subfigures in 5.2. The motivation
for using Net Operating Income (NOI), Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR), Balloon Payment,
Scheduled and Unscheduled Payments, Occupancy is explained with the toy model below.
In residential market, while negative equity, in nonrecourse states, is necessary for strategic
default ibid., it is by itself not sufficient. There are several frictions that make defaulting unappeal-
ing in nonrecourse states. Consider a borrower who owns a property worth At at time t and faces
a bequest mortgage balloon payment of BT . The borrower will not default as long as At > BT
from a financial standpoint. However, for strategic default, there are aspects to look into beyond
the financial loss from defaulting. Not defaulting renders a borrower the benefit of defaulting in
dire conditions in the future. The intertemporal substitution of default choice is co-determined by
timing of appraisal reduction, non-recoverability depending on whether the master servicer/special
servicer has ceased advancing for the related mortgage loan. Also, by defaulting she plausibly
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faces higher borrowing cost in the future due to differential credit-rationing by the lender, since
lenders are generally NPV-neutral and default is a deadweight loss for them. Let Kt be the net
benefit (opportunity cost of cash) of not defaulting at t. Then a rational borrower will not default
if At −BT +Kt > 0.
If the commercial borrower is not constrained a bequest lump sum payment due in the near
future, then her decision of strategic default is far more involved, because of the same intertem-
poral choice and the trade-off therein, i.e., the decision to default today Vs postponing the de-
fault decision later. Also, the option to default later depends on the borrower’s ability (DSCR)
to serve her debt obligations, which has high correlation with the probability of occupancy and
positive cash flow from the lessee in the property. If the property is vacant or if the lessee does
not pay up, the borrower is likely to default later and is unable to use the value of the option. Let
VT = AT −BT +KT , where T is the balloon payment date. Then the value Bajari, Chu, and Park
2008 of not defaulting at T-1 is:
VT−1 = aT−1 −mT−1 −BT +KT−1 + (1− πT−1)Emax(VT , 0) (1.1)
where a is the monetary value of the cashflow and the serviceflow experienced from time T -
1 and T, m is the total (scheduled and unscheduled) mortgage payment between T-1 and T, πT−1
captures the probability of vacancy of the property (i.e., not having a lessee, and E is the expectation
operator. The value of not defaulting at a generic date t can be deduced from backward induction:
Vt = at −mt −BT +Kt + (1− πt)Emax(Vt+1, 0). (1.2)
From the above equation, the decision of strategic default at t can be captured by the relation-
ship below:
StrategicDefault = F (A−B, a,m, π,K). (1.3)
The functional form of F (.) is extremely difficult, if not impossible to pin down. Even locally, to
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define F (.) piecewise using Implicit Function Theorem, one would need the partial derivative of
F (.)−1 with respect to the shortfall A−B, the monetary value of the cashflow and the serviceflow
a, the scheduled and unscheduled mortgage payments m, belief about the property occupancy
π, non-monetary benefit K to be well-behaved. We show in 5.3, this is not the case. The LTV
is a function of the shortfall A − B, the NOI is a function of the cashflow and the serviceflow
a, Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) is a function of a
m
, occupancy is the expectation of the
belief π, non-monetary benefits K are mostly unobservable. This is further clouded by the fact
that Recourse Laws are not strictly implemented in most states. Bankruptcy Laws need to be fairly
strong in a state to reinforce recourse laws.
We give indication from the data, how non-linear the interactions among the above variables
can be in Figure 5.2 and hence resort to the most flexible yet robust DNN methodology in Section
1.7.
1.4 Data
We have monthly proprietary novel data set of 91,767 loans (only US loans) from January 1998 to
September 2016 from Trepp15 We exclude CRE loans, as our research focused on NOI generated
from income-producing properties only found in CMBS loans.
We include the variables used in previous CMBS literature, like An, Deng, and Gabriel 2009,
Ambrose and Sanders 2003 and preclude the following key loan-specific variables: log(original
balance), LTV, time ofamortization, time to maturity, lockout, lockout expiration, corporate bond-
credit spread Titman, Tompaidis, and Tsyplakov 2005, yield curve, mortgage-treasury rate spread,
region dummy, seasonal/quarter dummy, among others.
We finally decide to use loan-to-value (ltv), occupancy rate (occ), tranche loan-to-value, (se-
curltv), tranche weighted average cost (securwac), annualized gross rate (actrate), outstanding
scheduled principal balance at end of current period (obal), derived most recent net operating
15Trepp is the leading provider of analytics, information, and technology to the global CMBS, commercial mortgage
finance, and banking industries. Trepp is the largest commercially available database containing detailed information
on over 1,800 deals and more than 100,000 loans, which support close to $800 billion in securities. Deal coverage
includes North American, European, and Asian CMBS, as well as Commercial Real Estate backed CDOs.
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income (noi), outstanding legal remaining outstanding principal balance reflecting defeasance of
the loan as of the determination date (balact), securitization balance of the loan predged to the trust
(face), most recent appraised value else securitization appraised value (appvalue), total amount of
principal and interest due (actpmt), regularly scheduled principal to be paid to the trust (cursched-
prin), principal prepayments and prepayments (full or partial), discounted payoffs, and/or other
proceeds resulting from liquidation, condemnation, insurance settlements (curunschedprin), inter-
est basis of an adjustable rate loan (pmtbas), net proceeds received on liquidation of loan (liqpro-
ceeds), expenses associated with the liquidation (liqexpense), difference between Net Proceeds
(after Liquidation Expenses) and Current Beginning Scheduled Balance (realizedloss), amount re-
ceived from a borrower as a pay off a loan prior to the maturity or anticipated repayment date
(pppenalties) as the loan-specific variables. Age of the property is include as a control in addition
to the age of the loan. We add age2 as as a control variable too to capture the non-linear relation-
ship of aging of the loan with the delinquency classes. We calculate ”time to maturity” to extract
any strategic default behavior closer to the realized maturity of the loans.
We use the loan vintage (to capture if origination and underwriting standards have an effect on
the delinquency class of the loans), 51 states in USA (msa, county, zip have severe missing values,
hence the identification comes at a state level), property type (we bucket thousands of property
types into 8 unique types), fixed/floating as dummy variables. We use ”Number of Properties”
(numprop) in a deal as a deal-specific variable. We control for refinance pipeline and/or balloon
payment by assigning a dummy if a loan is within 3 months threshold to its original scheduled
maturity date. We use MIT Commercial Index, National Council of Real Estate Investment Fidu-
ciaries (NCREIF) regional property value indices. Additionally, we include state-level quarterly
GDP (converted to monthly), monthly historical unemployment data by state and historical interest
rates of different maturities.
For the classifications models to generate realistic results and capture the marginal contribu-
tions of the features in a scale-free way, we convert numerical variables like: x :−→ x−min(x)
max(x)−min(x) .
This keeps the distributional characteristics of the numerical variables, but makes them all scale-
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free so that their marginal contributions towards the output can be uniform. We avoid the other
more frequently used standardization technique where x :−→ x−Mean(x)
StdDev(x)
as it converts all vari-
ables into standard normal. The entire valuable information, e.g., skewness, kurtosis and all distri-
butional characteristics are lost in this imposition of normal distribution across feature space.
The summary statistics for the cleaned data containing 9,617,333 observations of continuous
variables is provided in Table 5.1. ”One hot encoding” technique converts categorical variables as
binary vectors without any order.
1.5 Parametric Models and Empirical Results
Our first set of empirical results are based on parametric models: Naive Bayes, Multinomial (with
Lasso and Ridge regularization) & Ordered Logit harnessing the unprecedented size of our sample
set and the heterogeneity in the incentives of default and beliefs we investigate. The models calcu-
late the accuracy of prediction for 7 different delinquency states starting from Current/Performing
classes W0 30D which includes ”loans with payments not received but still in grace period or
not yet due”, Late/Non-Performing classes W30 60D, W60 90D which includes loans with ”Late
Payment beyond 30-days but less than 60 days, beyond 60-days but less than 90-days, Default state
W90 120D ((within 90 to 120 days of delinquency), Liquidation Proceedings & Final Resolution
state B120D (beyond 120 days of delinquency), combined together as ”limbo” loans. We add fur-
ther states in the PrfMatBal (Performing, Mature and Balloon Payment due) and NPrfMatBal
(Non-Performing, Mature and Balloon Payment due) classes to capture the incentives delay in res-
olution for foreclosed loans to REO/prepaid. Although PrfMatBal is a performing loan, but it can
be anywhere between 0-90 days of delinquency. PrfMatBal are also close to maturity, rendering
itself vulnerable to strategic behavior from changing interest rate environment and underwriting
standards. Hence, PrfMatBal is treated as a separate delinquency status. The same argument
holds even stronger for NPrfMatBal loans. We motivate below the reasons why these parametric
models misrepresent the risk for the delinquent loans in this context.
A Naive Bayes classifier estimates the conditional a-posterior probabilities of a categorical
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variable given independent covariates using the Bayes rule. The assumption of independence of
the covariates is key to the success of the Naive Bayes (NB) classifier. We see that W0 30D,
W30 60D & W60 90D classes have less mis-classification in Table 5.4 error in NB than other
models, since the assumption of independence among the co-variates holds until a loan is in these
classes. This analysis is still kept in the paper to motivate why we eventually need DNN as a means
of avoiding this strong assumption of independence among the covariates.
Ordered Logit exploits the natural order of delinquency classes and computes transition proba-
bilities in that order. Ordered Logit does not allow all the back transitions from a worse delinquency
state to a better delinquency state, which can be shown in a Finite State Automaton. Multinomial
Logit assumes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).2, which is not true in this situation as
we will see in the next section. Suppose, hypothetically, there are two choices given to a borrower
to be either within 30 days of delinquency or between 90 days and 120 days of delinquency,
which is not true in this situation as we will see in the next section. Suppose, hypothetically, there
are two choices given to a borrower to be either within 30 days of delinquency or between 90
days and 120 days of delinquency. Clearly, the borrower would like to stick with the first choice,
as the second choice classifies him/her in the default category and is detrimental for her credit-
worthiness from a lender’s perspective. Now suppose, one more choice for being in 30 days to
60 days of delinquency is given to the borrower, s/he may choose to rather be in this new state
instead of less than 30 days of delinquency and may strategically miss one payment if there is a
great investment opportunity for him/her in that one month horizon. In fact, none of the models
(except Naive Bayes) can distinguish these three classes (W0 30D, W30 60D & W60 90D) and
considers all of them as Current Loans in Table 5.4.
The granularity of delinquency classes brings out the gradual transition of loans into adverse
states rather than simply having a cutoff for default which would imply that we are assuming that
loans ”Within 30 days delinquency”, ”Between 30 days and 60 days delinquency” and ”Between
60 days and 90 days delinquency” have the same default risk. If all the loans which are less then
90 days delinquent had the same default risk, a borrower would only pay off just before 90 days
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delinquency in order to avoid default and facing derogatory consequences. The fact that the above
three buckets represent different default risk categories imply that the borrower’s default behavior
will change when she/she is between 30 days and 60 days of delinquency compared to the situation
when all the above three categories are bucketed together as ”Non-Default”.
In Table 5.4 the row labels are the predicted classes and the column labels are the actual classes.
As is evident from the Sensitivity and Error , the Multinomial Logistic Model can correctly classify
the Current or ”W0 30D” really well, but the Specificity is really low, i.e., the model cannot
classify the loans that are not in ”W0 30D” correctly vis-a-vis the ”W0 30D” class. Also the error
rates for the classes ”W30 60D”, ”W60 90D” are 100% which means the model cannot identify
any those classes correctly. Similarly, the classes ”W90 120D” and ”B120D” are also identified
very poorly the Multinomial Logistic Model. In fact, some of the risks (Current Note Rate, LTV,
Unemployment Rate, etc.) are misrepresented in Multinomial Logit, e.g., if local Unemployment
increases, the Current Commercial Loan Default should increase (Table 5.2). Lasso and Ridge do
not improve the performance of Multinomial Logit in Table 5.4.2.
1.6 Vanilla Machine Learning Models & Empirical Results
In the current section, we parallelize Random Forest and implement adaptive gradient boosting
after bagging. We finally implement DNN in Section 1.7 and compare the prediction on different
mortgage states on the holdout sample.
1.6.1 Distributed Random Forest
The confusion matrices of the delinquency classes for in-sample/training set are calculated for the
entire data in Table 5.3 and also subsample in Table 5.3 until the December, 2006 for stress testing
the robustness for Out-of Sample Prediction during the Financial crisis in Figure 5.10. As is evi-
dent from the Error in Table 5.4, the Distributed Random Forest Model can correctly classify the
Current or ”W0 30D” completely in Table 5.4. Also the error rates for the classes ”W30 60D”,
”W60 90D” are 98% which means the model cannot identify any those classes correctly but better
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than Multinomial Logit Model. Similarly, the classes ”W90 120D” and ”B120D” are also identi-
fied very poorly but better than the Multinomial Logistic Model in Appendix .3.
As is evident from the Out-of-Sample Errors in Table 5.4, the Distributed Random Forest
Model can correctly classify the Current or ”W0 30D” completely. here the column labels are
the predicted classes and the row labels are the actual classes.Also the error rates for the classes
”W30 60D”, ”W60 90D” are 100% which means the model cannot identify any those classes
any better than Multinomial Logit Model. Similarly, the classes ”W90 120D” and ”B120D” are
also identified very poorly but better than the Multinomial Logistic Model Out-of-Sample. The
Out-of-sample predictions worsen during the Financial Crisis. 16
1.6.2 Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM)
As is evident from the In-Sample Errors in Table 5.4, the Gradient Boosting Machine can
correctly classify the Current or ”W0 30D” completely. Also the error rates for the classes
”W30 60D”, ”W60 90D” are almost 100% which means the model cannot identify those classes
any better than Multinomial Logit Model. Similarly, the classes ”W90 120D” and ”B120D” are
also identified very poorly but better than the Multinomial Logistic Model In-Sample in Figure
5.3. We also attach the Variable Importance for GBM during the using data before Financial Crisis
in Figure 5.10.
Here the column labels are the predicted classes and the row labels are the realized delinquency
classes. The out-of-sample predictions for GBM perform as good as DNN in our preliminary anal-
ysis. This methodology sums the importances over each boosting iteration (see the gbm package
16Along with training a model that classifies accurately in a hold-out sample, one needs to be able to interpret the
model results. Feature importance, the coefficients of linear models, is the crucial tool to identify important features.
Almost all random Forest (RF) routines also provide measures of feature importance via permutation importance.
Permutation importance is obtained by randomly shuffling each predictor variable by estimating the effect on model
accuracy. This technique is model-agnostic because of independence from internal model parameters even while using
Lasso or Ridge regularization in the presence of highly correlated features.
The prediction accuracy on the out-of-bag data is recorded for each tree. Each predictor variable is permuted and
the same routine is repeated. The difference of the two are then averaged across all trees, and further standardized
by the standard error. If the standard error is equal to 0 for a variable, the division is not done. here is the Variable
Importance table 5.10a for the Random Forest Model Khandani, Kim, and Lo 2010a. The Variable Importance for
Out-of-Sample predictions during the Financial Crisis in Figure 5.10 give similar results.
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vignette).4.
1.7 DNN for disentangling Default Incentives
DNN is a form of machine learning with multiple layers that learns multiple levels of represen-
tations for different levels of abstraction Sirignano, Sadhwani, and Giesecke 2016. It captures
associations and discovers regularities within sets of patterns; it is suited for high volume, high
dimensional data. It performs well when the relationships are dynamic or non-linear in Figure 5.2,
when the standard regression models perform very poorly. No assumptions on normality, linearity,
variable independence are needed.
We use a multi-layer feedforward DNN, trained via stochastic gradient descent and tuned by
back-propagation. Each computational node trains a cache of the global model parameters on its
locally available data with asynchronous multi-threading and contributes to the global model via
model averaging across the DNN. We tune both and Optimizer and Model-specific Hyperparame-
ters (described in Appendix .5.2). We use SMOTE technique to reduce class imbalance. According
to Appendix .5.3 17, we use Variable Importance to compare the most significant marginal contri-
butions of the features (described in Appendix ??).
1.7.1 Model Results
We motivate the highly strategic delinquency behavior of the savvy commercial borrowers/ business-
owners from two different angles. We provide evidence from the Trepp data in Figure 5.6a that
from 2012, the number of loans have remained flat but the outstanding balance of loans have
steadily increased until 2016. This could have serious implications. There can only be two pos-
sibilities: if the same loans stay and there is no origination at all, and further if the outstanding
balance is increasing, it means there is serious delinquency in the loans and the servicers are un-
able to secure the payment from the borrower and all these loans could potentially become limbo
17As is clear from the similar counts of the loans of different categories in the in-sample confusion matrix in Table
5.3, we have undersampled the W0 30D class/Current Loans to alleviate the class imbalance problem. The Out-of-
Sample predictions across different delinquency classes are as good as GBM in Table 5.4.
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loans. Figure 5.6b furthers the narrative. From mid-2014, the age of the loans is decreasing and
the time-to-maturity is increasing. This could mean that from mid-2014, there are an equal num-
ber of originations to the number of maturing loans. But the fact that the Outstanding Balance is
increasing in this entire period could only mean that the same loans are getting rolled over to new
contracts, when balloon payments are missed during maturity.
Figure 5.6c clearly shows that LTV (widely used in previous literature and used by most
banks/asset managers for credit risk calculations) is flat throughout the data horizon. The inter-
est rate is decreasing almost monotonically in the data and there seems to be no sensitivity of LTV
to interest rate. This means LTV is probably not the right way to think about credit risk. It could
also be that the commercial borrowers target LTV. They strategically make payments towards their
obligation so that the ratio of ”Book Value of Loan” and the ”Value of the Property” remains rela-
tively stable over time. It would make sense for them to do this as banks/asset managers use LTV
at origination as the primary determinant of creditworthiness of the borrowers. Further, the Con-
temporaneous LTV (CLTV) is used to calculate LGD (Loss given Default or 1-Recovery Rate). So,
CLTV could also be targeted and there is no evidence of voluntary deleveraging from the borrower
inspite of widely changing macro-economic conditions, e.g., interest rate.
Figure 5.6d corroborates that the NOI monotonically increases in the data and the occupancy is
almost 100% in the entire data. So, there may be strategic saving of internal cash flow from income
producing properties. Because of the strictly increasing NOI level, the strategic dominance of NOI
over other factors can have disastrous aggregate macroeconomic consequences. To capture this, we
try different methodologies like vanilla models (Naive Bayes, Multinomial and Ordered Logistic)
and machine learning models (Distributed Random Forest, Gradient Boosting) and finally Deep
Neural Network (DNN) and find that DNN is best positioned to address the above issue and does
capture NOI as the most significant strategic variable from the Variable Importance (VI) tables of
the models. This difference does not stem from sample bias. This is the core reason for our choice
of big data for training all the models. Also, Trepp is the largest provider of CMBS data and hence
the sample is representative of the entire market and does not have any selection bias.
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We normalize Net Operating Income (NOI) as a percentage in the pooled data for loans and
create histograms of relative frquency of the number of loans in different delinquency classes with
respect to the different percentiles of NOI. We see a sheavy support for the relative frequency across
all the delinquency classes at the NOI percentages 5%-7%. We call them dominant NOI buckets.
We show the distribution of different delinquency classes with all the NOI buckets including the
dominant ones (see figure 5.7a). The significant heterogeneity across the delinquency classes and
the highly non-linear effect of NOI towards the strategic choice of the borrower to be in a specific
delinquency class is not bourne out of this diagram. Beyond the above dominant buckets, we
see highly non-linear strategic behavior for commercial mortgage borrowers to choose different
delinquency classes for different buckets of NOI. To visualize this, we zoom in and remove the
dominant buckets and form the rescaled (without dominant NOI bucket masses) relative frequency
histogram across all delinquency classes.
Figure 5.7b highlights the complex relationship that exists between the percentage of loans
across the different delinquency classes ”Within 30 Days”(W0 30D), ”30 Days to 60 Days”(W30 60D),
”60 Days to 90 Days”(W60 90D), ”90 Days to 120 Days”(W90 120D), ”Beyond 120 Days”
(B120D) and the buckets of net operating income (NOI) excluding the dominant NOI buckets,
which can be incentivized by the macro-economy. The sensitivity varies significantly in a highly
non-linear way in both magnitude and sign. There is a U-shaped choice between NOI buckets
37%-45%for the borrowers in the delinquency class W90 120D. This means that when a borrower
is already beyond the default threshold of 90 days, but less than the cutoff of 120 days, they are
incentivized to stay there for a while and time their future payments based on cash flow. Since
these NOI bucktes are higher, the borrowers make some profit from the income generated from the
property, but they still stay at the same delinquency classes and do not pay-off the earlier missed
payments to come back to the Current State (less than 30 days of delinquency). Similarly, the
borrowers in delinquency class B120D choose to be in lower NOI buckets in a non-linear way.
This is because of the lack of net cash flow income for them to be able to pay off the earlier missed
payments. They end up in a vicious cycle of making less money from the property and becoming
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worse off in terms of their creditworthiness. We call them ”limbo” loans as these loans stay in this
state for a while before they are resolved. The sensitivity estimates generated by vanilla models
can misrepresent the influence of risk factors because of naive choice of linear specification. This
can make it difficult to make economic conclusions from the borrower behavior. In our approach,
the relationship is entirely dictated by data, thereby minimizing model misspecification and bias
of the variable estimates.
The accuracy of predictions change dramatically, if NOI is taken out. We also conduct a ro-
bustness check by leaving out each of the strategic variables from the DNN model. When year
and month fixed effects are taken out in Figure 5.9, NOI loses its importance significantly! This
clearly indicates that NOI is not a statistically significant variable by itself. It is used strategically
by borrowers when clustering of macro-economic events happen and when NOI is taken out, the
constraint variable like prepayment penalty clause and voluntary prepayment variable like current
unscheduled pricinpal payment show up higher in the variable importance in Table 5.4 than LTV.
Similarly, when Prepayment Penalties are taken out of the list of variables. When Balloon Payment
constraints are taken out of the list of variables.
The neural networks literature provides us two methods for constructing Variable Importance
(VI) scores, the Garson algorithm, later modified by Goh 1995, and the Olden algorithm Olden,
Joy, and Death 2004. Both algorithms use the network’s connection weights to generate these
importance scores. The Garson algorithm utilizes all weighted connections between the nodes to
estimate VI. Olden’s algorithm, sums the product of the raw connection weights between each
input and output neuron across all hidden neurons. For DNNs, we use a similar but more inter-
pretable method due to Gedeon 1997 which considers the weights in connection to only the first
two hidden layers. For Deep Learning, there is no impact of scaling, because the numbers were
already scaled. hence, the relative importance is the same as the absolute importance in Figure 5.9.
Unlike model-specific approaches, model-agnostic interpretation via VI methods are more flex-
ible. We further investigate model-agnostic methods for quantifying global measures of importance
using three different approaches: 1) PDPs, 2) ICE curves, and 3) permutation Greenwell et al. 2018.
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As is clear from the preliminary analysis, the Net Operating Income (NOI), the Prepayment
Penalty clause and the Balloon Payment triger are significantly high in the variable importance
table 5.4. NOI is even higher than LTV as found in the VI tables for other previous models. This
provides evidence on how these three less statistically significant features contribute much more
towards the classification, via highly non-trivial and non-linear interactions with more statistically
significant variables.
Our DNN Variable Importance table in Figure 5.9 shows that NOI is the key endogenous fea-
ture for understanding strategic delinquency behavior of the commercial mortgage borrowers. We
intend to further investigate how prepayment penalty clause and indicator for balloon payments
co-determine the strategic delinquency behavior along with the NOI using Shapley values by cap-
turing the marginal contributions.
To test the robustness and stability of our DNN, we present the Variable Importance Plots of
Predicted Default Rate from June 2006 to December 2008 with several features in Distributed
Random Forest (DRF) in Figure 5.10a, Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM) in Figure 5.10b and
DNN in Figure 5.10c, trained on data before June 2006 and motivate why we need a highly non-
linear model and also why we allow for high-dimensional interaction among the borrower-specific,
macroeconomic, spatial, vintage effects in the features. Time-to-Maturity, Geographical cross-
correlation, NOI, Appraisal Reduction, Bankruptcy Flag, Property Type, Non-Recoverability, Ap-
praised Value supercede Securitized LTV in the Variable Importance chart for DNN in Figure
5.10c. Morover, Balloon Payment supercedes LTV, corroborating the robustness of our DNN
model. DRF captures non-lineary of the covariates but still ranks LTV much above NOI and other
strategic variables in Figure 5.10a, even after tuning and bagging. GBM is a greedy algorithm and
hence finds more occurances of local minima for LTV and hence ranks LTV higher than NOI in
Figure 5.10b, even after boosting.
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1.8 Conclusion
Using DNN, non-linearities of dependence of the response and interactions among features can
be captured, without specifying the relationships apriori. DNN provides an alternative identifi-
cation strategy, specially when there are no available quasi-natural experiments. Net Operating
Income, Prepayment Penalty Clause, Appraisal Reduction, Non-Recoverability, Bankruptcy Flag,
Liquidity Proceeds, Liquidity Expense and Balloon Payment Indicator co-determine the strategic
delinquency behavior of a commercial mortgage borrower. Loan-to-Value is unable to capture
this Strategic behavior as obviated by the Variable Importance charts since statistical significance
cannot capture the non-linear effect during Financial Crisis. Hyperparameter Tuning during the
implementation of DNN is still an art and not a science. The classification of critical delinquency
states of systems when the agent decisions are endogenous while the data is highly unbalanced
across states can only be captured through DNN.
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CHAPTER 2
COST OF MISALIGNED CARES ACT: OVERCROWDING, SELECTIVE
VERIFICATION AND UNINTENDED RACIAL CONSEQUENCES
I utilize a novel data on proprietary servicer call transcripts to investigate overcrowding of mort-
gage forbearance program (13% with only 1.5% unemployed) contained in the CARES Act. I
document selective verification of unemployment status (financial hardship) by the servicer. I also
discern unintended consequences (disparate impact) of 2.4% for Inbound and 2% for Outbound
communications for African American borrowers (without the servicer having race information)
by the servicer to reduce ex-post risk. My finding sheds light on the poor-targeting of Government
programs (FHA, VA, USDA) during exacerbated income shocks from COVID-19 and estimates a
$5.76 Trillion exposure from plausible non-payment of residential mortgage debt obligations from
forbearance.
2.1 Introduction
”This bill is free money for everyone. Proponents don’t care if you’re fully employed
or own your own house or own your business. ”Free money for everyone,” they cry.
And yet if free money were the answer, if money really grew on trees, why not give
more free money? Why not give it out all the time? Why stop at $600 a person? Why
not $1,000? Why not $2,000?” — Senator Rand Paul (Dec 21, 2020) 1
I allude to the heated debate regarding the amount of relief and the mechanisms of providing
relief in the current socio-political environment, charged with racial tension and unforeseen wrath
of the COVID-19 pandemic. Senator Rand Paul recently derided COVID-19 relief aid that Senate
Leader Mitch McConnell negotiated with the Democrats. President Trump signed the Omnibus
1Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-rand-paul-11608925235
Bill that includes $600 relief per person before the year end. We already know what happened
when money was directly handed out as relief to households and business owners in March 2020.
Chetty et al. 2020 track economic activity at a granular level 2. Using these data, they study
the mechanisms through which COVID-19 affected the economy and conclude that these bailout
money is mostly used as precautionary savings and not spent on consumption, which was the
desired outcome to stimulate the economy.
I investigate the other mechanism of relief provided by the U.S. Government to the real econ-
omy, namely, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (”CARES Act”) and find
that it was no better. I try to tease out the tension between giving away money directly to the
pocket of households Vs providing relief through forbearance, foreclosure moratorium and evic-
tion moratorium. The former exacerbates the budget deficit and the latter seems more targeted and
cost-efficient. I show that it is not the case and the latter leads to more overcrowding by certain
borrowers who don’t need relief, selective verification of financial hardship by the servicer and
unintended racial consequences (disparate impact) for African Americans.
Government intervention has been the mechanism to attenuate large unexpected shocks like
COVID-19 or housing crashes like the 2008 financial catastrophe. I investigate the effectiveness
or lack thereof of such Government interventions selectively applied on Government programs by
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Specifically, I find irrational (opportunistic) behavior
among borrowers with Govt.-backed loans vis-a-vis spatial overcrowding and rational (logical and
conservative) behavior from borrowers with Conventional loans. Conventional borrowers with
lower income and more financial constraints are the hardest hit by the wrath of COVID-19 and
hence apply for forbearance and conventional borrowers with relatively higher income and stable
jobs do not take up forbearance even though they may be affected in the short-term. On the other
hand, the borrowers with Govt-backed loans opportunistically apply for forbearance from almost
all income brackets in Figure 13 and I provide evidence in Figure 14 that some of these borrowers
avail forbearance even though they are not unemployed or have not had any curtailment of income.
2statistics on consumer spending, business revenues, employment rates, and other key indicators disaggregated by
county, industry, and income group in real time using anonymized data from private companies
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Hence, the Govt.-backed loan borrowers spatially overcrowd forbearance applications (see Figure
27). Moreover, I show that servicers are much more lenient towards borrowers with Govt.-backed
loans and stringent with borrowers with Conventional loans by verifying the employment status
thereby scrutinizing the forbearance applications of the latter. The CARES Act and the uniqueness
of the data set allows me to disentangle both of these information asymmetries in the same set up.
Specifically, I use the servicer call transcripts to extract soft information about the borrower and
create a narrative retrieval apparatus via Inbound/Outbound calls 3 capturing the intent of those
communications. For marginal borrowers who have missed a couple of payments and whose loans
are about to become non-performing, I see a significant spike in Foreclosure Moratorium by the end
of March 2020 in Figure 15. In April 2020, the servicers face a crucial choice whether to approve
these marginal borrowers in their forbearance applications or advise them to avail the foreclosure
moratorium. I see that, by May 2020, most of these borrowers have been dissuaded and informed
about their ineligibility (due to adverse delinquency status) by the servicer. This could have serious
implications of a looming housing crisis if there is a massive surge of foreclosure after foreclosure
moratorium ends.
The first few cases of the global COVID-19 pandemic in the United States were diagnosed in
early March 2020. The global COVID-19 pandemic precipitated a growing public health crisis and
necessitated President Trump to sign the CARES Act into law on March 27, 2020. The CARES
Act4 contained numerous fiscal stimulus programs and policy directives designed to aid households
and businesses negatively affected by the government mandated shutdown (business closings) and
social distancing restrictions imposed after March 15, 2020. Of course, there is a lot heterogene-
ity in terms of the implementation of the shutdown orders DLima, Lopez, and Pradhan 2020 and
actual implementation of the mask and social-distancing policies across counties and states, but
these are not the prerogative of this paper. Instead, I investigate the effect of the CARES Act as a
point-in-time Government policy and the implications thereof. In order to protect households from
3Inbound communications are initiated by the borrower and Outbound communications are initiated by the servicer.
The dialogue between the borrower and the servicer is recorded in call transcripts, email exchanges and/or physical
mails.
4For details, check https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s3548.
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unemployment or income curtailment resulting from government ordered business shutdowns, Ti-
tle IV of the CARES Act stipulated a foreclosure moratorium and created a payment forbearance
program for federally-related mortgage loans.5 One important feature of the forbearance program
is that it does not require that borrowers prove financial hardship or be in a delinquency status
before requesting forbearance. Indeed, I show in Tables 18 and 19, that borrowers having per-
forming Govt-backed (PL Gov) loans strategically take advantage of the CARES Act and apply
for forbearance (13.18%) even though they were not unemployed (1.48%) or did not suffer from
major financial hardship (4.73%). After a forbearance application is approved, lenders are prohib-
ited from collecting accrued interest, late fees, convenience fees, or other charges associated with
the missed payments. The Department of Housing and Urban Development clearly demarcated
the rules governing the forbearance program for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans on
April 1, 2020 and because of this I see most Forbearance applications approved on April 9th by
this specific servicer. There is another peak of forbearance applications when the Housing Govern-
ment Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced their forbearance
plans covering conventional mortgages on April 21, 2020. While the CARES Act specifically tar-
gets payment relief to FHA/VA loans and conventional mortgages backed by the GSEs, it does not
clearly indicate/delegate specific rules non-government backed (or private-label) mortgages, which
leads room for interpretation and discretion by the servicer.
The typical forbearance is approved for 6 months (or two consecutive 3 month blocks). The
borrower can choose to preempt the forbearance approval by starting to pay if she regains her
financial status and ability to continually pay from a new job or other source of income. The bor-
rower can also choose to use the 6 months forbearance approval, even if she regains her ability
pay before the end of 6 months. Beyond the first 6 months, the borrower can be granted another
forbearance period of 6 months. The CARES Act stipulates as maximum of one full year from
the time a borrower first applied for forbearance relief. In practice, no servicer would require a
5Section 4022 specifies that lenders must grant a minimum 60-day foreclosure moratorium beginning March 18,
2020 on all Federally backed mortgage loans. The section also requires that lenders create a 180-day forbearance
program for borrowers experiencing direct or indirect financial hardship due to the COVID-19 crisis.
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lumpsum payment afterwards. There will mostly be a partial payment plan after the end of the
forbearance spell (similar to a loan modification or an additional refinance loan). The CARES
Act mandated that the servicer inform at least the Gov-backed borrowers about their eligibility of
availing forbearance if their loans were performing ex-ante. There is a grey area for marginal bor-
rowers who are about to become non-performing in terms of their payment ex-ante. This ambiguity
is the crux of the negative amplified outcome of the misaligned CARES Act. Servicers can choose
to offer Foreclosure Moratorium to marginal borrowers who are not yet formally in foreclosure
and/or bankruptcy proceedings. Servicers can also offer loan modification. This leaves a discre-
tionary room for the servicer. The conflict of interest between the master and special servicer is
well-documented in the real estate finance literature. This incentive incompatibility of the special
servicer with the investor and the issuer can plausibly lead to a surge of foreclosures in the near
future and a vicious cycle thereafter depending on whether the economic recovery is tick-mark
shaped or W-shaped.
In this paper, I analyze the differential impact of the CARES Act forbearance provision that
specifically targeted government backed loans (FHA/VA and GSE mortgages) but not mortgages
originated outside these government agencies. I utilize a novel administrative dataset obtained
from a mortgage servicer that comprises a portfolio of FHA/VA and private-label mortgages. First,
I manually identify a set of keywords for identifying Inbound/Outbound communications and bor-
rower reported unemployment status in Section .6.1 in the Appendix. Because of unique and real-
time nature of this almost-daily administrative transcript of the communication between the bor-
rower and the servicer, I am able to track the borrower-noted unemployment status, which is much
more accurate than the aggregated estimates of unemployment from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Also the reason for these communications and the incentive compatibility between the borrower
and the servicer can be captured from Inbound/Outbound communications. I use these indica-
tor variables in my regression specification. There are several aspects of reporting Unemployment
status via Inbound/Outbound communications. Also, Inbound/Outbound communications can take
place due to different reasons. I do not distinguish these different aspects of Unemployment Sta-
29
tus, Inbound/Outbound communications in the regression specification as it would require big data
for exploiting such a rich specification. Also, I use logistic regression for number of forbearance
applications on several variables including but not limited to Inbound/Outbound communications
and borrower reported unemployment status, which is a linear model and hence cannot capture the
non-linearity of the different aspects of these indicator variables and their interactions. Instead, I
bring to bear an application of natural language processing (NLP) technology in order to identify
whether the borrower or servicer initiated the forbearance process. I also identify whether the bor-
rower indicated financial distress (e.g. job loss) as a motivating factor in requesting forbearance.
To the best of my knowledge, the use of transcripts of communications between the servicer and
borrowers to identify requests for forbearance and financial distress has not been pursued before in
academia. In contrast, typical studies in the mortgage literature that examine mortgage default of
modification rely on datasets derived from servicer records containing hard coded data Agarwal,
Chang, and Yavas 2012 and Mayer et al. 2014. In other words, access to servicer-borrower com-
munications is not available in most mortgage performance data. As a result, my study provides
a unique insight into the initial process of requesting mortgage payment relief that has heretofore
been unavailable to researchers.
In line with the design of the CARES Act forbearance program, there is a higher incidence of
forbearance with government backed loans in response to communication initiated by the servicer
(denoted as ”outbound”). The CARES Act required that servicers proactively reach out to borrow-
ers with details about the forbearance program. The Act leaves a grey area and does not stipulate
that servicer proactively contact private-label or non-government back loans. A positive increase
in forbearance in the private label set follows from a borrower initiated (denoted as ”inbound”)
communication. Unlike government-backed mortgages, the servicer is able to demand that the
borrower prove financial hardship before granting forbearance for Non-Gov borrowers. Conse-
quently, I find a lower incidence of forbearance within this set of loans following communication
with the servicer. The endogeneity from the strategic overcrowding of forbearance applications
by Gov-backed performing loan borrowers and the endogeneity emanating from selective verifi-
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cation by the servicer undo the CARES Act. To overcome these endogeneity issues, I implement
Differences-in-Differences approach towards the end of the paper. However, the CARES Act does
help some financially constrained borrowers and, at the same time, does not bail out the servicers.
Based on the available data, I find evidence for the following research questions. I formulate
them as conjectures/claims which undoes the CARES Act (not technically hypotheses, as I am not
rejecting the null) and corroborate them using logistic regression with and without fixed effects
and Differences-in-Differences approaches (for alleviating endogeneity concerns) in the following
sections of the paper.
Proposition 1: Borrowers having Gov-backed performing loans are overcrowding forbearance
applications, even if they are not unemployed/have any financial hardship from curtailment of
income.
Proposition 2: Servicers selectively verify the employment status of Non-Gov loan borrowers
and dissuade marginal borrowers by offering loan modification and/or foreclosure moratorium, to
preempt/prevent them from availing forbearance.
Proposition 3: Servicers’ behavior have unintended distributional implications towards
African American and Hispanic borrowers, their forbearance applications are accepted only in
dire financial conditions.
Proposition 4: Poorly-targeted CARES Act helped some borrowers and did not bail out ser-
vicers; still some borrowers overcrowded and some servicers prevented certain borrowers from
availing forbearance.
There has been a plethora of research following the inception of the CARES Act. An et al.
2020 provide evidence that lower-income and minority borrowers have relatively higher nonpay-
ment rates during the COVID-19 pandemic. McManus and Yannopoulos 2021 find mortgage for-
bearance in the COVID-19 period are similar to those during natural disaster. CoibionGorod-
nichenkoWeber study the impact of large one-time transfers to individuals from the CARES Act
on the consumption, saving and labor-supply decisions. Carroll et al. 2020 model responses of
households to past consumption stimulus packages and find, during the lockdown, most types of
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spending are undesirable and/or impossible. They also opine the jobs lost during the lockdown
may be permanently gone. Humphries, Neilson, and Ulyssea 2020 document how COVID-19 im-
pacted small business owners and how these effects have evolved since CARES Act. Boar and
Mongey 2020 documented that many unemployed workers received benefits that exceeded wages.
Akee et al. 2020 dissect the US Department of the Treasurys distribution of first-round CARES Act
funds to Indian Country in terms of relief funds. Petrosky-Nadeau 2020 investigate the existence a
reservation level of payments in which an individual is indifferent between accepting and refusing
an offer under the increased unemployment insurance and extended duration of relief provided by
the CARES Act. Neilson, Humphries, and Ulyssea 2020 explore information frictions and the
”first-come, first-served” design of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Baker and Judge 2020
explore the counterfactual where critical forgivable loan program by the government and find this
debt relief alone will not provide the cash they need to retain employees, pay timely rent, etc.
Wilson and Stimpson 2020 claim that the adverse policy environment has made immigrant com-
munities particularly vulnerable to community spread of COVID-19. Capponi, JIA, and Rios 2020
show the existence of a self-reinforcing feedback loop between foreclosures and growth in house
prices.
Racial implications in Real Estate Literature have been studied from various perspectives in
Cashin 2008, Bayer, Ferreira, and Ross 2016, Denton 2017, Spalding 2008, Jackson 1980, Pace,
Barry, and Sirmans 1998, Schafran and Wegmann 2012. To the best of my knowledge, the unin-
tended racial implications of selective verification of the unemployment status (financial hardship)
has not been studied previously in this literature.
2.2 Data
I utilize a proprietary administrative dataset containing detailed information on residential mort-
gage performance that was collected from daily mortgage servicing logs.6 The data consists of the
servicing records spanning the period from January to May 2020 for 19,418 loans that were active
6This dataset was provided by a private equity firm that focuses on real estate investments.
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as of January 2020. The data contains a rich set of variables that provide information about the bor-
rowers and their loans. For example, the data records the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) at origination,
the loan’s current interest rate, balance and appraisal, whether the loan is a fixed-rate or adjustable-
rate mortgage, the loan purpose (cash out refinance, home improvement, rate-term/vanilla refi-
nance, or purchase), the property type (modular home, single family, multi-family, condominium,
townhouse, or planned unit development (PUD)) and occupancy status (owner-occupied, second
home, or investment property), the borrower’s credit (FICO) score at origination, loan modification
flag, and amount of any corporate advances paid by the servicer on behalf of the borrower.7 For
a subset of the data, I have the employment industry (mostly Small and Medium Enterprise for
the borrowers in this portfolio) and credit tradeline information, which provides a proxy for the
household liability (mortgage, credit card, auto loan, student loan, etc.).
As typical in mortgage servicing data, my dataset contains detailed hard information on each
loan’s payment status. Using this information, I define loans as being performing (PL) or non-
performing (NPL). I classify loans as performing if their payments are less than 60-days delinquent
and non-performing if payments are 60-days or more delinquent. The data indicates whether the
loan was originated as part of a federal government-backed insurance program (Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration (VA), or US Department of Agriculture (USDA))
or if the loan was originated as a conventional or non-conforming mortgage.8
In addition to the typical information collected from mortgage servicing tapes used in prior
7The borrower makes monthly payments comprising principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI). The TI part is
usually put into an escrow account. The servicer then draws down that escrow account to pay the taxes and insurance
premium on behalf of the borrower. That account can typically hold up to 2-yrs of TI funds. The servicer can earn
a float on those funds. There is a separate reserve fund set-up where the servicer deposits part of the PI to hold in
reserve in case the borrower misses a payment. This reserve is funded out of the monthly servicing fee that the servicer
deducts from the PI before passing it to the investor.
Corporate advances are expenses paid by the servicer and recoverable from the borrower. Typical corporate advances
include attorney or court fees associated with a foreclosure or required insurance premiums paid on behalf of the
borrower. The servicer passes all these costs through to the investor. Each month, the advances they make are netted
out of the remittance that goes to the investor. If the pool doesn’t generate enough cash to cover the advances (rare),
then the investor has to write a check to cover the advances. On a particular loan, advances balances get paid down
from the cash that comes in – either if the borrower makes a payment or the loan liquidates when the borrower is
delinquent and there are advance balances which get paid down first before any cash is applied to PI.
8Conventional mortgages refer to loans eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac while non-conforming
refers to jumbo mortgages or subprime mortgages that are not eligible for purchase by the government sponsored
enterprises (GSEs).
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studies e.g. Cordell et al. 2015; Agarwal et al. 2018; Buchak et al. 2018; Kruger 2018; Conklin
et al. 2019, the unique feature of this dataset is that it contains transcripts documenting the commu-
nication between the borrowers and the servicer call centers. These transcripts contain real-time
(almost daily) loan status updates and thus provide a preview of the loan status variables contained
in typical mortgage servicing records. Thus, using these servicer comments, I create a time series
of several important indicator variables to capture the borrower’s payment intention or financial
stress. For example, I search the transcripts for the keywords “COVID” and “forbearance” to iden-
tify if and when a borrower had a conversation with the servicer regarding forbearance options
emanating from CARES Act (enacted in March 2020).9 To capture financial stress arising from
plausible employment interruption, I use natural language processing (NLP) techniques to identify
whether a borrower is unemployed in Appendix .6.1. I also identify borrowers who are experi-
encing income disruption via the keywords “curtailment of income”. This is a stronger indicator
than unemployment for a COVID based forbearance application and, more importantly, is a proxy
for the borrower’s inability to pay. I also scan for the words “foreclosure” and “moratorium” to
identify borrowers who are currently in a foreclosure moratorium status, a relief channel for non-
performing loans. Finally, I identify whether the servicer comments originated with the borrower
(inbound) or from the servicer (outbound), detailed in Appendix .6.1. My regression specification
is very rich and I use Forbearance Applications as my dependent variable and Inbound/Outbound
Communications and Borrower noted Unemployment as explanatory variables. However, I do
not use interactions of Borrower noted Unemployment and Inbound/Outbound Communications
in the regression specification. Similarly, there are several aspects of Inbound/Outbound Com-
munications which captur the rationale and the incentives of those communications. I showcase
these details via NLP separately instead of directly invoking them in the regression. I provide
the t-SNE diagrams10, which are 2-dimensional projections of word clouds similar to the words
9See the Appendix for a complete list of key words used to denote various aspects of the mortgage servicing calls.
10t-SNE is a non-linerar algorithm for visualizing high-dimensional data van der Maaten and Hinton 2008, via
two-dimensional maps, a faithful representation of those points in a lower-dimensional space. Secondly, t-SNE has a
tuneable parameter, perplexity, which tracks the balance between local and global components of data, in a sense, ”a
guesstimate” about the number of close neighbors each point has.
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”Unemployed”, ”Inbound” (IB) and ”Outbound” (OB) in Figure 16. The strategic element of the
forbearance applications is higher for the inbound comments. The creation of these flags (dum-
mies) is uniquely able to determine the delinquency status of the borrower and her propensity to
apply for forbearance.
As evident in Figure 16, there are several clusters in the t-SNE, which necessitates a deeper
dive into interaction of unemployment with IB in Figure 17, unemployment with OB in Figure
18 and unemployment per se (without IB and OB) in Figure 19. In Figure 16, one can notice 4
clusters. On the South-East corner, words related to ”ob” (in violet) which are not so much related
to unemployment per se but continual renegotiation between the borrower and the servicer. On the
North-East corner, the cluster represents words related to ”ib” and ”inbound” (in sea-green) where
the borrower seems to be making the case for loan modification and other offers that they can avail
from the servicer. In the North-West corner, the two subclusters are entangled, one of them high-
lights the occupancy and related issues emanating from unemployment and the other specifically
relates curtailment of income with the intent of the borrower. The use of these keywords in defining
the ”Unemployment”, ”Inbound” and ”Outbound” flags (dummy variables) helps me tease out the
tension among these aspects of borrower and servicer behavior, which have not been explored pre-
viously in academia, to the best of my knowledge. Figure 17 details 3 of the 4 clusters in Figure 16
on the facets of ”Inbound” and ”Unemployment”. The partial adjustment and payment disputes in
the North-East corner point out aspects of financial hardship and renegotiation related to Inbound
calls from the borrower. The other entangled cluster captures several borrower aspects related to
intent and servicer response to offer the borrower more favorable terms for the loans. The refusal
of forbearance for certain borrowers is also captured in the South-West corner of Figure 17. Fig-
ure 18 captures the selective verification of the unemployment status of certain borrowers by the
servicer. The southern part of Figure 18 underscores the typical outbound conversations related to
borrower financial health and dire personal circumstances and the ensuing renegotiations. Finally,
Figure 19 encapsulates all words related to ”Unemployement” in a giant cluster.
I also find clear indications of multiple facets of IB and OB which can capture the reason for
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the communication between the borrower and the servicer and also their incentive compatibility.
I create 3 sub-clusters of IB t-SNE for: (1) IB and Financial Hardship in Figure 20, (2) IB and
Family, Property, Loss in Figure 21, (3) IB and Legal Issues in Figure 22. In the same chain
of thought, I create 3 sub-clusters of OB t-SNE for: (1) OB and Loan Modification in Figure
23, (2) OB and COVID in Figure 24, (3) OB and Legal Issues in Figure 25. Figure 20 captures
several aspects of the Inbound communications related to financial hardship, e.g., liquidating Vs
keeping property by the borrower, change in owner occupancy due to employment transfer and
distance of the property from the new job, inability to sell the property, borrower illness, etc.
Not all of the above are verified for borrowers with Gov-backed loans and hence this category of
Inbound communications heavily contributes towards the opportunistic/strategic elements of bor-
rower forbearance applications. Figure 21 points out Inbound communications related to marital
matters like marriage/divorce/death of spouse, excessive obligations, casualty loss, etc. Figure 22
is more comprehensive and nuanced to the legal aspects of Inbound communications, e.g., prior
bankruptcy, ownership transfer, business failure, leniency from military service, non-payment by
the tenant, payment disputes, etc. Figure 23 captures the keywords related to selective verification
by the servicer, e.g., decline, payment dispute, disposition, suspense, reapply, ineligible, denial,
flag, intermittent, etc. Figure 24 directly captures Outbound communications related to COVID-
19 and as one can see there are not many words related to forbearance, since the servicers approve
forbearance applications from the borrowers who fall under the purview of the CARES Act and
try to dissuade other borrowers when the borrowers initiate conversations related to forbearance
and/or foreclosure moratorium. Figure 25 details the Outbound communications related to the
specific servicer attributes such as performance, borrower indication, involuntary, representation,
temporary, title, signal, silence, commitment, satisfaction, judicial, document, identification, etc.
Table 18 reports the descriptive statistics for the mortgages as of the April 2020 servicer re-
porting date. Panel A summarizes the statistics for all loans while Panels B and C summarize the
data based on whether the mortgages are government-back loans (Panel B) or non-government pro-
gram loans (Panel C). The average loan had an origination amount of approximately $96,700 on
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a property with an appraised value of approximately $120,000. The average loan-to-value ratio at
origination was approximately 80%. Since the data consists of first-mortgages, second mortgages,
and home-equity loans/lines of credit, the average loan amount is lower than samples comprising
exclusively first-mortgages. The mean borrower credit score at origination was 613, reflecting
the higher proportion of subprime borrowers in the portfolio (65% of the sample). Panels B and
C reveal significant differences in the government (FHA/VA) and conventional (non-government)
loans. For example, FHA/VA mortgages had higher origination loan-to-vale ratios than conven-
tional loans (96% versus 72%) and higher average current balances ($122,308 versus $56,648,
respectively). The geographic distribution FHA/VA loans in the dataset in Figure 26 is consis-
tent with the distribution of FHA market shares reported in Ambrose and Pennington-Cross 2000
and Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer 2002. Across all loans in the sample in Panel A, the
call center logs indicate that 7% of the loans were flagged for a Covid-19 related forbearance. In
addition, approximately 3% of the borrowers indicated an employment problem and 5% reported
having a serious income issue (curtailment of income). During April, 29% of all borrowers were
contacted by the servicer (outbound) while 22% of the borrowers initiated contact with the servicer
(inbound). Panel B reveals significant differences in call center activity for government and non-
government loans. I see that 42% of government loan borrowers experienced a call center initiated
contact (outbound) with the servicer and 32% initiated (inbound) contact with the servicer. In con-
trast, 23% of the non-government borrowers experienced a call center initiated contact and 17%
initiated a contact with the servicer. Consistent with the FHA being more aggressive and faster
in responding to the Covid-19 crisis, I see that 11% of these borrowers had a Covid-19 related
discussion with the servicer as compared to 4% of the non-government loan borrowers.
Table 19 goes one step further on Panels B and C in Table 18, by creating separate buckets
form Performing (PL) and Non-Perfoming (NPL) loans among Govt-backed (Gov) and Non-Gov-
backed (Non-Gov) loans. In Panel A, PL and Gov is highest group applying for COVID-19 com-
pared to unemployed borrowers in the group. Number of incoming calls is also very high for this
group. For Gov-backed PL loans, COVID-19 Forbearance applicants (13.18%) is much higher
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than unemployed (1.48%) and Curtailment of Income (4.7%). So, at least 8% of these borrowers
are definitely strategic. The number of Inbound calls is also much higher for Gov-backed loans,
leading to the possibility of strategic behavior. The original LTV is much higher for Gov-backed
PL loans, still the current mortgage rate for Gov-backed loans is much lower and their FICO
scores are relatively higher. In Panel B, PL and Non-Gov still has higher COVID-19 Forbearance
applicants than the number of unemployed borrowers in the same group, but much less than PL
and Gov, although their current delinquency status is much better. For Non-Gov PL loans, only
the unemployed borrowers are applying for COVID-19 Forbearance. This happens to be same
as Curtailment of income, which means the only source of income for these borrowers is from
employment. In Panel C, NPL and Gov takes advantage of Foreclosure Moratorium, as they are
mostly ineligible for Forbearance applications. DLQ for NLP is 4 .37 (in Panel C) and 4.39 (in
Panel D), meaning 120+ day delinquent, hence they are ineligible for Forbearance. The servicer
may be letting the borrower know their ineligibility for Forbearance since the servicer has corpo-
rate advances in place. In particular, the servicer increases their call volume and frequency for
NPL non-GOV cases since corporate advances are the highest in that bucket.
The spatial distribution of key variables in this paper provide stronger evidence of the strategic
behavior of borrowers in PL Gov group. There are plenty of Non-Gov loans in Las Vegas in
Figure 26 depicted by yellow color and Las Vegas was one of the major fatalities of the COVID-19
pandemic as the entire state runs on gambling and tourism revenue which were shut down abruptly.
However, the forbearance applications of residents of Las Vegas were overcrowded (in Figure 27)
by residents from the northern mountain states who arguably were affected much less severely
by the first major hit of the COVID-19 during March - April. The geographical distribution of
the curtailment of income in Figure 28 also paints a similar picture in April 2020 data, where the
residents of only a few pockets were facing severe financial hardship, but forbearance applications
were rampant from all over the United States by the opportunistic/strategic PL Gov borrowers.
The distribution of Inbound calls and Outbound Calls provide preliminary evidence of strategic
behavior by the borrowers and the selective verification by the servicer respectively in my data.
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2.3 Servicer Perspective and Institutional details
If the forbearance is extended for another 3 months after June 2020, this could have serious cash
flow implications for the investor (bond-holder). This is crucial since after 4 months of Forbear-
ance, the servicer is not required to make any advances to the investor. So, essentially, after 4
months, the investors would have to take the hit, if the borrower decides to be delinquent and not
make timely payments after 6 months of Forbearance. It is a high Cash flow risk whose downside
is not protected. If the borrower was 2 payments down or in foreclosure, they are still being re-
ported to the Credit Bureau as 2 payments down or in foreclosure, and they cannot refinance until
they become current. They would qualify to be considered for a modification. From the servicer’s
perspective, all of the non-government insured loans will need to demonstrate that they have been
impacted by the pandemic (i.e. borrowers are unemployed). The purpose of the loan does not avid
the CARES Act. Certain loans would not be covered, such as second homes and second liens.
However, second liens undergo an analysis on whether there is enough equity to initiate foreclo-
sure, and second homes would require full workout submissions. All of this is somewhat moot
since there most states have moratoriums on referral to foreclosure, foreclosure sale, and eviction
(excluding vacant properties).
Another key question for Non-Gov loans (e.g., Conventional Loans) in this portfolio is if the
servicer is indifferent to the outcome: Foreclosure Vs Forbearance, since the advancing costs are
taken care of by the investor. It is fair to say the the servicer has no exposure to either PI (princi-
pal interest) advances or corporate advances once the loans are acquired by the PE firm (provider
of this data). On the government portfolio, the guarantors (HUD, VA and USDA) have insisted
on forbearance being a preferred decision before foreclosure. On the conventional portfolios, al-
though there is no guarantor dictating decision paths, the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau), the CARES Act, and many states (such as NY and CA) do provide regulatory guidance
over offering workout opportunities (forbearance) over foreclosure. They also indicate that the
borrower owns certain responsibilities in requesting that help that is more expansive then what the
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GSEs require, which has allowed the servicer to be more insistent on documentation of financial
hardship instead of wanting to take time off from making payments. The servicer does insist on
documentation of a lost income rather than a just a phone call request for a forebearance plan.
Also, from a business perspective, the servicer earns service fee income on both a loan in fore-
closure or on forbearance, so the servicer is indifferent on the path based on similar income and
similar expenses. However, if they can ultimately cure the default with a forbearance that turns into
a modification, then the servicer would prefer that solution, i.e., they will ultimately make more
income. The servicer would also incur additional staffing costs for loans that go through the Fore-
closure/REO process than a loan that goes through the forbearance reinstatement process, again
slightly favoring the forbearance, where the servicer will ultimately incur less staffing expenses.
Related to the above aspects, how the servicer is incentivized/contracted may lead to making
more financial gains in one choice Vs the other. Of course, the servicer has to consider the local
jurisdictions/rules in place for offering loss mitigation options before starting foreclosure. This
becomes crucial, since 70-75% of the borrowers who had applied for Forbearance are extending
their non-Payment from being in Forbearance. So, there is a clear choice to be made by the servicer
for Non-Gov loans (which are not directly under the purview of the CARES Act). The incentives
of the servicer for Foreclosure Vs Forbearance paths from being a performing loan, need not be
aligned with the interest of the PE firm acquiring these loans. Although the guarantors have no
authority over the PE firm portfolio, the government and state agencies/regulators do, and their
preference leans towards the borrower (voter). The servicer is definitely risk adverse with picking
a fight with a regulator. Even if a request for an extended forbearance is denied, there is a limit
to moving forward with the foreclosure process. Properties that are vacant can usually proceed
with foreclosure (referral or sale), but not in all states, and in some counties, the Courts have not
reopened to allow movement.
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2.4 Univariate Analysis & Empirical Model Specification
The comparison of differences in Covid-19 forbearance responses and call center activity across
various loan types is captured in Table 2, which shows that significant differences exist between
performing and non-performing loans for government-back and non-government back mortgages.
Government-backed performing loans (columns 2-4), had approximately the same rate of in-bound
and out-bound communication (15% versus 17%) and for the non-performing government-backed
loans, outbound rate (51%) is significantly higher versus inbound (29%). The difference is not sur-
prising since servicers are required to attempt to contact borrowers who have missed monthly pay-
ments in an effort to mitigate potential losses associated with default. It is interesting to note that
only 9% of non-performing borrower communications mention Covid-19 forbearance relief in con-
trast to the 13% rate observed in performing borrowers. I also find several interesting insights from
Columns (5) through (7) that compare performing and non-performing non-government loans.
First, similar to the government loans, I see that outbound communication is significantly higher
in the non-performing set than in the performing set (54% vs 10%). Again, this is to be ex-
pected since non-performing loans require direct servicer intervention whereas servicers typically
respond to borrower requests for some action in the performing loan group. In comparing the
differences between government and non-government mortgage portfolios, I see that borrowers
with performing loans in the FHA/VA and conventional portfolios have approximately the same
unemployment indicator, which is again consistent with borrowers who are current on their mort-
gage payments having low employment problems. However, the Covid-19 forbearance rates are
significantly higher in the government backed loan group than in the non-government portfolio.
Thus, given that employment issues are roughly equal between government and non-government
borrowers, the higher Covid-19 forbearance rates in the government portfolio is evidence of strate-
gic forbearance requests coming from the borrowers who are current on their government insured
mortgages.
I test for evidence of strategic forbearance, controlling for differences across borrowers and
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mortgages, with the following logistic regression framework:
Pr(Fi) = Φ(δ1IBi + δ2OBi + δ3Gi + δ4Pi + δ5IBi ×Gi
+δ6OBi ×Gi + δ7IBi ×Gi + δ8OBi × Pi + γU ′i +X ′iβ + κc) (2.1)
The parameters δ1 through δ8 are the primary coefficients of interest and capture the differential
effects on the probability of the borrower entering forbearance based on whether the borrower (δ1)
or servicer (δ2) initiated contact during April 2020. The interaction terms (δ5 through δ8) thus
capture the differential servicer incentive effects based on the type of loan (government insured or
non-government) and the loan payment status (performing versus non-performing).
2.5 Multivariate Analysis
Table 20 reports the regression results for early forbearance. Columns (1) and (2) report the results
for all loans with and without county fixed effects, respectively. Not surprisingly, the positive and
statistically coefficients (at the 1% level) in all columns 1-4 in Table 20 for inbound and outbound
confirm that the probability of forbearance increases with any communication with the servicer,
whether initiated by the borrower or servicer. This is to be expected since forbearance requires an
active request on the part of the borrower and thus necessitates communication with the servicer.
The estimated coefficients for inbound and outbound in my preferred specification that includes
county fixed effects (column 2) reveal that the probability of forbearance is essentially the same
regardless of whether the servicer or borrower initiated the contact.
Turning to the differential between FHA/VA in column (3) or private-label mortgages in col-
umn (4), the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant indicating no difference in the in-
cidence of requesting forbearance between these borrower groups (all else being equal). However,
it is interesting to see that the coefficient for the variable indicating whether the loan is currently
performing is also not statistically significant. Thus, I do not find evidence that borrowers who
were already in financial difficulty and were delinquent on their loan prior to the pandemic are
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taking advantage of the forbearance option. In fact, the interaction of inbound with performing
is statistically significant and indicates that requests for forbearance are most likely arising from
borrowers who were current on their loans at the onset of the pandemic.
Columns 1-2 in Table 20 show that Inbound calls for Performing loans (IB PL) is positive and
significant with and without county fixed effects. Same is true for Outbound Calls for Performing
Loans (OB PL) in Columns 1-2. Essentially, both the borrower and the servicer makes more
communications if the loan is performing. I test this with triple interaction too and find the same
results as a robustness check. IB PL is insignificant in Gov-only case in Column 3, since there
borrowers get Forbearance by default from CARES Act. In the Non-Gov case, however, IB PL is
significant in Column 4, i.e., the borrowers have to actively communicate with the servicer to apply
and be considered for forbearance. Similarly for OB PL, columns 1-2 are significant. For Gov-
only loans, OB PL is significant as the servicer has to let the borrower know about the availability
of forbearance option and have to ask the borrower if they want to enjoy the benefits delaying the
payments in the future via forbearance. The servicers also respond to the borrower inquisitions
in the situation where the borrower initiates the forbearance conversation. For Non-Gov loans,
OB PL is insignificant, however, I feel that this behavior can also be strategic/selective from the
servicer’s perspective based on the loan-type, i.e., Cash-Out Refinance or Purchase only loans.
Cash-out loans comprise of almost all of the PL foreberance cases for non-Gov loans - 409 out of
461 in April 2020. This is why I separate the sample to only cash-out and no-cash-out in Table
21. IB GOV and OB GOV are insignificant without the interaction with the delinquency status of
the loans. Curtailment of Income is an important determinant of Forbearance applications for the
Liquidity-constrained borrowers. Unemployment Status per se is not as good of an indicator for
Forbearance like Curtailment of Income.
Cash Out loans in this PE firm portfolio are distressed loans, which they bought at a significant
discount in 2017. No promissory notes are attached to these Cash Out loans. These borrowers have
lower FICO scores and are subprime. But from the time, they were acquired by the PE firm, they
have mostly remained performing loans. Because the cash-out loans were bought at such discount
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and they comprise of subprime borrowers which mostly have been making payments, the focus
has been less on re-couping corporate advances, since the servicer and the PE firm both share
the profit in a liquidation/exit event. Because most Cash Out loans are non-Gov, the borrowers
have to provide evidence to the servicer to get Forbearance approved. This is corroborated by
positive significance of IB PL. Both the OB PL and OB GOV are positive significant, indicating
the servicer calls are significant for GOV PL borrower. On the other hand, the borrower calls
significant when they have GOV loan.
Both the IB GOV and IB PL are positive but insignificant in Columns 2-4 with County fixed
effects. This means, the borrower makes less calls when they have GOV and PL, as they are provi-
sioned for forbearance under the CARES Act. OB PL is positive significant in Column 2-3, since
servicer makes mandatory calls in GOV loan case if the Borrower is PL. OB PL is negative highly
significant for Non-Gov loans (which are not Cash-Out), i.e., the servicer makes more calls for
non-GOV borrowers to let them know they have to verify their unemployment status and financial
hardship, otherwise they are ineligible for forbearance. For Govt.-backed loans, the CARES act
legally binds the servicer to approve those borrowers and continue making advances. The servicer
is legally obliged to advance for 4 months into Forbearance. From the data, I find that 70-75%
are extending Forbearance. Hence, the servicer will have no incentive to reject Forbearance exten-
sions as they have no skin in the game beyond 1 more month (first Forbearance was approved for
3 months).
2.6 Race Implications of Forbearance
I find evidence that African American borrowers have been able to avail the leniency from for-
bearance, but much less than the white borrowers. This is especially important in the current
socio-economic and political climate charged with racial tension. The servicers have sophisticated
Machine Learning models to profile the borrowers and hence, even without the race information,
the Machine Learning models uncover structural relationships among Loan performance variables
and/or triangulate from otherwise excluded characteristics Fuster et al. 2017, implying plausible
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statistical discrimination. However, the servicer do not have the race information per se and it
is difficult, if not impossible to impute the race (or ethnicity) from the name of the borrower. 11
I argue that I demonstrate evidence of disparate impact and not disparate treatment. This still
has a serious social cost and creates divide and inequality in the current socio-political and racially
charged environment, exacerbated by the unforeseen pandemic ensuing from the novel COVID-19.
Among both conventional and FHA performing loans, the percentage of Inbound Forbearance
applications is higher for White borrowers compared to the African American (henceforth Black)
borrowers, by (53.5% − 29.41%) ' 24% and (50.47% − 48.10%) ' 2.4% respectively in Figure
29 and Table 30. Among both conventional and FHA performing loans, the percentage of Out-
bound Forbearance applications is higher for White borrowers compared to the African American
(henceforth Black) borrowers, by (40.54.5% − 27.78%) ' 13% and (45.00% − 43.18%) ' 2%
respectively in Figure 31 and Table 32. NPL loans do not mostly fall under the purview of for-
bearance and can be considered for foreclosure moratorium or loan modification depending on the
loan balance and borrower past behavior.
I test the above observation in the model in Table 22, I add an indicator whether a borrower
is Black (African American) and interact the dummy variable with IB, OB, IB PL and OB PL to
make further inferences beyond Table 21. Firstly, for Non-Gov Black borrowers, there is a huge
negative significance towards forbearance, with and without county fixed effect in Table 22. This
clearly shows, all else equal, Black borrowers are prevented (unintentionally dissuaded from the
race perspective) against availing forbearance applications because of adverse loan performance
behavior, since the servicer does not have the race information of the borrowers. Also, for Non-
Gov Black borrowers, IB PL Black is positive and significant with no fixed effects. With county
fixed effects, the result is also economically significant, however the statistical significance is not
bourne out in the county fixed effect due to small sample size when grouped by county.
11I am undertaking a new project in 2021 where I will obtain the confidential and proprietary audio files of some
of these communications between some of these borrowers and the servicer legal representatives. The accent, tonal
quality, emotional content, responsiveness, co-operation, willingness to negotiate, etc. can be captured in that paper.
The idea is to design a mechanism through borrower responsiveness and co-operation, which is stricter than a carrot
but more lenient than a stick.
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OB PL is still negative for Non-Gov loans with race in the specification, providing robustness
of the selective behavior by the servicer, as detailed in the previous section Table 21. OB Black
for Non-Gov loans is highly positive and significant, with and without county fixed effects. This
implies the servicers verify the Unemployment status or financial hardship for Black borrowers
and then and then only are those Black borrowers are approved on their forbearance applications.
OB PL Black is negative and significant without county fixed effects, which means Black borrow-
ers who have performing loans are dissuaded by the servicers with their forbearance applications.
Typically a borrower who has a performing loan ex-ante should not be in financial distress ex-
ante. Essentially, the servicer is trying to reduce the ex-post risk for Black borrowers. If the Black
borrowers are really in financial distress, they need to provide hard evidence to get their forbear-
ance approved. On the flip side, these borrowers are not encouraged by the servicer to apply for
forbearance and are mostly pre-empted by adding an income verification clause.
In it important to point out some nuances of columns (5), (6) in Table 22. Column (5) is without
county fixed effect and I see warnings that some fitted probabilities of forbearance are numerically
0 or 1. This implies perfect predictability for a whole lot of people, specially in counties from
which I have lower number of loans and hence lower forbearance application rates. This is plau-
sibly related to the commonalities in a small county, i.e., if one person applies for forbearance,
there everyone in the vicinity also does and vice versa. Also, the supply chains in smaller coun-
ties are heavily affected by the economic activities from big cities, which are mostly coastal in
USA and hence affect heavily by COVID-19. The African American community amplifies these
small county commonalities further more and hence their behavior is uniform and predictable from
the same county. Also, smaller counties presumably have fewer industries and fewer number of
jobs available, which skews the forbearance application behavior one way or the other. This is
the reason, I evaluate forbearance rate with county fixed effect in column (6). This enables me to
observe forbearance application and acceptance for African American people across county level
heterogeneity, before and after CARES Act.
46
2.7 Diff-in-Diff for Borrower & Servicer behaviors
To address the endogeneity concerns from the strategic overcrowding of forbearance applications
by Gov-backed performing loan borrowers and the endogeneity emanating from selective verifica-
tion by the servicer, I use Difference-in-Differences approach. The treatment group comprises of
the Govt.-backed loans and the control group contains the Conventional/Private Label Non-Govt.
backed loans. The treatment time is end of March 2020, when the effect of CARES Act is internal-
ized. In Table 23, the first variable is the interaction between treatment group and treatment time.
In all columns (1)-(6), the interaction is statistically significant, implying significant causal impact
of CARES Act on the treatment group. This clearly addresses the endogeneity concerns.
Columns (1) (without county fixed effect) and (2) (with county fixed effect) in Table 23 capture
the Diff-in-Diff estimates for all loans, controlling for Inbound/Outbound calls and their interac-
tions with Performing Loans and Gov dummies. The unique feature of this specification is the
real-time ”Borrower Noted Unemployment” and ”Borrower Noted Income Curtailment” which
gives me a unique chance to capture the borrower financial health. The strong positive significance
of the interaction term provides evidence of the average positive treatment effect on the treated.
Then I delve deeper to confirm the narrative of the paper. In columns (3) and (4), I explore the
Diff-in-Diff approach to capture the strategic forbearance applications of the borrowers from their
Inbound communications. The volume of Inbound communications after CARES Act increases
the likelihood of forbearance applications. This overcrowds several worthy borrowers who really
need the forbearance because of their financial hardship, e.g., borrowers in Las Vegas who are
heavily impacted by the shutdown of the gaming industry cannot all avail forbearance, whereas,
borrowers in mountain zone in Montana and other areas are applying for forbearance although the
local economy was not affected by COVID-19 immediately in March/April.
Similarly, I conduct a Diff-in-Diff analysis in columns (5) (without county fixed effect) and
(6) (with county fixed effect) to capture the selective verification of of borrowers by the servicers
vis-a-vis Outbound communications. The robust positive significance of the interaction term again
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provides sound evidence to the narrative that the servicers try to pre-empt certain borrowers with
Non-performing loans and other marginal borrowers from availing the forbearance options. In-
stead, the servicers encourage them for loan modification or foreclosure moratorium options.
For robustness checks, I also create Non-Gov dummy in Table 24 as the Outbound communica-
tions of the servicers for selective verification of unemployment status mostly targets the Non-Gov
borrowers. I still find strong positive statistical significance for the interaction of term of the Treat-
ment time and the treated (here treatment group in Non-Gov). Finally, because of multi-collinearity
issues discusses in Section 2.6, I exclude those counties which have one or less loans for the whole
time horizon of 5 months. Table 25 again shows strong statistical significance among counties
with more than one loans for the interaction term. These results prove beyond any doubt the causal
impact of strategic/opportunistic behavior on the borrower’s part on forbearance selective verifi-
cation by servicer on dissuading (denial with provision of alternatives like foreclosure moratorium
or loan modification) forbearance applications.
2.8 Cost-benefit analysis of CARES Act
I conduct a simple Back-of-Envelope Calculation to give an estimate of the cost and benefit of the
CARES Act. As of the end of May 2020, the US Residential Mortgage Debt was $ 11.1 Trillion12.
Around 4 million Gov borrowers availed Forbearance by the end of May 202013. Forbearances
are approved for 6 months at a time. So the, next cost of forbearance for Gov-backed borrowers
nationally is:
(Availed Forbearance) * (P&I) * (Forbearance period)/ (Principal Payment)
= 4,000,000 * $721.18 * 6 / 3 = $ 5.76 Trillion






Summary Statistics Table 18 detailed in Figure 33 in Black Knight August 2020 report. The latest
updates on forbearance and foreclosure moratorium are provided by Housingwire. 14
2.9 Looming Plausible Housing Crisis
United States is still in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic and no one can say for certain what
the future holds. In these highly charged socio-economic and political circumstances charged with
racial tensions, the possibility of an upcoming housing crisis cannot be overlooked. I take recourse
to a recent article by Black Knight August Research15. Although the number of Forbearance appli-
cations have gone down in Figure 34 and weekly new forbearance plans have declined and flatted
in Figure 35, there is still a sizable amount of forbearance plans extended in Figure 36. Moreover,
the evictions of non-paying renters/homeowners is temporarily halted by President Trump at least
till Jan 31st, 2021. As evident in Figure 37, the status of loans leaving COVID-related Forbearance
plans are not current. After the forbearance period ends, they become delinquent loans, which can
subsequently be offered foreclosure moratorium or loan modification to cure them. There could be
a significant surge in foreclosure in the near future if these borrowers are able to avail foreclosure
moratorium and get temporary relief from ban in eviction for renter and homeowners alike. FHA
and VA have worse delinquency than other GSE and Private label loans. So, the marginal borrow-
ers whose loans are about to become Non-performing can eventually end up in a vicious cycle of
foreclosure and lack of employment which in turn increases foreclosure. So, a misaligned CARES
Act to provide economic relief to the borrowers due to a public health crisis could be amplified
into a much bigger housing crisis in the near future. Also, the exposure of 5.76 Trillion USD, as
explained in the previous section could become permanent and it may take years, if not a decade,
of slow economic recovery to reduce this national debt.
14Source: https://www.housingwire.com/articles/heres-what-mortgage-forbearance-looked-like-in-2020/
15Black Knight’s August Report on Forbearance is provided here: https://cdn.blackknightinc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/BKIMMAug2020Report.pdf
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2.10 Ongoing Research and Future Work
The effect of securitization on loan modifications (or lack thereof) has received a great deal of
attention among academics and policymakers. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010 find securitization
induce a foreclosure bias. Agarwal et al. 2011a and Kruger2018 find securitization reduces the
likelihood of renegotiation and increases the likelihood of foreclosure. One critical assumption
in the extant literature is that the quality of the portfolio and securitized loans are similar. The
literature relies on hard information at the time of origination to control for loan quality despite the
fact that it is a time-varying attribute. This may be a concern if portfolio borrowers and securitized
borrowers had similar credit scores and incomes at origination, but securitized borrowers were
more likely to lose their job. The change in employment status would partially explain the higher
likelihood of foreclosure that was mistakenly attributed to the securitization process. I address this
issue by quantifying and incorporating soft information in Chapter 4 from servicer call logs. An
even more acute consequence of another future paper is to run a horserace between different loan
dispositions of forbearance, foreclosure moratorium, loan modification and possibly partial loan
forgiveness, conditional on securitization in the upcoming democratic Biden administration.
2.11 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide insights on the lack of effectiveness of the mortgage forbearance program
contained in the CARES Act. I demonstrate that the CARES Act created a huge untenable exposure
for the government in 2021 and this dollar cost and social cost is higher than the current heated de-
bate on handing out money directly to households. Utilizing a novel administrative dataset coming
from a mortgage servicer, I examine the communications between borrower and servicer in order
to shed light on the probability that a borrower will request forbearance. In line with studies look-
ing at mortgage modifications during the Great Financial Crisis period Demyanyk and Van Hemert
2011, Mayer et al. 2014, I provide evidence to suggest that borrowers are strategically taking ad-
vantage of the CARES Act to request mortgage forbearance, the servicers are selectively verifying
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the unemployment status/financial hardship for Non-Gov borrowers. I find that this selective veri-
fication by the servicer precludes unintended distributional implications based on race for African
American and Hispanic borrowers. My results document strategic behavior in response to CARES
Act policy which was an ad-hoc response during the advent of COVID-19 in the United States.
The economic costs of strategic behavior/selective verification are significantly large relative to
the potential gains to borrowers, lenders, and servicers from these policies. My results highlight
the misalignment of ad-hoc policies on Government programs such FHA, VA, USDA of the HUD,
due to the non-verification (for Gov borrowers) and selective verification (Non-Gov borrowers) of
unemployment status/financial hardship. I am able to conduct this research due to the narrative re-
trieval apparatus I have created from the novel administrative data on the communication between
the borrower and the servicer. The flawed interpretations and the erroneous inference thereof of
the special servicers can be mitigated using Machine Learning/Natural Language Processing tech-
niques. More work must be done to assess the overall costs/benefits of such forbearance policies
and their effectiveness in preventing foreclosures, or else, surge in foreclosures will inevitably lead
to the next housing crisis.
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CHAPTER 3
QUANTIFYING SOFT INFORMATION, MORTGAGE MARKET EFFICIENCY &
ASSET PRICING IMPLICATIONS
I provide a novel framework for machine learning models to ingest quantified soft information
during the life of a loan, using cutting-edge natural language processing techniques on salient
unstructured text. This soft information, from servicer call transcripts, is not restricted to mere
positive/negative sentiments and provides efficiency and alleviates the information asymmetry be-
tween the lender (and/or issuer) and the borrower. Proprietary servicer comments are hardly acces-
sible and offer the soft information for real-time delinquency status of the mortgages. I investigate
whether the special servicer invoked by the investor can utilize the valuable comments from the
master servicer. The time-varying soft information about the borrower’s financial condition, health
of the loan and the property condition from these master servicer comments renders the predictive
power and has asset pricing implications. Given this valuable information, the special servicer may
choose to use this information, as I anecdotally see with several private equity investors. The well-
known unresolved conflict of interest between the master and special servicers can be resolved,
thereby reducing moral hazard and increasing efficiency and transparency.
3.1 Introduction
One of the key functions of the fixed-income (especially mortgages) finance profession is measur-
ing the delinquency status of a loan (mortgage) and developing quantitative models that predict
the distribution of future outcomes. This enables lenders, consumers, investors, and policymak-
ers with the information on the structural context needed to allocate resources efficiently. Banks
have a repository of information about borrowers creditworthiness, collected over time through
frequent and personal contacts (relationship banking) between the prospective borrower and the
loan officer. Banks have also been using available public records with the advent of technology.
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This private/soft information is valuable to the banks for its lending decisions during underwriting.
However, the soft information gets blurred during the surveillance process after the loan has been
issued, since the financial or personal situation of the borrower may change over time. My novel
proprietary data allows me to quantify the time-varying soft information1 about borrowers, previ-
ously inaccessible to academia. I provide the first quantitative measures of this soft information,
beyond positive/negative sentiments, about the borrowers, so that this information can be trans-
mitted during the securitization process and there is no information loss during securitization as
pointed out by DeMarzo2004. 2
The situation is substantially more complicated for securitized loans. Figure 38 describes how
soft information can be used to gain insights about the changes in borrower financial condition
and life events in real time and utilize the information for improving loan performance predic-
tions through the feedback loop enabled by servicer call transcripts. MBS (Mortgage-backed
securities) securitizations are not balance-sheet transactions and are done at arms length via an
SPV. 3 Going forward, the delinquent loans can be kicked off (bought out by the issuer) from
the pool via Early-Buy-Out (EBO) 4 or Reps and warranties. Otherwise, the bank can choose to
do nothing, in which case these delinquent loans become limbo loans. Inaction on limbo loans
1Soft information goes beyond the one-dimensional measure of sentiment. Soft information is difficult to transmit
and quantify (mostly unobservable to the issuer); however, I can extract soft information from the call transcripts
(text data) between the borrower and the servicer. The context under which soft information is collected and the
collector of the information are intertwined. Natural Language Processing (NLP) renders a narrative retrieval device
to capture the soft information along with the context. Hard information is quantitative, easy to store and distribute in
impersonal ways, and its information content is independent of its collection methodology. Hard information has been
used historically to predict mortgage loan delinquency status even in the latest cutting-edge models. I predict ex-post
default rate more accurately and hence conclude soft information along with hard information is critical in identifying
the health of loans.
2DeMarzo2004 argues that pooling of assets (loans) has an information destruction effect for the intermediary that
prevents her from fully exploiting individual asset information. Asset servicers are employed to monitor information
about the assets, to ensure that timely performance of loan payments and to provide confidence to investors.
3During the ramp up period, an MBS manager invests the proceeds of the issuance into assets. In addition to the
ramp-up period, the typical MBS has a warehousing period before the securities issuance when the sponsor starts
collecting collateral. There is a sample selection (around 10%) which the sponsor removes from the MBS and keeps
the remaining for due diligence. Some delinquent loans are kept in a pool, and the banks hire special servicers to
monitor them.
4When Ginnie Mae loans become close to 90 days delinquent, the issuer has teh right to buy them out early from
the Ginnie pool and sell them in the secondary market to Private Equity, who bid for these loans and buy them at a
discount. This has provided a new way of reducing the skin in the game for the issuer after the implementation of Risk
Retention rule from Dodd-Frank Act from early 2017.
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(see LindaTangJRERLimbo2015) has reduced dramatically after change in securitization structure
from Risk Retention rule in 2017 (see GhentRR). This may further be exacerbated by exogenous
changes, e.g., regulations regarding Ginnie Mae (VA/FHA/USDA) claims process and/or Compre-
hensive Capital Adequacy and Review (CCAR) regulations in the last 3-4 years. In the current
COVID-19 pandemic, I use soft information and address the choice between forbearance, foreclo-
sure moratorium, loan modification and loan forgiveness, conditional on securitization in a future
paper.
I claim that the aforementioned quantified soft information can resolve the conflict of interest
between the master and special servicers (see Mayer and Gan 2006). This can have an unfore-
seen reduction of moral hazard in the opaque residential real estate market, thereby increasing
efficiency and transparency. The servicers (see Ambrose, Sanders, and Yavas 2008)5 collect and
document monthly loans payments, manage escrow accounts and monitor the underlying proper-
ties’ condition. These master servicers prepare loan payment reports for the trustee and transfer
collected funds to the trustee for payment to investors. The special servicer come into the picture
for a 60 days past due loan, and she can modify the terms of the loan via loan extension or loan
restructuring or foreclose on the loan and sell the underlying collateral.
The special servicer is responsible for work-out of the loans forwarded by the master servicer,
but is contractually obligated to maximize the interests of the investors. The optimal solution would
be for the special servicer to cure the the loan to performing status.6 The special servicer is not
concerned with the borrower’s position (preempting the borrower to negotiate an outcome other
than foreclosure), but rather may undertake actions (modification, foreclosure, etc.) that maximize
the position of the first-loss investor and guarantee the timely cash flow payments to the senior
investor. This mechanism contrasts directly with the role of a master servicer (the administration
5”There are three types of servicers. The subservicer is typically the loan originator in a conduit deal who has
decided to sell the loan but retain the servicing rights. The subservicer sends all payments and property information to
the master servicer. The master servicer oversees the deal and ensures the servicing arrangements are maintained. In
addition, the master servicer facilitates the timely payment of interest and principal to the investor. When a loan goes
into default, the master servicer has the responsibility to provide for servicing advances.”
6Special servicers are generally compensated by a percentage of the outstanding balance of the loans that they
serve plus a fixed fee. Unlike the master servicer, the special servicer generates more profit if a particular loan goes
into default.
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of troubled loans originated and retained by traditional lenders).
Generally, a master servicer has a management system (Ops), which typically manages these
delinquent loans. They also have a capital market (CM) function. CM and Ops groups have differ-
ent priorities. The objectives of CM include NPV based advances, managing capital constraints,
etc. which may not be in line with the primary objective of monitoring delinquent loans for which
the servicer (Ops) was hired by the bank, to begin with. The loans for which escrow advances have
been made and about two-thirds of the Corporate Advances have been identified as deadweight
losses are the candidates for buy-out from the issuer. This is a new mechanism that the issuers and
lenders are plausibly using to avoid risk-retention for the adverse loans in the MBS. On the other
hand, the legal servicer comments, used in this paper, are from the Ops, which has valuable soft
information both about the borrower life events and financial condition & the property condition.
Hard information post-origination and definitely post-securitization about the borrowers’ real-
time financial plight and property conditions are very difficult for lenders to obtain due to privacy
laws in place. The number of times the borrowers call themselves on the one hand, and moni-
toring by the legal representatives on the other, depends greatly on the individual borrower and
her situation. The representative has to give the mini-miranda7 in accordance with FDCPA8 (Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act) and confirm certain account specifics to ensure it is the borrower
to whom they are speaking. Then the representative will try to determine if the borrower wants
to keep the house or liquidate, the reason for default as well as occupancy of the property, if not
already known. Hence, I explore soft information to our advantage from servicer comments and
gain unforeseen insights.
To give an idea of the economic significance, I provide the size of EBO deals from January-
June of 2020 (see Figure 39) in each delinquency buckets for the largest 4 issuers for this Private
7At the beginning of a collection call, a debt collector must recite wording that has come to be called the mini-
Miranda disclosure. It informs the consumer that the call is from a debt collector, that they are calling to col-
lect a debt, and that any information revealed in the call will be used to collect that debt. The disclosure must
also be included in written correspondence with consumers, such as a collection letter. This important provision
is required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to prevent debt collectors from calling under false pretenses




Equity firm, which has around 15% market share of the national EBO market in the United States.
The sheer volume of delinquencies creates capacity constraints and necessitates the use of ML to
operate nimbly with less manpower. The marginal cost of quantifying and ingesting soft infor-
mation is much less than hiring more lawyers (who bill by the hour) and unnecessary conflict of
interest between master and special servicer.
To extract soft information, I utilize the legal abbreviations that are internal codes for the
servicer to keep track of the monitoring process and keeping the comments, either, when the bor-
rowers are calling themselves to report material changes in their professional life (e.g., loss of job)
or personal life (e.g., birth of a baby, death of a significant household member, divorce, etc.) or,
when the servicers are really monitoring the borrower and asking detailed and decisive questions.
The intent of the servicer can be captured by the proportion of the valuable comments to the total
number of times a borrower is called after their mortgage becomes non-performing.
To evaluate the cumulative effect of soft information throughout the month, I define delin-
quency classes as loan outcomes at the end of each month and find the cumulative effect of soft
information throughout the month. The soft information is obtained from the time of acquisition
of these loans by the Private Equity firm. These loans come in the form of Early-Buyout deals,
of which 60% loans get re-pooled to a new GNMA pool within 3-6 months, providing the value
of quantified soft information is prediction accuracy. The remaining 40% remain in the portfolio
of the PE firm which are monitored via the surveillance process vis-a-vis hard information and
quantified soft information (see Figure 40). I keep two delinquency classes PL (Performing Loan)
and NPL (Non-Performing Loan) and two liquidated (terminal classes/absorbing states) classes
PIF (Paid-in-Full) and ShortSale to aggregate the transitions into meaningful buckets.
I conduct robustness checks for a larger and more granular set of delinquency classes B120D
(Beyond 120 days), BK (Bankruptcy), FC (Foreclosure), PIF (Paid-in-Full), REO (Real-Estate
owned), ShrtSal (Short Sale), W0 30D (Within 0 to 30 days), W30 60D (Within 30 to 60 days),
W60 90D (Within 60 to 90 days), W90 120D (Within 90-120 days) and document the impact of
quantified soft information on asset prices and their estimated volatilities.
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I quantify soft information across 8-12 different aspects and severity of delinquency. This soft
information has differential time-varying impact for different delinquency classes, which cannot
be captured by frequently used measures of sentiment used previously in the literature. Sentiment,
a measure of investor beliefs, has been viewed as a determinant of the variation in asset prices
(Keynes 1937). The plausible role of sentiment is especially important for the housing market,
where financial errors can have very costly as beliefs are unobservable and difficult to quantify (Soo
2018). The usual proxies of sentiment used in the stocks, mutual fund flows, dividend premiums,
etc. are unfortunately unavailable for the housing market (Baker and Wurgler 2006). Over two-
thirds of US households invest the majority of their portfolio in real estate via home ownership
(Chan, Schneider, and Tracy 1999). Survey measures during the 2008 financial crisis are limited
in capturing the spatial variation, as their scope is not national.
Soft information has been explored in the literature in several contexts. Agarwal and Ben-David
2018 find loan officers put emphasis on hard information in approval decisions and henced the
loan-prospecting incentivizes overlooking of unfavorable soft information. Agarwal et al. 2011b
investigate soft information from revealed risk tolerance from the borrower’s choice of credit con-
tract which revealing her risk level. Demers and Vega 2008 use text from management’s quarterly
earnings to extract soft information on managerial net optimism. They test both cases: informa-
tiveness of contemporaneous hard information and soft information per se. D’Aurizio, Oliviero,
and Romano 2015 use soft information in bank lending decisions focusing on firm heterogeneity
in corporate ownership structure.
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont, and Martimort 2003 provide evidence that soft information helps the
principal even in the event of collusion of the supervisor and agent under asymmetric informa-
tion. An et al. 2015 show that soft information is more evident in low-competition markets and
among borrowers with low credit score, while adverse selection is more applicable to liquidity-
constrained borrowers and loans originated by brokers. Elul 2011 find evidence using soft infor-
mation that privately securitized loans perform worse than observably equivalent portfolio loans
due to adverse selection. Campbell, Loumioti, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2019 explore whether
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non-agency-related costs and behavioral biases come in the way of the effective internalization
of soft information. Ergungor and Moulton 2014 evaluate soft information on loan performance
of low-income cohort and provide adequate explanation for observed performance differences be-
tween bank and nonbank lenders.
Machine learning is recently used in real estate literature. I study deep neural network (DNN)
for disentangling liquidity constrained and strategic default in the first chapter. Ambrose et al.
2019 uses machine learning methodology to assess the completeness of PSAs for conduit CMBS
deals. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any machine learning application on pro-
prietary servicer comments data. My paper uses cutting edge Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques to alleviate the well-documented conflict between the master servicers and special ser-
vicers. Jiang et al. 2018 predict whether a borrower default is significantly concerning online
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 briefly discusses the data set that I use.
I plan to attach much more details about the data in the online appendix later. Section 3.3 describes
our model structure and estimation. I detail a lot of our analysis in Subsection 3.3.1 using the
frequency-based Bag of Words Models, Subsection 3.3.2 using semi-supervised Word-to-Vector
Models and Subsection 3.3.4 using Topic Models. I then provide evidence for the incremental
value in market efficiency and resolution of the conflict of interest between Master and Special ser-
vicers from out-of-sample predictions for four delinquency states in Section 3.4 and then for more
granular 10 delinquency states in Section 3.5. Section ?? provides some asset pricing implications
of quantifying soft information. Section 4.4 provides significant evidence of the usefulness and
ubiquity of the quantified soft information in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and captures the
consequent borrower financial hardship. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
I have daily proprietary novel data on servicer comments from November, 2017 to December, 2019
from servicers of bulge bracket banks for 44,182 loans. Overall, I have 14,000,575 pooled obser-
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vations when I stack all the comments for all the loans in our data. Once I clean the ’NULL’ and
other meaningless messages, I analyze 12,567,500 messages using cutting-edge Natural Language
Processing (NLP) techniques in GPU/Clouds. I extract soft information about the borrowers’s fi-
nancial condition and life events & property condition from this test data and try to prove predictive
power for borrower behavior beyond what is observed in the loan performance data.
The special servicer, who provided me this proprietary data, has a national presence and has
a big market share among the servicers in residential mortgages in the United States.9 A private
equity firm purchases these loans in a joint-venture with the servicer and gets access to the master
servicer call transcripts with the borrowers. The servicer legal representative uses his/her own
abbreviations and phrases to enter the results of communication with the borrower. Hence, there is
a lot of noise in the call transcript data. To quantify soft information from this unstructured data,
I resort to novel NLP techniques. This paper is the first attempt to use these time-varying soft
information about the borrowers in addition to loan performance variables. In fact, NLP helps me
structure this data into a tabular format, so that it can be ingested by classification models along
with other hard loan performance variables, detailed in Table 26.
Vanilla structural models cannot retrieve the narrative of the conversation between the master
servicer and the borrower. There are several aspects of borrower financial health, e.g., unem-
ployment status, furlough, impact of COVID-19, etc. which are highly uncertain in the current
turbulent times. Similarly, life events, e.g., death, divorce, marriage, relocation due to job change,
etc. which have historically not captured in the hard information due to privacy laws in place.
A simple upward or downward market sentiment is hence unable to capture these nuances. I ex-
plain in great details the different cases of these soft information in Subsection 3.3.2. The primary
purpose to significantly improve the prediction accuracy of the adverse delinquency states, e.g.,
foreclosure, real-estate owned, shortsale, bankruptcy, etc. This improves the mortgage market effi-
ciency tremendously and mitigates the well-known conflict of interest between the master servicer
and the special servicer. These soft information does internalize lenders’ expectations about future
9The entire list of servicers is not public information. The GSEs may have a listing of their servicers, but that
would be for a subset of the loans.
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payments by the borrowers, however I only obtain the call transcripts in this research, which is the
servicer’s summarization of the dialogue. I intend to delve deep into the incentive compatibilities
in a future paper using the audio conversation between the borrower and the servicer.
To be consistent with prior literature, I include residential mortgage loan-specific attributes
from our proprietary data source and yield curve, mortgage-treasury rate spread, 10 year risk-
free rate volatility, region dummy, seasonal/quarter dummy, among others. I include local macro-
variables to capture the channel of potential contagion in which defaults in the same state might
amplify the barely surviving loans. Such feedback mechanisms are well-documented by Agarwal,
Ambrose, and Yildirim 2015, Anenberg and Kung 2014, Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao 2009, Lin,
Rosenblatt, and Yao 2009, Towe and Lawley 2013, and among others.
3.3 Methodology and Techniques
I use several cutting-edge Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to quantify soft infor-
mation. Bag of Words is the first approach I try to visualize the clusters (groups of similar words)
of keywords. This does not alleviate the sparsity issue 10 when the words are converted to vec-
tors. Once I have the word clusters, I can use the word-to-vector technique to convert words to
easily computable vectors, which the computer can understand. Finally, I define topics and themes
from these words to capture the sentiment of these vectors. I intend to have a continuous mea-
sure of sentiment and can create an index from the sentiment measure. This decision is based on
the number of distinct topics that emanate from the topic model. I can use the sentiment index
as a control variable along with loan performance attributes to gain superior prediction of future
borrower behavior.
I exclude the servicer comments with gibberish (no English meaning) and focus on a set of
targeted keywords that have been historically categorized by the Private Equity firm who provided
me the data. I need these words to compare the context of lemmatized tokens from the servicer
10The text is vectorized into counts i.e. each sentence is represented by a vector with the dimensions of size of the
vocabulary of the corpus (say |V |), and the value of each dimension being the number of occurrences of that word in
the sentence. This enables a tabular representation of the document (commonly known as the term-document matrix),
with the rows representing sentences and the columns the vectorized word counts.
60
comments data via a supervised word-to-vector algorithm. Of course, this limits our analysis to
sentiment related to these historical keywords, but they are very comprehensive, listed in Table 50.
3.3.1 Bag of Words
Bag of Words is an NLP technique that extracts features and meaning from documents. Numerous
linguistic techniques assume independence, implying that the words are contextually insignificant
and order-agnostic.
While the sequence of appearance of the words themselves aren’t as important as their exis-
tence (meaning), counting the individual occurrence allows for a determination of the degree of
importance or significance. Some of the well-known parsing techniques that fall under the bag-
of-words methodology include: 1) targeted phrases 2) word lists 3) Naive Bayes, and 4) thematic
document structure. Targeted phrases (Loughran, McDonald, and Yun 2009) seek to identify par-
ticular words or phrases that are highly significant with respect to the context of the document.
Word lists, as the name suggests, refers to a compilation of words that possess a certain sentiment
(for example, positive or negative). The relative frequencies of words that possess a certain senti-
ment direct the sentiment of the overall document. Naive Bayes is a well-established supervised
learning algorithm to classify sentences into sentiments or classes based on Bayes’ rule. Antweiler
and Frank 2004, Das and Chen 2007.
While these models are simple, efficient, and robust, they have some drawbacks. Since words
are treated as stand-alone objects, their ordering is completely ignored, and in turn, so are their
semantic relationships with each other. As the size of the corpus increases, it is highly likely the
vocabulary (|V |) scales up and along with it, the size of the sparse term-document matrix. This
large-scale sparsity can cause computational challenges in further processing. These shortcom-
ings necessitate more computationally efficient methods that capture the relationships between the
words.
Hence, I follow the steps below to clean the servicer comments:
1. Splitting: I use deconstruction (see Whitelaw et al. 2009) to remove to conjoined words. As
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a lot of the sentences are conjoined, the keywords are mixed with other words, e.g., cram-
downacknowledge or nocramdown. Without split, one loses the keyword, from the English
vocabulary perspective. So, a probabilistic split (package) is run that splits nocramdown
into no and cramdown. The misspelled words like agnecy will unfortunately be split into a
random string of characters like agn and ecy, because on its own it is not meaningful as an
English word. ins gets split into ’in’ and ’s’, but ins means insurance in our data. So, ins, fc
(foreclosure), bk (bankruptcy), reo (real-estate owned) are kept as is.
2. Lemmatization: Lemmatization just brings the word to its base form. Since a lot of words
are not meaningful English words, lemmatization will leave them as is. To clarify how diffi-
cult it is to lemmatize the data at hand, I provide one example, where there are random let-
ters in the middle, e.g., ”DSPN=209 09/26/2016 Fire AT/NEAR FIRE NO UTLS;LISTENED
TO PREV TAGED C WITH 09/26/2016 Fire AGNECY;AGT ONLY TRIED TO FIND POL
BY NAME;SENT FAX REQT 09/26/2016 Fire FOR POL INFO” becomes ”dspn = 209
09/26/2016 fire fire no utl listen prev tag c 09/26/2016 fire agn ecy agt only try find pol
name send fax req 09/26/2016 fire pol info” after lemmatization, removing prepositions and
stopwords.
3. Vocabulary: After a careful combination of the above steps, I remove the non-English
words, except a few from our list of keywords, from all the servicer comments. This helps
remove the unnecessary characters which provide no information in this research question.
As an example, the above lemmatize sentence becomes: ”fire fire no listen fire only try find
name send fax fire info”.
There is a tradeoff between splitting and lemmatization, e.g., without splitting the sentences
are not meaningful. With the split, one can remove non-English words like ’in’ and ’s’, but one
would lose the meaning of the word ’in’ and hence the context in the sentence. This is primarily
because the legal comments (abbreviations) are all written in shorthand (unfortunately, this is the
industry standard among servicer legal representatives) and combined in a jumbled-up form. The
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following Dendogram (hierarchical agglomerative clustering Murtagh and Legendre 2014) in Fig-
ure 41 captures the hierarchical structure among the keywords and renders a clear indication of the
heterogeneity in keywords’ thematic similarity.
3.3.2 Word to vector
A more sophisticated technique compared to Bag of Words involves converting words (or phrases)
themselves into their vector representations, known as word (or phrase) embeddings. The main
goal of vectorization is to capture the similarity between words using their vector representations,
which is not existent in simple models like bag of words that treat words as atomic units. The
embeddings capture semantic meaning when trained on text corpus, using word2vec model. Skip-
Gram model learns word embeddings in semi-supervised setting, since there are no direct labels
associated with the words, but the neighboring words (the context word in a sentence) provides a
proxy for the labels.
These distributed word representations 11 have been studied in depth in the past (Rumelhart,
Hinton, and Williams 1986). To overcome the curse of dimensionality suffered by older models,
neural networks were proposed to represent words as high-dimensional real valued vectors (Bengio
et al. 2003; Mikolov et al. 2010). The goal of using neural networks is to potentially determine a
probability distribution for the next word or phrase, based on the previous words (context). The
choice of neural networks was found to be encouraging as the vectors thus generated were known to
capture many syntactic and semantic relationships in a meaningful manner - for ex: vector(”King”)
- vector(”Man”) + Vector(”Woman”) yields vector that is nearly identical to vector(”Queen”)
(Mikolov, Yih, and Zweig 2013).
First, I use RAKE (Rapid Automatic Keyword Extraction), which uses stopwords and phrase-
11The two main neural network architectures that are used for distributed word representations are Feedforward
Neural Net Language Models (NNLM) and Recurrent Neural Net Language Models (RNNLM). While NNLMs are
highly effective in overcoming the curse of dimensionality suffered by statistical language modeling, they have two
drawbacks: they are computationally complex due to the presence of a projection layer (resulting in dense matrix
multiplications); in addition to the input, hidden and output layers, and the number of preceding words (context) have
to be fixed beforehand. To overcome this, Mikolov et al. 2010 proposed a RNNLM which does not have a projection
layer, reducing computational complexity. Furthermore, the hidden layer is linked to itself, allowing for some short-
term memory using information from the past and thus removing the need for an ad-hoc context length.
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delimiters to detect the most relevant words/token in a comment. For the sentiment classification
part, a word2vec model converts each lemmatized word from the corpus into a high dimensional
vector. Since I know the vector representation of each word in the servicer comments, I have
to ”combine” these vectors together and get a new one that represents the comment as a whole.
Since averaging the word vectors together is equal-weighted, I compute a weighted average where
each weight gives the importance of the word with respect to the corpus. The tf-idf score (term
frequency-inverse document frequency) acts as a weighting scheme that extracts the relevant words
in a comment.
tfidf(t, c) = tf(t, c).idf(t) (3.1)
where tf(t,c) is the term frequency of the token t in the comment c. Also, the idf(t) is the inverse
document frequency of the term t, computed by this formula:
idf(t) = log(1 +
1 + nc
1 + df(c, t)
) (3.2)
where nc is the number of comments and df(c,t) is the number of comments containing token t.
The idea is to find clusters of similar words to our pre-specified keywords (chosen from qual-
itative judgement and historical perspective by the Private Equity firm who provided methe data).
To expand the list of keywords, I find similar words to our keywords in the following way. The
idea is to convert these similar words to vector and quantify higher-dimensional soft information
(beyond sentiment).
3.3.3 Visualization of clusters of similar words
To achieve this objective, I first plot the main adverse delinquency states, namely, ”delinquent”,
”bankruptcy”, ”foreclosure”, ”reo”, ”short sale”, using T-SNE, which is just a two-dimensional vi-
sualization of clusters of similar words, with the axes scaled appropriately to fit important similar
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words. 12, in Figure 42. The axes do not have any units or physical significance and is chosen
automatically by the T-SNE algorithm to appropriately fit the important similar words in one dia-
gram. If I start from the south-east corner of Figure 42, I find the blue cluster of words similar to
”delinquent”. These words could signify any number of days of delinquency from 30 days to 120
days of late payment. Next to the ”delinquent” cluster, I find the ”reo” cluster in peach color. The
word ”fcl” defines a boundary of ”reo” delinquency state with the ”foreclosure” state, since most
of the time, a Foreclosure process precedes an REO proceeding. To the north of peach color ”reo”
cluster, I find the red color ”short sale” cluster, which is a different kind of outcome for severely
delinquent loan. The one red spot for ”forebear” signifies a specific kind of ”short sale” where
the lender shows forbearance and takes a loss and the borrower gets relief from the put option
by surrendering the property in non-recourse states. The light green color for the ”foreclosure”
cluster is at the center and is a logical state for severely delinquent loans. The ”foreclosure” state
could precede bankruptcy proceedings and generally precedes short-sale or REO. The violet color
”bankruptcy” cluster is a transient delinquency state. It can happen when the borrower voluntarily
files for Bankruptcy proceedings in Chapter 13 and tries to negotiate the terms of the loan with
the lender. The bankruptcy proceedings from Chapter 7 are more of a natural continuation of
the foreclosure proceedings. Hence, there is a boundary between ”foreclosure” and ”bankruptcy”
clusters, where I can see the word ”bankruptcy” in the ”foreclosure” cluster and similarly the word
”foreclosure” in the ”bankruptcy”.
Next, I investigate and report the T-SNE results for several key events that happen during the
lifecycle of a loan and extract intricate relationships and interactions with the main 5 delinquency
states described above. I add each category on top of the main 5 delinquency states to visualize
how each category results in one of these 5 delinquency states.
As is evident in Figure 43, the ”legal” cluster is mostly intertwined with the ”foreclosure”
12T-SNE is a machine learning graphing tool known as a stochastic nearest neighbor embedding van der Maaten
and Hinton 2008) which helps me visualize clusters in two-dimensional space. In a topic model, servicer comments
have a mixture of themes, which can be a narrative snapshot of the state of the loan during it’s lifecycle. The t-SNE
plots help digest the high-dimensionality and complexity of servicer comments, illustrating their intuitive underlying
structure as recurrent co-location of topics.
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cluster. There are two types of legal proceedings, one related to the title-issue from improper or
missing promissory note for the residential mortgage. The other ”legal” sub-cluster refers to the
court proceedings related to the foreclosure process.
Figure 44 describes very crucial life events for the borrower, which act as triggers for wors-
ening delinquency state. Some of the key life-changing events are ”death”, ”divorce” and ”unem-
ployment”. On the south-east and north-west corners of the Figure 44, I find two sub-clusters of
”unemployment” in red. The north-west sub-cluster of ”unemployment” has an extended boundary
line with the blue color ”delinquent” cluster. This can be due to sudden loss of job for a house-
hold depending on employment income or deteriorating conditions for small and medium business
owners. The south-east red sub-cluster for ”unemployment” indicates those borrowers who self-
report their employment status with the lender and they are able to negotiate the terms of the loan,
e.g., mortgage rate, duration, etc. and hence avoid the more severe delinquency states. On the
north-east corner of the Figure 44, I find the clusters for ”death” and ”divorce”, which have an
extended boundary, which indicates re-marriage due to death of the significant other. I also find
some intersection of the south-east sub-cluster of ”unemployment” for borrowers who negotiate
the terms of the loan with the lender. It is highly likely that the same borrowers also head into
divorce proceedings with their significant other because of the tight financial condition due to loss
of employment. One peach dot of ”divorce” is between ”short sale” and ”reo” clusters at the center
of the Figure 44, as a sudden flight to those severe delinquency states, can result from divorce
proceedings. As usual, on the south-west corner, I see some overlap between the ”bankruptcy” and
”foreclosure” clusters.
In the south of the Figure 45, I see that the ”military” cluster in red color has a boundary
with almost all the key delinquency states. This is because military personnel are looked at more
leniently by lenders and these loans can enter these delinquency states and sometimes come back
to a current/non-delinquent state. Also, I have VA loans in our data and hence veterans, who are
viewed leniently by the lenders and are backed by HUD programs. Here, the lenders go through a
claims process in case the veterans or military personnel default.
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In Figure 46, I see the red cluster of borrowers who have experienced natural disasters. I
have removed the cases of natural disasters where the borrowers have fire and/or flood insurance
and other forms of insurance. These loans sometimes become delinquent due to a few months
of missed payments in case the borrower gets the insurance money and repairs the home. If the
home is severely damaged, then REO is a natural outcome for these homes, as is indicated by the
intersection with the light green ”reo” cluster.
Now, I focus on the cases where delinquency behavior is observed due to ”Occupancy”-related
circumstances in Figure 47. We try to capture all ”Occupancy”-related circumstances with the
keywords ”abandon” and ”vacant”. The peach color cluster for ”abandon” at the center of the
Figure 47 obviously has some intersection with the red cluster ”vacant” as they fall under the same
umbrella of ”Occupancy”-related circumstances. I see a lot of duplexes being abandoned due to
the cost burden from maintenance. A house could be abandoned due to a whole host of factors,
e.g., the house has become uninhabitable or is irreparable, a trespasser is found more likely near
an abandoned house, due to punitive legal proceedings, a house-owner can abandon the house.
On peach dot in the ”bankruptcy” cluster signifies voluntary bankruptcy filed by certain borrowers
who may have sinister motives to avoid the debt-service obligation. It is more likely that such
a voluntary applicant of bankruptcy can very well abandon the property. One peach dot in the
”delinquent” cluster could be an indication of future voluntary bankruptcy petition. The ”vacant”
cluster is much broader. Of course, the ”vacant” cluster has some intersection with the ”delinquent”
cluster as ”occupancy” (decision to occupy or live in) of the house where the borrower is delinquent
in the debt-service is a questionable choice of the borrower household. I see some red dots in the
center of the Figure 47 having an intersection with the light green ”reo” cluster as it is the natural
choice for the lender for ”vacant” houses.
Figure 48 refers to keywords ”condemn”, ”damage”, ”hazard/loss” which are related to the
property condition. Condemnation is an outcome due to property condition. All of these keywords
have intersection with the ”reo” cluster as this is the natural outcome for houses with Property
Condition related to ”condemn”, ”damage”, ”hazard/loss”.
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Figure 49 lists keywords ”contest”, ”lien strip”, ”title issue”, ”repurchase” related to the Title
of the promissory note related to the mortgage and ownership of the residential property. The
peach color ”lien strip” has heavy intersection with the violet ”bankruptcy” cluster, which could
be an outcome of the involuntary bankruptcy proceedings following foreclosure petition by the
lender. One light blue dot also defines ”foreclosure” as the channel for ”lien strip” leading to the
bankruptcy process. The ”title issue” and ”contest” are intertwined due to obvious reasons. The
”contest” cluster is closer to ”foreclosure” and hence ”contest” can be used as a leading indicator
for foreclosure proceedings. The red color ”repurchase” cluster has a broad intersection with
several clusters. Repurchase can first be can a natural outcome of ”lien strip”. A repurchase is
also associated with an REO proceeding by the lender. One red dot in the light green ”short sale”
cluster indicates ”repurchase” from short-sale.
3.3.4 Topic Models
Bybee et al. 2020 have proposed a novel approach of estimating the state of the entire economy
via textual analysis of news from the Wall Street Journal. They use a topic model condensing news
into interpretable themes and also quantifies the time-varying proportion of attention to each theme.
Topic models are a popular dimension reduction technique from the fields of unsupervised machine
learning and natural language processing. They have two essential elements. Just as principal
component analysis condenses large data matrices into a comparatively low number of common
factors, a topic model’s first element reduces an inherently ultra-high dimension representation of
a text corpus into a relatively low-dimensional set of common ”topics”. The formation of topics is
unsupervised; they are estimated as clusters of terms that are most likely to co-occur in the same
article. Those clusters are optimized so that relatively few clusters (many fewer than the number of
distinct terms in the data set) preserve as much of the meaning in the original corpus as possible,
by best explaining the variation in term usage across articles.
A topic model estimates the proportion of text relevant to each topic. This makes it possible
to analyze the interaction between topics, categories, and delinquency classes. The topic model
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as a narrative (servicer comments) retrieval device which providers a nuanced verbal interpreta-
tion of the communication between the borrower and the master servicer. First, because servicer
comments are recorded almost daily, I can estimate the delinquency state of a loan at a higher
frequency than most loan-specific and macroeconomic series allow. This time-varying correlation
of high frequency sentiment provides a narrative understanding of credit lifecycle of a loan.
Thematic structures are used to identify overarching themes in the document or classify the
various themes in a document by relating words to latent semantic variables. Two of the most
important styles in thematic structures are Latent Semantic Analysis. Hofmann 1999, Boukus
and Rosenberg 2006, where singular-value-decomposition is used as a dimensionality reduction
technique on the term-document matrix, and Latent Dirichlet Allocation, where a latent thematic
structure can be inferred from the document.
I use the keywords identified from the servicer comments data via the list of keywords identified
from experience. Historically, those experienced keywords have been categorized and mapped into
delinquency classes, e.g., current, delinquent, short-sale, paid-in-full, bankruptcy, foreclosure. I
use these newly identified keywords and perform unsupervised learning to form topics, which gives
me a better understanding of the different delinquency classes. I implicitly identify the transitions
among the previous delinquency classes and add more to the list. This helps me understand the life
of a loan completely and what possible states a loan can be in.
First, I characterize the topical structure in servicer comments. Servicer comments can be
lemmatized into easily interpretable topics with intuitive time-series patterns. A model with less
than 200 topics is statistically optimal according to Bayes factor criteria. Models with fewer topics
tend to mix themes into overly broad clusters, while more topics use more parameters and hence
overfit. Almost all topics exhibit strong time-series persistence.
I first list the word clouds for each of the 12 topics that I identify from the lemmatized data in
Figure 52. I also try with 8 topics to find some topics that contain more than one category (e.g.,
property condition and natural disaster). I even try 16 topics and find the same category is present
in more than one topic. Hence I decide to keep 12 topics for further analysis. In Figure 53 I plot
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the relative weights of words in each topic and also their frequencies for topics 1-6 and a similar
analysis for topics 7-12 in Figure 54. In Figure 55, I provide snapshots of each topic and the above
relative weights and frequencies. More importantly, I can visualize the clustering of certain topics
in Figure 55 and can identify themes based on these clustering of similar topics, which capture
both cross-sectional and time-series correlations of the different categories. This step is crucial in
terms of mapping these categories into delinquency states of the loans and is a clear evidence of
the predictive power of the servicer comments from the soft information about borrower financial
condition and property condition beyond the loan performance variables.
3.4 Model Results with four delinquency classes
In this section, I provide evidence that including predictive soft information using the servicer
comments has incremental value over prediction just using loan performance variables. I keep
two delinquency classes PL (Performing Loan) and NPL (Non-Performing Loan) and two liqui-
dated (terminal classes/absorbing states) classes PIF (Paid-in-Full) and ShortSale to aggregate the
transitions into meaningful buckets.
3.4.1 Model Results with Loan Data without Servicer Comments
I first provide the misclassification errors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing Loan), PIF
(Paid-in-Full), PL (Performing Loan), ShortSale from the In-Sample Confusion Matrices in Table
27 only using loan performance data. I then provide the first 47-49 rows of the Variable Importance
Tables for DRF (in Table 28), Lasso (in Table 29) and DNN (in Table 30). The I provide the
misclassification errors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing Loan), PIF (Paid-in-Full), PL
(Performing Loan), ShortSale from the Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices in Table 31 only using
loan performance data.
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3.4.2 Model Results with Loan Data and Servicer Comments
Now I add the vectors created by the word2vec methodology, described in Section 3.3.2 on top
of the loan performance variables in Subsection 3.4.1. I first provide the misclassification er-
rors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing Loan), PIF (Paid-in-Full), PL (Performing Loan),
ShortSale from the In-Sample Confusion Matrices in Table 32 using loan performance data with
servicer comments. I then provide the first 47-49 rows of the Variable Importance Tables for DRF
(in Table 33), Lasso (in Table 34), GBM (in Table 35) and DNN (in Table 36). The I provide the
misclassification errors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing Loan), PIF (Paid-in-Full), PL
(Performing Loan), ShortSale from the Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices in Table 37 using loan
performance data with servicer comments.
Clearly, there is improvement in misclassification error from Table 31 to Table 37 after adding
the soft information from servicer comments. The misclassification error decreases from 3% to
2% for non-performing loans (reducing the cost in monitoring these loans), from 7% to 5% for
loans that are paid-in-full (increasing the alpha for the investor), from 8% to 6% for loans that are
on short sale (reducing the uncertainty in the plausible delay in pricing from the auction process in
short sale). The economic significance of these improvements is huge and this helps the servicer
undertake optimal actions, if they know the future delinquency status of the loans with better
accuracy. Moreover, the variable importance tables (Table 28 with only hard information and
Table 33 overlaying the soft information on the hard information) provide a clear indication about
the variables which have the largest marginal contributions towards the default outcome.
3.5 Model Results with Granular Delinquency Classes
I conduct robustness checks for a larger and more granular set of delinquency classes B120D
(Beyond 120 days), BK (Bankruptcy), FC (Foreclosure), PIF (Paid-in-Full), REO (Real-Estate
owned), ShrtSal (Short Sale), W0 30D (Within 0 to 30 days), W30 60D (Within 30 to 60 days),
W60 90D (Within 60 to 90 days), W90 120D (Within 90-120 days).
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3.5.1 Granular Model Results with Loan Data without Servicer Comments
I list the Misclassification Errors from the In-Sample Confusions matrices of DRF, Lasso, GBM
and DNN for the loan-performance data without the servicer comments data in Table 38. Then I
list the first 47-50 variables in the Variable Importance tables for each of DRF (Table 39), Lasso
(Table 40), GBM (Table 39) and DNN (Table 42) for the loan-performance data. Then, I list the
Misclassification Errors from the Out-of-Sample Confusions matrices of DRF, Lasso, GBM and
DNN for the loan-performance data without the servicer comments data in Table 43.
3.5.2 Granular Model Results with Loan Data and Servicer Comments
I list the Misclassification Errors from the In-Sample Confusions matrices of DRF, Lasso, GBM
and DNN for the loan-performance as well as servicer comments data in Table 44. Then I list the
first 47-50 variables in the Variable Importance tables for each of DRF (Table 45), Lasso (Table
46), GBM (Table 47) and DNN (Table 48) for the combined data. Then, I list the Misclassification
Errors from the Out-of-Sample Confusions matrices of DRF, Lasso, GBM and DNN for the loan-
performance as well as servicer comments data in Table 49.
B120D category is where the loans become limbo and reduction of misclassification error be-
tween Table 43 and Table 49 reduces the uncertainty regarding the future outcome of many of
these loans. This impact is significant as these are the loans that the servicers worry about and they
often resort to expert judgement while manually optimizing the future disposition of these loans.
Bankrupt loans can be predicted with 100% accuracy. This can save a significant amount of time
and dollar cost for the servicer as they will know which loans to modify and which loans to file
Bankruptcy Chapter 7 (liquidation) instead of Chapter 13 (renegotiation). Reduction in misclassi-
fication errors in the W60 90D and W90 120D categories also help ascertain which loans have a
chance to cure and which loans are on a sure path to adverse states.
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3.6 Conclusion
Ascertaining the categories of mortgage loan delinquency and the transitions between them with
reasonable accuracy is, to this date, a subjective task, leading to massive imprecision in determin-
ing the health of loans. The majority of empirical research has focused on loan-specific, borrower-
specific, property-specific and macroeconomic indicators to approach this problem. I offer an al-
ternative approach that retrieves the borrower-lender interaction vis-a-vis the soft information from
the servicer comments. Our approach is motivated by the view that servicer comments provide the
most accurate delinquency state of a loan. The information asymmetry between the master servicer
and the special servicer has been well-documented. But, to the best of our knowledge, no attempts
have been made to alleviate this issue. The flawed interpretations and the erroneous inference
thereof of the special servicers can be mitigated using Machine Learning techniques. I estimate
NLP models from the full text of master servicers of loans sold to a Private Equity Fund having a
Real Estate portfolio. I measure which keywords are allocated to each cluster at each point in time,
and then use these measurements as inputs into statistical models of loan performance. Clusters
of similar words from the servicer comments closely coincide with categories that a legal firm (an
affiliate of the Private Equity firm) has identified from over 15 years of experience. I show that
clusters generated from master servicer comments contain substantial information about the future
delinquency states above and beyond standard indicators. Our approach relies on the model to di-
gest massive text data that are beyond human readability and flags keywords that are most similar





The implications for each delinquency class are unique and can be accurately measure using
the DNN methodology. The results are also highly robust during these unforeseen times of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
4.1.1 COVID-19 Results without internalizing 2008 Crisis
After cleaning the data, we have 1,315,421 observations from Jan 2017 - Sep 2020. We first
try training the DNN model with data from Jan 2017 - Feb 2020 and confirm that NOI is more
important than LTV leading upto the COVID-19 pandemic in Table 5.5. However, consistent with
our conjecture that Commercial Mortgage delinquency leads a financial (in this case, induced by a
global health crisis), the out-of sample predictions are inaccurate. Then we train the DNN model
from Jan 2017 - Nov 2019, as the first cases of COVID-19 were identified in Wuhan, China during
December, 2019. We still find that NOI is more important than LTV in Table 5.6 and also provide
evidence about other variables which become important in co-determining the default behavior.
We find similar accuracy in predictions in Table 5.7 compared to Table 5.4. This solidifies our
previous and we can indeed claim that DNN extracts the inherent structural relationship among the
covariates and can robustly predict even during several financial crises.
4.1.2 Results by Industry during COVID-19
We track the evolution of the number of loans in different delinquency classes across time (Dec
2019 - Sep 2020) and across industries (Assisted, Healthcare, Hotel, Industrial, Multi-family, Of-
fice, Special) in Figure 5.11. We clearly see the hotel industry being massively displaced. We see
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enormous number of commercial mortgage loans in the hotel industry degrade from W0 30D to
W30 60D (orange bar) from May, 2020. There is some degradation from W30 60D (orange bar)
to W60 90D (ash-color bar). These loans become limbo from August 2020 as evident from the
rise in dark-blue bar of B120D loans. The office space has also seen massive cashflow shortages
from the lack of business activities and inability of payments therefrom for tenants in big cities.
This is evidenced by constant green bar (Non-Performing Mature Balloon Loans) which are trying
to roll-over the loan contract and some oare successful from the lax underwriting standards due to
historical levels of low interest rate monetary policy.
4.1.3 Determinants of Each Delinquency Class
We zoom in to individual delinquency classes and find the determinants of each adverse delin-
quency class using DNN. In Table 5.9, we still find NOI higher than LTV for DNN trained on Jan
2017 - Nov 2019 and misclassification error is almost 0%. For Real-Estate-owned (REO) loans,
the misclassification error is again 0% in Table 5.10, but NOI is no longer higher than LTV in
Table 5.11 as there is no NOI when the lender takes back the property. For foreclosure, again the
misclassification error is again 0% in Table 5.12 and similarly NOI is no longer higher than LTV in
Table 5.13 as foreclosure proceedings are lengthy processes which start after Bankruptcy Chapter
13 and there is no renegotiation to be done and either the loan gets resolved in court or leads to the
terminal state of Bankruptcy Chapter 7 (liquidation). As shown in Subsection 4.1.2, the behavior
of W90 120D and B120D loans are determined by industry heterogeneity. There is slightly higher
error (in Tables 5.15 and 5.17) for these two uncertain delinquency states as the COVID-19 is an
ongoing pandemic and still unfolding.
4.2 Chapter 2
Although, I do not have data on individual borrower sophistication (I have it at zip code level),
but the concentration of forbearance applications or lack thereof from smaller counties suggests
borrowers availing forbearance from hearsay. Some counties who were not abreast with the details
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of the CARES Act, especially for the Non-Gov. borrowers. Hence, they did not avail forbearance
or were dissuaded. For a longer term permanent remediation of this issue, the government should
initiate a marketing campaign whenever they enact something as serious as the CARES Act. The
marketing campaign, although a short term solution, can lead to more awareness uniformly across
the cohort of borrowers in an entire community. Educating financially less fortunate borrowers
about consistent payments and loan modification options available to them can lead to a permanent
solution which can prevent them being left out in the future.
The government had very little time to react after the pandemic ensued around March 2020.
The CARES Act was designed in a rush to provide immediate relief to the hardest hit portion of
the population. But the implementation of the CARES Act was conducted through the temporary
non-payment of mortgage obligations for borrowers in financial hardship. The servicer acted as a
crucial financial intermediary in the implementation of the CARES Act. Hence, the Govt.-backed
borrowers were approved forbearance as the servicers do not want to mess with Govt. policies.
The rampant approval of forbearance for Govt.-backed borrowers heavily affected the servicers’
cash flow. Hence, the servicers, in order to compensate for this loss and to deal with this timing of
cashflow dilemma, used discretionary adverse selection on African Americans and other minority
borrowers, because the CARES Act left a grey area in their documentation. This clearly puts
into question whether the government should depend on a financial intermediary to implement the
policies after they are enacted.
More broadly, the government should look at the entire mortgage and housing market while
implementing these adhoc policies. The CARES Act was specifically designed for the Govt.-
backed borrowers. However, the share of Govt.-backed loans originated at the county level needed
to be slowly increased, so that borrowers will be inclined to avail these Govt.-backed loans and
then a policy on Govt-backed loans would be successful. However, the blatant ignorance towards
the Non-Gov loans would create more stress in the real economy overall.
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4.3 Chapter 3
Asset pricing economists have a simplistic view of mortgages as contracts sharing risk between
lenders and borrowers. Borrowers with existing mortgages do not face margin calls on their col-
lateral if they are in financial distress, or if the standards for underwriting new mortgages become
tighter.
4.3.1 Impact of Soft Information on Asset Price
For better asset pricing for mortgages, a better prediction of the delinquency status is the key
ingredient. For broader delinquency classes PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, when I compare the Out-
of-Sample confusion matrices in Table 31 (only loan data) with Table 37 (loan data with soft
information from servicer comments), I see significant improvement in misclassification error for
the delinquency classes NPL and ShortSale across all 4 models. ShortSale is a severely adverse
delinquency status. The reduction of misclassification to 25% of the original 8% has significant
asset pricing implications. The costly auction process during shortsale can be avoided leading to
material reduction in deadweight loss of the lender. Also, an accurate shortsale price negates the
spillover effect of the Short Sale process on the future price of the property. The improvement
in accuracy for NPL loans lead to better monitoring and the similar reduction in misclassification
error for PIF loans lead to an immediate alpha for the investors. The better attribution of default
risk leads to a better asset pricing, both at the loan-level and at the property-level.
Also, DNN performs really bad in Table 31 (only loan data). This is because the hard infor-
mation is highly correlated cross-sectionally and is mostly sticky across time. This is again a clear
evidence that a model as sophisticated as DNN cannot differentiate between current and adverse
loans. Hard information mostly cannot capture the time-sensitive soft information which I now
include in Table 37. Here, one can see how well the DNN classifies the good and the adverse
delinquency classes. The misclassification errors are close to 0%.
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4.3.2 Impact of Soft Information on Asset Volatility
I use a subtle methodology to capture the impact of quantifying soft information on asset volatil-
ity. I disintegrate the PL class into W0 30D and W30 60D classes based on months of missed
payments and NPL class into W60 90D, W90 120D, B120D, BK, FC, REO, to identify the transi-
tions into granular classes and in essence, capture the volatility of the asset quality. For a 10-class
classification, with highly unbalanced data, DNN no longer performs good. The results of GBM
and DRF are extremely robust. When I compare Table 43 (only loan data) with Table 49 (loan data
with soft information from servicer comments) for the granular classes, I find that misclassification
error is significantly reduced for the adverse classes like W90 120D, B120D, BK, FC, REO, etc.
This reduces the estimated volatility of the process of classification. Bankruptcy, foreclosure, REO
are all costly processes and classifying these loans more accurately saves time and money for the
lender and allows the borrower to avail loan modification and to avoid going to a point of no return
and permanently jeopardizing her future creditworthiness.
4.4 Corona Virus and Ongoing Work
A closer look at some of the servicer comments during March-April 2020 provides insights from
phrases relating to COVID-19 and the CARES Act. The occurrences naturally include words like
’COVID’, ’corona’, ’coronavirus’ and ’virus’, as well as words like ’forbearance’ and ’foreclo-
sure moratorium’ in Figure 50. Another important topic I look out for is unemployment and/or a
loss in pay, as indicated by the phrase ’curtailment of income’. While occurrences of the words
COVID, coronavirus and virus are always in the right context, the word corona appears on multiple
occasions warranting its selective removal. I also studied the interplay of words like COVID and
forbearance or COVID and curtailment of income, to see if any forbearances or losses in income
were originating from layoffs from COVID or other COVID related causes.
Firstly, words relating to the virus, forbearance, foreclosure moratoriums and curtailment of
income as well as some of their cross products (eg: COVID + forbearance) in Figure 51 are good
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indicators to track the status of loans under the CARES Act. It could help me differentiate between
strategic and nonstrategic defaulters by individually tracking loans that associate losses in pay or
jobs to the virus or those requesting forbearances due to COVID. Secondly, the Act was signed in
the last week of March, implying that it will take some time for me to see its effects taking place.
The comments from this month across loan pools will be crucial in identifying trends in delin-
quency classes and future payments. Life events like death and divorce might play a significant
role in the months to come. Thirdly, coupling the identified loans with the industry the borrower
works in, their occupation (if present) and their age group may enable me to generate a consoli-
dated risk metric for all potential borrowers enabling more effective tracking and delinquency class




Machine Learning is still considered as a black-box in Finance and/or Economics profession, de-
spite, innovations in leaps and bounds, in the last 10 years. Unprecedented computational re-
sources, access to unique big data has enabled me to answer three fundamental questions in real
estate finance, both commercial and residential. My thesis 1 aims to bridge the gap between the use
of flexible, interpretable ML models without full-fledged theories and mainstream econometrics. I
disentangle strategic default from liquidity-constrained default, which has been an open research
agenda in mortgage (due to lack of data on material life events, e.g., death, divorce, job loss trigger,
etc.) literature and econometrics for 30-40 years. The context of commercial mortgages enables
me discern a whole host of strategic behaviors due to unique contractual features. Similarly, I use
an administrative data on proprietary servicer call transcripts and retrieve unforeseen time-varying
soft information about borrowers. I also use this data to track financial hardship real-time emanat-
ing from the current COVID-19 pandemic. I find overcrowding in terms of forbearance application
by certain borrowers in Govt. programs (FHA/VA/USDA) who did not suffer from unemployment
or curtailment of income. In my thesis as well as in my current working papers, I emphasize the
power and flexibility of ML techniques. I intend to further theoretical contributions in the field of
deep neural networks so that neural networks can used side-by-side mainstream econometrics. I
have work in progress on the concepts of identification strategy, instrumental variable and causality
in the realm of deep neural networks.
1I am grateful for AREUEA Dissertation Award among 7 PhD candidates chosen globally.
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APPENDICES
5.1 Deep Learning for disentangling Liquidity-constrained and Strategic Default
Figure 5.1: We list the possible combinations of LTV and NOI that can disentangle Liquidity-constrained
Default and the incentives for Strategic Default behavior.
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(a) Default Rate Vs DSCR & LTV (b) Default Rate Vs NOI & LTV
(c) Default Rate Vs NOI & Time to Maturity (d) Default Rate Vs Time to Maturity & LTV
(e) Default Rate Vs Age & LTV (f) Default Rate Vs NOI & Age
Figure 5.2: Bivariate Heatmaps are 2D projections of Default Rate surface over two co-vaoriates. Blue
color signifies high default rate and pink color low default.
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(a) Default Rate Vs Net Operating Income (b) Default Rate Vs Loan-to-Value
(c) Default Rate Vs Prepayment Penalties (d) Default Rate Vs Current Note Rate
(e) Default Rate Vs Appraisal Reduction Amount (f) Default Rate Vs Occupancy Rate
(g) Default Rate Vs Time to Maturity (h) Default Rate Vs Age of Loan
Figure 5.3: Partial Dependence Plots for Predicted Default Rate ??
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Figure 5.4: This diagram provides the evolution of delinquency buckets by year.
Figure 5.5: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
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(a) Number of Loans vs. Outstanding Loan Balance (b) Number of Loans vs. Age and Time to Maturity
(c) Number of Loans vs. Interest Rate and LTV (d) Number of Loans vs. NOI and Occupancy
Figure 5.6: We provide evidence from the Trepp data in Figure 5.6a that from 2012, the number of loans
have remained flat but the outstanding balance of loans have steadily increased until 2016.
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(a) All Default Classes
(b) Default Classes without 90-120 days
(c) Default Classes without 90-120 days & Perform-
ing
Figure 5.7: The delinquency states.
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(a) Variable Importance: Lasso (b) Variable Importance: Ridge
(c) Variable Importance: Ordi-
nal
(d) Variable Importance: DRF (e) Variable Importance: GBM (f) Variable Importance: DNN
Figure 5.8: Variable Importance for 6 models, namely, Lasso, Ridge, Ordinal, Distributed Random Forest
(DRF), Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM), Deep Neural Network (DNN).
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(a) VI without NOI (b) VI without Year Month (c) VI without PrePayPen
(d) VI without Balloon Payment (e) VI without Occupancy (f) VI without Appraisal Reduc
Figure 5.9: These are Variable Importance (VI) charts, leaving one out.
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(a) VI in 2008: DRF (b) VI in 2008: GBM (c) VI in 2008: DNN
Figure 5.10: Variable Importance is stress-tested during Financial Crisis across all non-parametric models.
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Figure 5.11: Impact of COVID-19 across industries
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Table 5.1: The summary statistics for the cleaned data contains 9,617,333 observations of continuous vari-
ables.
Statistic N Min Pctl(25) Median Mean Pctl(75) Max
beginbal 9,617,333 0 1,838,146 4,036,697 7,882,727 9,100,000 99,990,043
orig bal 9,617,333 0 1.92M 4.10M 9.31M 9.14M 1.68B
rate 9,617,333 0 6 6 6 7 9
Sched princip 9,617,333 0 1,060 4,235 15,665 9,838 430M
Unsched prin 9,617,333 0 0 0 50,300 0 1.50B
balance act 9,617,333 0 1,774,511 3,980,981 7,797,502 9,009,824 99,999,000
payment 9,617,333 0 15,000 28,600 65,900 57,800 675M
pppenalties 9,617,333 0 0 0 420 0 29,477,125
liqproceeds 9,617,333 0 0 0 17,900 0 2.56B
realizedloss 9,617,333 0 0 0 5,260 0 204M
liqexpense 9,617,333 0 0 0 3,200 0 1.06B
numprop 9,617,333 1 1 1 1 1 225
Appraisal Reduc 9,617,333 0 0 0 132,000 0 391M
SecurLTV 9,617,333 0 63 71 67 76 150
Face 9,617,333 0 6 6 6 7 9
NOI 9,617,333 0 268,000 527,000 1.22M 1.10M 1.09B
LTV 9,617,333 0 63 71 69 77 150
AppValue 9,617,333 1,620 3.46M 6.80M 17.4M 14.5M 48.1B
OccRate 9,617,333 0.0 0.89 0.96 0.92 1.0 1.4
Basis 9,617,333 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.0 4.0
Unemp 9,617,333 0.019 0.049 0.061 0.066 0.080 0.154
GDP 9,617,333 0 008 016 013 048 0.0174
2YrTr 9,617,333 02 06 0.010 0.019 0.031 0.061
10YrTr 9,617,333 0.015 0.024 0.036 0.034 0.043 0.063
NAREIT 9,617,333 -0.45 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.38
MIT.Liq 9,617,333 0.017 0.022 0.036 0.025 0.105 0.184
time to maturity 9,617,333 0 35 66 80 100 765
age 9,617,333 0 31 60 63 90 409
age2 9,617,333 0 961 3600 5393 8100 167281
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Table 5.2: Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Regression: The marginal effect does not have a clear
interpretation as evidenced by the co-efficients of Multinomial Logit.
names W0 30D W30 60D W60 90D W90 120D PrfMatBal NPfMtBl B120D
1 Intercept -24.83 -230.36 -223.45 -319.34 591.88 -170.20 272.02
2 State -0 0.69 0.30 0.99 -2.12 -0.76 -0.08
52 PropType -0.39 0.65 -0.12 0.61 0.55 0.62 0.49
60 MatType 0.23 -4.82 -2.87 -3.79 7.32 -57.90 -6.62
61 Balloon 0.33 -5.39 -3.48 -4.05 5.79 -53.02 -5.83
62 NonRecov -1.59 -0.94 -0.75 0.69 -3.13 0.53 0.43
63 BnkrptcyFlg -0.15 0.02 0.19 1.10 -0.78 -1.88 -0.09
64 BeginBal -3.39 -2.13 -3.27 1.56 -0.67 -8.03 5.99
65 Obal -1.18 21.62 19.06 -41.82 18.39 -7.16 -115.35
66 Rate -17.31∗∗∗ 29.77 29.74 34 -27.34∗∗∗ 8.05 32.65
SE 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.10 0.39
67 SchedPrin 134.71 153.33 54.63 89.44 156.85 173.07 41.50
68 Payment 44.44 -361.30 -6.64 -37.43 24.03 -1.95 57.25
69 UnschdPrin 45.46 -133.66 70.57 -47.70 57.08 -71.93 -172.29
70 PrePayPen 11.65 -253.05 -103.59 -61.27 -44.45 -370.52 16.91
71 ActBalance 2.25 0.94 2.73 -2.03 -0.28 8.07 -4.28
72 Liqprcds -75.90 76.39 35.06 131.46 8.39 179.17 165.38
73 Liqexp 448.71 -1139.31 -2653.88 -518.47 -124.37 -1035.34 72.08
74 RlzdLoss 69.41 26.56 -48.44 -42.75 39.97 -43.45 -58.66
75 NumProp -2.03 3.72 4.96 16.78 5.49 4.55 -23.82
76 AprslRed -101.36 8.64 11.74 66.68 -20.31 49.31 87.47
77 SecurLTV 5.65 5.77 5.39 3.49 3.20 3.68 -4.19
78 NOI 159.73 -7.38 -39.41 27.03 124.60 -77.96 -149.62
79 LTV -6.55∗∗∗ -3.10 -2.39 0.03 -3.56 -2.21 0.77
SE 1.11 0.53 0.41 0.01 0.61 0.38 0.13
80 AppValue -2.27 3.02 4.01 7.02 -201.11 11.14 9.66
81 OccRate 0.42 -3.10 -3.55 -3.51 -1.27 -2.28 -2.84
82 Basis -7.14 -2.13 -1.89 0.28 19.61 48.04 5.77
84 Age -6.55 -5.95 -4.29 -4.77 -2.70 6.02 8.03
85 Age2 16.16 0.62 -2.87 -1.52 12.32 -10.49 -8.52
86 Unemp -1.93∗∗∗ 17.51 21.77 18.87 25.90 21.55 -12.23∗∗∗
SE 0.05 0.43 0.53 0.46 0.64 0.53 0.30
87 GDP -0.84 0.75 0.27 3.30 8.21 2.35 -6.66
88 2YrTr 4.89 -7.05 -9.52 -34.94 -5.31 -50.57 -3.23
89 10YrTr 10.94 18.14 18.82 37.29 -20.60 7.96 15.26
90 NAREIT 0.10 0.13 0.32 0.20 0.02 0.41 0.17
91 MIT.Liq 0.29 -0.12 -0.35 -0.31 0.27 -0.34 3.71
92 TimeToMat 4.69 4.63 4.43 4.57 -101.20 -140.81 2.91
Table 5.3: Cross-Validation Training Errors of Models across Delinquency Classes with sample ranging
from Jan 1998 - June 2012.
Naive Mult Lasso Ridge DRF GBM DNN
W0 30D 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0
W30 60D 0.61 1 1 1 0.98 1 1
W60 90D 0.63 1 1 1 0.98 1 1
W90 120D 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.21 0.27 0.21
PrfMatBal 1 1 1 1 0.76 0.84 0.78
NPrfMatBal 1 0.67 0.7 0.74 0.16 0.12 0.12
B120D 1 0.8 0.87 0.83 0.22 0.21 0.2
Totals 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 5.4: Out-of-Sample Test Errors of Models across Delinquency Classes with sample ranging from Jul
2012 - June 2016.
Naive Multi Lasso Ridge DRF GBM DNN
W0 30D 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
W30 60D 0.89 1 1 1 1 1 1
W60 90D 0.59 1 1 1 1 1 1
W90 120D 0.2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.14 0.15 0.17
PrfMatBal 0.98 1 1 1 0.97 0.96 0.95
NPrfMatBal 1 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.19 0.13 0.13
B120D 1 1 1 1 0.07 0.08 0.07
Totals 0.98 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
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time to maturity 0.65



























Table 5.7: Out of sample Confusion Matrix for DNN (Deep Neural Network) across Delinquency Classes.
W0 30D W30 60D W60 90D W90 120D PrfMatBal NPrfMatBal B120D Error
W0 30D 565681 10 81 370 0 3588 1290 0.01
W30 60D 3174 0 5 4 0 31 35 1
W60 90D 1684 0 0 4 0 16 20 1
W90 120D 1396 0 0 11 0 47 39 0.99
PrfMatBal 493 0 0 4 0 148 6 1
NPrfMatBal 999 0 0 136 0 1566 43 0.43
B120D 2495 0 3 16 0 97 277 0.90
Totals 575922 10 89 545 0 5493 1710 0.03
Table 5.8: Out of sample Confusion Matrix Misclassification Error for Bankruptcy is close to 0% during
COVID-19
Non-BK BK Error
Non-BK 581697 13 0
BK 22 2037 0.01
Totals 581719 2050 0
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time to maturity 0.29
Table 5.10: Out of sample Confusion Matrix Misclassification Error for REO is close to 0% during COVID-
19
Non-REO REO Error
Non-REO 364993 1084 0
REO 782 365042 0
Totals 365775 366126 0


























Table 5.12: Out of sample Confusion Matrix Misclassification Error for Foreclosure is close to 0% during
COVID-19
Non-FCL FCL Error
Non-FCL 364993 1084 0
FCL 782 365042 0
Totals 365775 366126 0
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Table 5.15: Out of sample Confusion Matrix Misclassification Error for W90 120D is high during COVID-
19
Non-W90 120D W90 120D) Error
Non-W90 120D 577640 4636 0.01
W90 120D 1365 128 0.91
Totals 579005 4764 0.01
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Table 5.17: Misclassifical Error is high for B120D loans
Non-B120D B120D Error
Non-B120D 579326 1555 0
B120D 2382 506 0.82
Totals 581708 2061 0.01
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.1 Loan to Value and Net Operating Income





whereAOBt is the Outstanding Balance at time t-1 that is amortized ,DSt is the scheduled payment due for
servicing the debt obligation at time t, BT is the Balloon Payment due at maturity, MVt is the Market value
of the property/properties at time t (which varies significantly with respect to macroeconomic conditions and
spatial/location context) for which the mortgage has been issued, ARt is the Appraisal Reduction at time t.
AOB remains consistent, since, prepaymant penalty clauses discourage voluntary curtailment/full pre-
payment. SP obligations are not met both when the borrower is cash-constrained and also when the borrower
chooses to strategically default. Proximity to balloon payment at maturity further complicates the endoge-
nous behavior of the commercial borrowers towards maturity of the loan. The market value of a property
is a function of the macro-economic factors like state GDP, Unemployment Rate, geographical location, 2
Year and 10 Year Treasury Rates. Until valuation is obtained, Appraisal Reduction Amount (ARA) may
be calculated based on the scheduled principal balance or some other formula as defined in the servicing
agreement.
NOI calculation involves the following key variables. Potential Rental Income assumes zero vacancy or
could be based on a rental market analysis. Vacancy losses are realized when tenants vacate the property
and/or tenants default on their lease obligations. Total Operating Expenses on an Investment Property could
include ”Property Taxes, Rental Property Insurance, Property Management Fees, Maintenance and Repairs,
Miscellaneous Expenses, etc. Debt service, depreciation, leasing commissions, tenant improvements, re-
pairs to wear and tear, income taxes, and mortgage interest expenses are not included in the calculation
of net operating income”. This is because NOI is property-specific devoid of other investor or borrower-
specific expenses. NOI helps calculate Cap Rate (property’s potential rate of return), ROI, Debt Coverage
Ratio, Cash Return on Investment. NOI provides an estimate a property’s ongoing operating revenue. NOI
analysis can be manipulated from the choice to accelerate or defer certain expenses. The NOI of a property
can change depending on the property management. Because other expenses are not considered in NOI,
the real cash flow from a property may differ net other expenses. Further projected rents cannot be used to
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calculate NOI when rents differ from market rents.
.2 Multinomial Logit Model
In a Multinomial Logit Model, log-odds of each delinquency state with respect to the ”Current” state as-
sumes a linear specification. The odds that a loan has a delinquency classes j as opposed to the baseline,
depending only on individual loan-specific covariates is defined as:
Pr(Yi = j|Zi = z)




the choice Yi takes on non-negative, un-ordered integer values Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. Multinomial logistic
regression does not assume normality, linearity, or homoskedasticity; it has a well-behaved likelihood func-
tion, a special case of conditional logit. A more powerful alternative to multinomial logistic regression is
discriminant function analysis which requires these assumptions are met. Multinomial logistic regression
also assumes non-perfect separation.
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption inherent in Multinomial Logit Model
implies that adding or deleting alternative outcome categories does not affect the odds among the remaining
outcomes.
Pr(Yi = j|Yi ∈ {j, l}) =
Pr(Yi = j)











This can be tested by the Hausman-McFadden test. There are alternative modeling methods, such as
alternative-specific multinomial probit model, or nested logit model to relax the IIA assumption.
.2.1 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Multinomial Logit assumes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The following Finite State Au-
tomaton details all possible transitions so that the above arguments can be visualized.
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Current 30DPD 60DPD 90DPD 120DPD
Clearly, the borrower would like to stick with the first choice, as the second choice classifies him/her in
the default category and is detrimental for her creditworthiness from a lender’s perspective. Now suppose,
one more choice for being in 30 days to 60 days of delinquency is given to the borrower, s/he may choose
to rather be in this new state instead of less than 30 days of delinquency and may strategically miss one
payment if there is a great investment opportunity for him/her in that one month horizon. In fact, none of
the models (except Naive Bayes) can distinguish these three classes (W0 30D, W30 60D & W60 90D) and
considers all of them as Current Loans in Table 5.4.
The borrower can undertake this decision as she/she is already some days in delinquency and she/she
wouldn’t mind going to the next bucket until she/she falls in the bucket for 90 days to 120 days of delin-
quency. In this situation, the borrower’s creditworthiness doesn’t change that much from a lender’s per-
spective. hence, the odds for being in the ”less than 30 days delinquency” to being in the classes of 90
days to 120 days of delinquency will change drastically in the presence of this new choice of being in 30
days to 60 days of delinquency. hence the IIA assumption is clearly violated.
Also the marginal effect of features towards classifying the response set does not have a clear interpre-
tation in terms of sensitivity and directionality. We list the co-efficients of Multinomial Logit for the sake of
completeness. (Table 5.2)
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.3 Distributed Random Forest
Recursive partitioning, a critical data mining tool, shelps in exploring the stucture of a data set. This section
provides a brief overview of CART modeling, conditional inference trees, and random forests.
Random Forests are developed by aggregating decision trees and can be used for both classification and
regression. Each tree is a weak learner created from bootstrapping from subset of rows and columns. More
trees will reduce the variance.It alleviates the issue of overfitting, can handle a large number of features.
It shelps with feature selection based on importance. It is user-friendly with two parameters: number of
trees (default 500) and variables randomly selected as candidates at each split,
√
ntree for classification and
ntree/3 for regression. ”Out Of Bag Error” is estimated for each bootstrap iteration and related tree.
R’s randomForest splits based on the Gini criterion and H2O trees are split based on reduction in Squared
Error (even for classification). H2O also uses histograms for splitting and can handle splitting on categorical
variables without dummy (or one-hot) encoding. Also, R’s randomForest builds really deep trees, resulting
in pure leaf nodes, leading to constant increments in prediction and ties and hence relatively lower AUC.The
trees in H2O’s random forest aren’t quite as deep and therefore aren’t as pure, allowing for predictions that
have some more granularity to them and that can be better sorted for a better AUC score.
CART models an outcome yi for an instance i as:
yi = f(xi) =
M∑
m=1
cmIxi ∈ Rm (4)
where each observation xi belongs to exactly one subset Rm, cm is the mean of all training observations
in Rm.
.4 Gradient Boosting Machine
GBM Friedman 2000 creates an ensemble Kuncheva 2003 of weak prediction models in stages and utilizes
a differentiable loss function. Boosting trees does increase accuracy, but at the cost of speed and meaningful
interpretability.
At each step m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M of gradient boosting, an estimator hm is computed from the residuals of
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the previous model predictions. Friedman (2001) proposed regularization by shrinkage:
Fm(x) = Fm−1(x) + νγmhm(x) (5)
where hm(x) represents a weak learner of fixed depth, γm is the step length and ν is the learning rate or
the shrinkage factor. XGBoost Chen and Guestrin 2016 is a faster and more accurate implementation of the
Gradient Boosting algorithm Chen, Lundberg, and Lee 2018.
.5 Deep Neural Network
Figure 12: Deep Neural Network
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.5.1 Deep Neural Network for CMBS
The purpose for a Deep Neural Network (DNN) is bourne out of the need to have transparency and account-
ability Albanesi and Vamossy 2019. By the very nature of the DNN, we do not have to add interaction terms
in the specification of the model, especially in the case of high dimensional data. The sequential layers
embody highly non-linear and non-trivial interaction among the variables and capture several latent fun-
damental features in the process. The causal interpretation of the covariates both in default Kvamme et al.
2018 and prepayment calculations have not been explored in details. The broader impact could be traced out
by improved allocation of credit and aid in policy design (macroprudential, bankruptcy, foreclosure, etc.).
With the provision of enough hidden units, a neural network can mimic continuous functions on closed
and bounded sets really well Hornik 1991, vis-a-vis the product and division of relevant features and their
interactions. More layers, and not more units in each layer, learns atures of greater complexity. Deep neural
networks 12, with three or more hidden layers, require exponentially fewer units than shallow networks or
logistic regressions with basis functions; see Montufar et al. 2014 and Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville
2016.
Under certain regularity conditions, the estimators are consistent and also asymptotically normal (see
Hornik, Stinchcombe, and White 1989, Sussmann 1992 and Albertini and Sontag 1993 where they study
the identifiability). One can regularize DNN using optimal hyper-parameter tuning via cross-validation and
”drop out” some sample values to reduce overfitting Srivastava et al. 2014.
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) ?? have an extensive set of current applications like: System identifica-
tion and control (e.g., vehicle control, trajectory prediction, etc.), Game-playing and decision making (e.g.,
chess, poker, etc.), Pattern and sequence recognition (e.g., radar systems, face identification, signal clas-
sification, speech/image recognition, etc.), Medial diagnosis and finance (e.g., automated trading systems,
cancer diagnosis, etc.).
.5.2 Hyperparameter Tuning and Grid Search
Hyper-parameter tuning with Random Grid Search (RGS) tests different combinations of hyper-parameters
to find the optimal choice based on accuracy, without overfitting.
Hyperparameters can be divided into 2 categories:
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• Optimizer hyperparameters
• Model Specific hyperparameters
Our model hyperparameters are: score training samples = 6125796, epoch = 60000, hidden = c(30,20,10,7),
hidden dropout ratios = c(0.01, 0.01, 0.01,0.01), momentum start = 0.5, momentum ramp = 100, momen-
tum stable = 0.99, missing values handling = ”Skip”, initial weight distribution =”Uniform”, nesterov accelerated gradient
= TRUE, activation = ”RectifierWithDropout”, nfolds = 10, fold assignment = ”Stratified”, keep cross validation predictions
= FALSE, variable importances = TRUE, adaptive rate = FALSE, l1 =1e-5, l2 =1e-5, export weights and biases
= FALSE, mini batch size = 128, loss = ”CrossEntropy”, distribution = ”AUTO”, balance classes = T,
max after balance size = 1, rate = 05, rate annealing = 1e-06, rate decay = 1, stopping metric = ”MSE”,
seed = 1122.
.5.3 Class Imbalance Problem
Most classifiers are unable to distinguish minor classes Kuncheva 2003 and are sheavily influenced by major
classes, e.g., the conditional probability of minor classes are underestimated in a logistic regression King
and Zeng 2001, Tree based classifiers, and KNN yield high recall but low sensitivity when the data set is
extremely unbalanced Daelemans, Goethals, and Morik 2008. There are a plethora of techniques to balance
the data, e.g., oversampling, under-sampling and Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE)
proposed by Chawla et al. 2002.
.6 Cost of Misaligned CARES Act: Overcrowding, Selective Verification and Unintended Racial
Consequences
.6.1 CARES Act
Key words chosen manually
Keywords for identifying employment issues are: “unemployed”, ”out of work”, ”laid off”, ”furlough”,
”unable to achieve”, “collactivitie” and “suspended”, “insufficient” and “conditional liquidation”, “ADV”
and “late charge”, “not available” and “payment”, “loss” and “request”, “lost job”, and “didn’t” and “work”.
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Keywords for identifying Inbound communications are: ”Inbound”, ”IB”, ”reached out to” and not
”borrower”, ”received”, ”Borrower is writing”, ”was contacted”, ”borrower” and ”informed” or ”indicated”,
”request”, ”marital difficulties”, ”death of family member”, ”excessive obligations”, ”casualty loss”, ”pay-
ment dispute”, ”tenant not paying”, ”prior bk” and not ”OB” and not ”Outbound”.
Keywords for identifying Outbound communications are: ”OB”, ”Outbound”, ”COVID19 Forbearance
Letter 712 Requested from vendor”, ”Asked”, ”Replied”, ”msg in dmm portal to da”, ”Called borrower”,
”LMStatus:”, ”No Contact”, ”email reply back”, ”Good Morning”, ”CMS encourages”, ”Carrington Mort-
gage Services authorizes”, ”next due”, ”response”, ”responded”, ”decline”, ”CMS representative”, ”will be
asked”, ”CMS is committed”, ”was contacted”, ”LM Program”, ”payment dispute”, ”prior bk”, ”illness”,
”Offered Borrower” and not ”IB” and not ”Inbound”.
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.6.2 Differential Borrower Behavior
Figure 13: Forbearance applications and Loan Count across different median incomes in US Dollars.
Figure 14: Performing Loans: Time Trend of COVID, Unemployed Curtailment of Income Flags.
105
Figure 15: Non-Performing Loans: Time Trend of COVID, Unemployed Curtailment of Income
Flags.
.6.3 Keywords from NLP on data
Figure 16: Words related to Unemployment, Inbound and Outbound.
106
Figure 17: Words related to Unemployment and Inbound.
Figure 18: Words related to Unemployment and Outbound.
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Figure 19: Words related to Unemployment only (without Inbound and Outbound).
Figure 20: Inbound Communications and Financial Hardship.
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Figure 21: Inbound Communications, Family, Property and Loss.
Figure 22: Inbound Communications and Legal Issues.
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Figure 23: Outbound Communications and Loan Modification.
Figure 24: Outbound Communications and COVID.
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Figure 25: Outbound Communications related to Servicer.
.6.4 US Map Spatial distribution for key variables
Figure 26: Percentage of Govt. loan Exposure by County in April 2020 among Performing Loans.
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Figure 27: Percentage of COVID Forbearance Applications by County in April 2020.
Figure 28: Percentage of Curtailment of Income by County in April 2020.
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Figure 29: Inbound Forbearance Communications by Delinquency Status and Race in April 2020.
Figure 30: Inbound Forbearance Communications Table by Delinquency Status and Race in April
2020.
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Figure 31: Outbound Forbearance Communications by Delinquency Status and Race in April 2020.
Figure 32: Outbound Forbearance Communications Table by Delinquency Status and Race in April
2020.
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Figure 33: Average Mortgage Principal and Interest for Gov-backed loans.
Figure 34: National Active Forbearance Plans.
Figure 35: National New Forbearance Plans - by week.
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Figure 36: Status of COVID related Forbearance in August 2020.
Figure 37: Status of Loans leaving COVID-19 related Forbearance Plans.
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Table 18: Summary Statistics: Data for April 2020 performance report (all loans)
PANEL A: All Loans
PANEL A count mean sd median min max range skew kurtosis
Covid Forbearance Flag 19159 6.74% 0.251 0 0 1 1 3.451 9.911
Unemployed Flag 19159 3.48% 0.183 0 0 1 1 5.079 23.8
Prior Unemployment Flag 19159 0.64% 0.08 0 0 1 1 12.359 150.755
FC Moratorium Flag 19159 6.74% 0.251 0 0 1 1 3.451 9.911
Curtailment of Income Flag 19159 4.86% 0.215 0 0 1 1 4.198 15.628
Inbound Borrower Flag 19159 22.31% 0.416 0 0 1 1 1.33 -0.23
Outbound Borrower Flag 19159 29.38% 0.455 0 0 1 1 0.906 -1.18
Dlq 19159 1.429 2.049 0 0 5 5 0.987 -0.837
original balance 19159 96791.008 84115.159 70947.24 1972.51 747750 745777.49 2.353 8.299
original appraisal 19159 119747.758 97459.965 90000 3122.24 978200 975077.76 2.821 11.993
original fico 19159 612.567 67.522 613 372 847 475 0.244 -0.13
current rate 19159 0.066 0.029 0.058 0 0.197 0.197 0.427 -1.026
orig ltv 19159 80.504 23.657 88.585 2.704 139.349 136.645 -1.082 0.527
log(current balance) 19159 10.801 1.08 10.898 0.01 13.584 13.574 -0.692 1.589
Gov 19159 0.348 0.476 0 0 1 1 0.64 -1.591
corporate adv 19159 6.897 1.767 7.174 0.482 12.197 11.715 -1.34 3.213
rem term 19159 190.817 112.797 202 6 526 520 0.061 -1.032
mod flag 19159 0.354 0.478 0 0 1 1 0.611 -1.627
N 19159
PANEL B: Government Loans
Covid Forbearance Flag 6660 11.13% 0.31 0 0 1 1 2.47 4.11
Unemployed Flag 6660 5.23% 0.22 0 0 1 1 4.02 14.19
Prior Unemployment Flag 6660 1.07% 0.1 0 0 1 1 9.53 88.79
FC Moratorium Flag 6660 12.57% 0.33 0 0 1 1 2.26 3.1
Curtailment of Income Flag 6660 7.76% 0.27 0 0 1 1 3.16 7.96
Inbound Borrower Flag 6660 32.43% 0.47 0 0 1 1 0.75 -1.44
Outbound Borrower Flag 6660 41.80% 0.49 0 0 1 1 0.33 -1.89
Dlq 6660 2.26 2.17 1 0 5 5 0.25 -1.73
original balance 6660 142333.67 78248.12 126424 21825 730987 709162 1.78 5.35
original appraisal 6660 149441.5 84418.46 131000 23000 890000 867000 1.96 6.66
original fico 6660 617.38 65.13 628 376 813 437 -0.02 -0.21
current rate 6660 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.1 0.09 1.76 4.47
orig ltv 6660 95.92 7.55 98.11 9.97 130.77 120.79 -2.83 13.79
log(current balance) 6660 11.51 0.71 11.59 0.01 13.41 13.4 -1.8 15.37
corporate adv 6660 5.95 2.41 6.21 0.48 11.47 10.99 -0.58 -0.07
rem term 6660 274.79 61.87 283 7 446 439 -1.44 2.72
mod flag 6660 0.69 0.46 1 0 1 1 -0.83 -1.31
N 6660
PANEL C: Non-Government Loans
Covid Forbearance Flag 12499 4.40% 0.21 0 0 1 1 4.45 17.77
Unemployed Flag 12499 2.54% 0.16 0 0 1 1 6.03 34.33
Prior Unemployment Flag 12499 0.42% 0.06 0 0 1 1 15.4 235.33
FC Moratorium Flag 12499 3.63% 0.19 0 0 1 1 4.96 22.56
Curtailment of Income Flag 12499 3.31% 0.18 0 0 1 1 5.22 25.22
Inbound Borrower Flag 12499 16.91% 0.37 0 0 1 1 1.77 1.12
Outbound Borrower Flag 12499 22.75% 0.42 0 0 1 1 1.3 -0.31
Dlq1 12499 0.99 1.83 0 0 5 5 1.56 0.65
original balance 12499 72523.93 76741.5 50993.05 1972.51 747750 745777.49 3.63 17.55
original appraisal 12499 103925.67 100213.71 74000 3122.24 978200 975077.76 3.48 16.07
original fico 12499 610 68.63 605 372 847 475 0.38 -0.05
current rate 12499 0.08 0.03 0.08 0 0.2 0.2 -0.29 -0.69
orig ltv1 12499 72.29 25.17 77.54 2.7 139.35 136.65 -0.53 -0.28
log(current balance) 12499 10.42 1.05 10.47 3 13.58 10.58 -0.38 1.48
corporate adv 12499 7.4 0.98 7.37 5.02 12.2 7.18 0.74 0.9
rem term 12499 146.07 108.18 125 6 526 520 0.91 0.31
mod flag 12499 0.17 0.38 0 0 1 1 1.72 0.96
N 12499
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Table 19: Summary Statistics: Data for April 2020 performance report (granular)
PANEL A: Performing and Govt-backed loans
count mean sd median min max range skew kurtosis
Covid Forbearance Flag 3657 13.18% 0.34 0 0 1 1 2.18 2.74
Unemployed Flag 3657 1.48% 0.12 0 0 1 1 8.04 62.7
Prior Unemployment Flag 3657 0.57% 0.08 0 0 1 1 13.08 169.05
FC Moratorium Flag 3657 0.16% 0.04 0 0 1 1 24.62 604.17
Curtailment of Income Flag 3657 4.73% 0.21 0 0 1 1 4.26 16.18
Inbound Borrower Flag 3657 24.99% 0.43 0 0 1 1 1.15 -0.67
Outbound Borrower Flag 3657 27.89% 0.45 0 0 1 1 0.99 -1.03
Dlq4 3657 0.53 1.03 0 0 5 5 3.26 11.37
original balance 3657 134613.71 74617.33 118907 21825 653015 631190 1.73 4.72
original appraisal 3657 141636.78 81805.48 125000 23000 890000 867000 2.06 7.35
original fico 3657 615.57 66.86 625 376 813 437 0.04 -0.27
current rate 3657 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.1 0.08 1.93 6.45
orig ltv 3657 95.89 7.71 98.16 9.97 124.39 114.42 -3.07 16.2
current balance 3657 110525.8 70592.05 96412.37 522.02 669748.08 669226.06 1.61 4.53
corporate adv 3657 603.63 2370.6 187.44 0.62 95760.35 95759.73 25.17 853.19
rem term 3657 271.36 66.4 281 9 446 437 -1.44 2.36
mod flag 3657 0.73 0.44 1 0 1 1 -1.05 -0.89
N 3657
PANEL B: Performing and Non-Govt-backed loans
Covid Forbearance Flag 10157 4.54% 0.21 0 0 1 1 4.37 17.08
Unemployed Flag 10157 1.19% 0.11 0 0 1 1 9 78.94
Prior Unemployment Flag 10157 0.30% 0.05 0 0 1 1 18.32 333.5
FC Moratorium Flag 10157 0.01% 0.01 0 0 1 1 100.75 10150
Curtailment of Income Flag 10157 2.64% 0.16 0 0 1 1 5.91 32.92
Inbound Borrower Flag 10157 13.22% 0.34 0 0 1 1 2.17 2.71
Outbound Borrower Flag 10157 14.43% 0.35 0 0 1 1 2.02 2.1
Dlq 10157 0.2 0.77 0 0 5 5 5.33 29.86
original balance 10157 65724.2 61534.64 49605.26 2025.39 709600 707574.61 3.57 19.04
original appraisal 10157 94719.04 83717.5 70000 3122.24 978200 975077.76 3.61 18.49
original fico 10157 613.93 68.78 610 402 847 445 0.35 -0.04
current rate 10157 0.08 0.03 0.09 0 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.52
orig ltv 10157 72.22 24.81 77.05 2.7 139.35 136.65 -0.47 -0.34
current balance 10157 48789.55 56157.64 32970.4 19.14 699407.76 699388.62 3.65 20.23
Gov 10157 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA
corporate adv 10157 1867.42 2898.92 1404.94 150 99951.25 99801.25 14.74 364.16
rem term 10157 140.73 105.79 119 6 494 488 0.96 0.45
mod flag 10157 0.16 0.36 0 0 1 1 1.88 1.52
N 10157
PANEL C: Non-Performing and Govt-backed loans
Covid Forbearance Flag 3003 8.62% 0.28 0 0 1 1 2.95 6.68
Unemployed Flag 3003 9.79% 0.3 0 0 1 1 2.7 5.32
Prior Unemployment Flag 3003 1.67% 0.13 0 0 1 1 7.55 55.04
FC Moratorium Flag 3003 27.67% 0.45 0 0 1 1 1 -1.01
Curtailment of Income Flag 3003 11.46% 0.32 0 0 1 1 2.42 3.85
Inbound Borrower Flag 3003 41.49% 0.49 0 0 1 1 0.35 -1.88
Outbound Borrower Flag 3003 58.74% 0.49 1 0 1 1 -0.35 -1.87
Dlq 3003 4.37 1.02 5 2 5 3 -1.46 0.71
original balance 3003 151734.91 81484.54 135695 24600 730987 706387 1.81 5.79
original appraisal 3003 158945.96 86563.52 140500 25000 800000 775000 1.88 6.13
original fico 3003 619.58 62.89 631 392 810 418 -0.11 -0.12
current rate 3003 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.08 1.57 2.71
orig ltv 3003 95.95 7.35 98.05 38.16 130.77 92.61 -2.5 10.12
current balance 3003 136656.28 81399.43 121333.65 0.01 665499.18 665499.17 1.68 4.87
corporate adv 3003 4969.19 8068.78 2128.66 7.03 89295.04 89288.01 4.02 23.74
rem term 3003 278.97 55.59 284 7 418 411 -1.33 2.76
mod flag 3003 0.64 0.48 1 0 1 1 -0.59 -1.65
N 3003
PANEL D: Non-Performing and Non-Govt-backed loans
Covid Forbearance Flag 2342 3.80% 0.19 0 0 1 1 4.83 21.33
Unemployed Flag 2342 8.41% 0.28 0 0 1 1 2.99 6.97
Prior Unemployment Flag 2342 0.94% 0.1 0 0 1 1 10.17 101.37
FC Moratorium Flag 2342 19.34% 0.4 0 0 1 1 1.55 0.41
Curtailment of Income Flag 2342 6.23% 0.24 0 0 1 1 3.62 11.1
Inbound Borrower Flag 2342 32.92% 0.47 0 0 1 1 0.73 -1.47
Outbound Borrower Flag 2342 58.84% 0.49 1 0 1 1 -0.36 -1.87
Dlq 2342 4.39 1.05 5 2 5 3 -1.48 0.64
original balance 2342 102013.65 118082.73 59776.37 1972.51 747750 745777.49 2.57 7.06
original appraisal 2342 143853.8 145765.45 89950 13070 975000 961930 2.5 7.11
original fico 2342 592.96 65.29 585 372 845 473 0.51 0.03
current rate 2342 0.07 0.03 0.07 0 0.15 0.15 0.13 -1.04
orig ltv 2342 72.62 26.66 79.42 4.3 138.5 134.2 -0.74 -0.13
current balance 2342 90729.69 115243.56 49559.65 45.29 793649.71 793604.42 2.56 7.04
corporate adv 2342 8367.93 14368.58 4529.73 170 198219.24 198049.24 7.02 70.28
rem term 2342 169.24 115.18 158 6 526 520 0.68 -0.16
mod flag 2342 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 1 1.2 -0.57
N 2342
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Table 20: Multivariate Analysis of Borrower Forbearance for all loans
This table reports the regression results for early forbearance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Loans FHA/VA Non-FHA/VA
Loans Loans
Inbound Call 2.772*** 2.939*** 3.279*** 2.627***
(0.181) (0.199) (0.219) (0.232)
Outbound Call 2.209*** 3.094*** 3.020*** 3.145***
(0.32) (0.483) (0.413) (0.722)
AssetType n -1.088** -0.169 -0.181 -0.654
(0.414) (0.501) (0.617) (0.83)
Government (FHA/VA) Loan -0.714 0.107
(0.475) (0.471)
corporate adv -0.173 0.263 0.502 -6.723*
(0.345) (0.31) (0.341) (3.307)
Inbound Call X Government 0.453** 0.27
(0.146) (0.166)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan 0.827*** 0.506** 0.197 1.065***
(0.151) (0.169) (0.208) (0.262)
Outbound Call X Government 0.691 -0.103
(0.438) (0.429)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan 2.134*** 1.381** 1.379* 1.255
(0.385) (0.461) (0.567) (0.793)
AssetType Gov -0.164 -0.207
(0.155) (0.147)
current balance -9.172*** 16.991*** 19.264* 13.474*
(0.787) (4.604) (9.022) (5.814)
orig ltv 0.001 0 -0.006 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
original fico 0.000059 0.000404 0.0003 0.0002
(0.000467) (0.000476) (0.001) (0.001)
current rate -9.754*** -3.181* -23.120*** -1.362
(1.782) (1.62) (6.442) (1.775)
currentratetype new 0.048 0.178 0.003 0.089
(0.162) (0.152) (0.297) (0.191)
Borrower Noted Unemployment 0.623*** 0.690*** 0.396 1.037***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.232) (0.258)
Borrower Noted Income Curtailment 2.144*** 2.031*** 2.007*** 2.005***
(0.152) (0.161) (0.218) (0.233)
AIC 7992.973 7273.096 3408.143 2665.806
Log Likelihood -3979.486
Fixed Effect None County County County





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.7 Quantifying Soft Information, Mortgage Market Efficiency & Asset Pricing Implications
Table 26: Variables Names and Descriptions
Variable Name Description
LoanID Unique identifier of the loan in the Private Equity firm
cutoff date The date on which the observations on hard information are recorded
origination date The origination date of the mortgage loan by the original lender
first pay date The first date on which the deb obligations are due for the borrower
maturity date The original maturity date of the loan, which may change due to loan modification and/or renegotiation
original balance Original Balance of the loan when issued by the lender
original appraisal The appraisal value of the property when the loan is originated
original term Original term of the loan
amort term Current amortization term of the loan, different from Original term if the loan term has been modified
original fico Original FICO score of the borrower at origination
original rate Original mortgage rate offered to the borrower at mortgage origination
original pi Original amortized amount of monthly principal and interest payments due
original rate type Original type of mortgage rate: Fixed or ARM
balloon flag Y/N
io flag Y/N
io term Mortgage term where the loan is interest-only
loan purpose Cash Out, Purchase, Rate Term, Home Improvement
property type Condo Modular Home Multi Family PUD Single Family Townhouse
occupancy type Investment Property Owner Occupied Second Home
doc type Full Limited None Reduced Stated
current balance Current outstanding balance of the loan
value Latest appraised value of the property
iptd Interest payment due date
npdd Next payment due date
current rate Current interest rate of the mortgage
current pi Current amortized amount of monthly principal and interest
bk flag Y/N
bk file date The date when bankruptcy was last filed
fc flag Y/N
fc start date The date when foreclosure was last filed
current fico Current FICO score of the borrower
current fico date The date when the current FICO score was calibrated
zip Zip code of the borrower residence
mod flag Y/N
mod date The date of the last loan modification
current rate type Current type of rate: Fixed or ARM
orig ltv Original Loan-to-Value
lien position 1/2/3
deferred balance Balance deferred to next year for tax-saving purposes
reo flag Y/N
jr lien balance The balance left in the junior lien mortgage
pmts1 Payments in a month
pmts3 Payments in 3 months
pmts6 Payments in 6 months
pmts12 Payments in a year
corporate adv Corporate advances by the servicer
escrow adv Escrow advances by the serviser
state State of the borrower residence
legal grade A, A-, A+, B, B-, B+, C, C-, C+, D, D-, D+, F, NI
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mortgage ins Insurance related to mortgage obligaitons
fc stage F0 - No FC, F0 - Removed F1, F1 - File Referred, F2 F2 - First Legal Filed, F3 F3 - Judgment Entered, F5 - Sale Scheduled
address Street address of borrower residence
city Cit of borrower residence
loan type Conventional, FHA, HELOC, PMI, USDA, VA
number of units Number of units in the property
bk dq delay Delay between delinquency and filing of bankruptcy
bk fc delay Delay between filing bankruptcy and filing foreclosure
loan age Age of the loan from origination
mnths in bk Number of months a loan has been in bankruptcy
mnths in fc Number of months a loan has been in forelosure
mnths since mod Number of months a loan has been modified
rem term Remaining term of the loan, which can change if the loan term is modified
days dq Days of Delinqency
Status Bankruptcy Current Foreclosure W0 30D W30 60D W60 90D W90 120D
Year Month The month in the year the observation is made about loan performance variables
AssetType NPL, PL, REO, ShortSale
LoanStatus Active - 120+ Days DQ, Active - 30 Days DQ, Active - 60 Days DQ, Active - 90 Days DQ, Active - BK,
Active - Current, Active - FC, Active - REO, LIQ - Charge Off, LIQ - Third Party Sale, Pending Servicing Transfer
SaleStrat REO, Foreclosure Sale Scheduled, Sale Ready, Pending Short Sale, Pending Deed-in-Lieu, Loss Mit Hold, Out for offers
Modified Recently, Pending Third Party Sale, On Hold LoanSale Status, Foreclosure Judgment Entered,
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Table 22: Multivariate Analysis of Borrower Forbearance and Race
In Table 22, I add an indicator whether a borrower in Black and interact the dummy variable with IB, OB,
IB PL and OB PL.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Loans FHA/VA Non-FHA/VA
Loans Loans
Inbound Call 2.2319∗∗∗ 2.6727∗∗∗ 3.2027∗∗∗ 3.3648∗∗∗ 1.8695∗∗∗ 1.8817∗∗∗
(0.2754) (0.3798) (0.2062) (0.2582) (0.5097) (0.3850)
Outbound Call 0.2602 1.9040∗∗ 2.1668∗∗∗ 3.1023∗∗∗ 1.4771∗∗∗ 19.9902∗∗∗
(0.3084) (0.5886) (0.2336) (0.4711) (0.4436) (0.5709)
AssetType n −1.0236∗ 0.4955 −1.5982∗∗ −0.3012 −0.3179 17.9754∗∗∗
(0.4330) (0.6446) (0.5309) (0.6930) (0.7133) (0.4405)
Gov −3.1633∗∗∗ −1.7033∗
(0.4501) (0.6719)
Black −0.9346 −0.3006 −0.3018 0.4258 −29.3945∗∗∗ −52.9484∗∗∗
(0.6573) (0.7690) (0.6449) (0.7629) (0.9410) (0.9052)
corporate adv −0.0615∗∗ −0.0241 −0.0545∗∗ −0.0198 −0.1633 −0.3023
(0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.1930) (0.2364)
Inbound Call X Government 0.9447∗∗∗ 0.5606
(0.2534) (0.3231)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan 0.4287 0.1033 0.3874 0.0072 0.9865 0.3951
(0.2198) (0.2355) (0.2274) (0.2514) (0.6394) (0.3921)
Inbound Call X Black 0.0797 −0.1952 −0.0172 −0.2187 0.4552 −0.4292
(0.3563) (0.4033) (0.3755) (0.4311) (1.0909) (1.2637)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan X Black 1.0892 1.1840 1.0405 1.0202 14.5899∗∗∗ 37.1040
(0.6471) (0.6103) (0.6460) (0.6256) (1.3884) (5308.7008)
Outbound Call X Government 2.4230∗∗∗ 1.3121∗
(0.4095) (0.5874)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan 2.2692∗∗∗ 1.0948 2.6058∗∗∗ 1.4769∗ 1.3874∗ −17.3784∗∗∗
(0.4377) (0.5630) (0.4756) (0.6358) (0.6651) (0.4108)
Outbound Call X Black 0.9429 0.3988 0.3865 −0.3640 29.4304∗∗∗ 52.3158∗∗∗
(0.6668) (0.7904) (0.6277) (0.7456) (1.2576) (0.9052)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan X Black −1.2053∗ −1.1254∗ −1.1010 −0.8566 −15.7338∗∗∗ −18.2862
(0.6125) (0.5723) (0.6089) (0.5837) (1.0205) (5412.8656)
AssetType Gov −0.2585 −0.4327
(0.3734) (0.3454)
current balance −0.0920 0.1292 −0.1624∗∗ 0.1734 −0.0205 −0.0927
(0.0473) (0.0889) (0.0540) (0.1080) (0.1691) (0.2751)
orig ltv −0.0150∗∗∗ −0.0056 −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.0084 −0.0119 0.0036
(0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0174)
original fico −0.0017∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0015∗ −0.0010 −0.0050∗ −0.0085∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0036)
current rate −24.7370∗∗∗ −12.1368∗ −43.1878∗∗∗ −22.6451∗∗∗ −11.5115 −14.6377
(5.0955) (5.0962) (5.5675) (6.8337) (6.6101) (8.6513)
currentratetype new 0.0363 0.4382 −0.4367 0.2032 0.1956 0.9364
(0.2606) (0.2745) (0.3944) (0.3956) (0.3744) (0.5797)
Borrower Noted Unemployment 0.3068 0.3236 0.2180 0.3024 0.8731 0.2683
(0.2468) (0.2531) (0.2637) (0.2760) (0.6727) (0.5892)
Borrower Noted Income Curtailment 1.9243∗∗∗ 1.8378∗∗∗ 2.0206∗∗∗ 1.9731∗∗∗ 0.8551 0.8601
(0.2044) (0.2237) (0.2220) (0.2495) (0.5318) (0.5551)
AIC 4021.2615 3022.3850 3653.3871 2658.0711 398.9610 173.7232
Log Likelihood −1988.6307 −1808.6936 −181.4805
Fixed Effects None County None County None County
Num. obs. 28843 28843 25845 25845 2998 2998
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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Table 23: Differences in Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Loans Inbound Outbound
Communications Communications
After March 2020 X Gov 6.6243∗∗∗ 6.6480∗∗∗ 6.5795∗∗∗ 6.2790∗∗∗ 6.2565∗∗∗ 6.3283∗∗∗
(0.5883) (0.9369) (0.5832) (0.6014) (0.5816) (0.6832)
Inbound Call 2.4607∗∗∗ 3.2348∗∗∗ 3.0057∗∗∗ 3.8570∗∗∗
(0.2536) (0.3597) (0.2728) (0.4061)
Outbound Call 0.7644∗∗ 2.5906∗∗∗ 1.1442∗∗∗ 3.2238∗∗∗
(0.2735) (0.5492) (0.2668) (0.5963)
AssetType n −1.3161∗∗ 0.7332 −0.1727 0.6966 −1.4215∗∗∗ 0.4652
(0.4404) (0.5443) (0.2966) (0.3644) (0.3693) (0.5514)
Gov −8.2762∗∗∗ −6.6097∗∗∗ −6.6315∗∗∗ −5.5770∗∗∗ −7.6262∗∗∗ −6.5326∗∗∗
(0.7661) (1.2329) (0.6573) (0.7222) (0.7148) (0.9812)
corporate adv −0.1832∗∗∗ −0.1012∗∗∗ −0.1616∗∗∗ −0.0884∗∗∗ −0.2109∗∗∗ −0.1633∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0187) (0.0248) (0.0198) (0.0227) (0.0208)
Inbound Call X Government 0.8808∗∗∗ −0.0461 1.0352∗∗∗ 0.2352
(0.2460) (0.3158) (0.2407) (0.3278)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan 0.8933∗∗∗ 0.1936 1.2170∗∗∗ 0.6775∗∗
(0.1928) (0.2096) (0.2222) (0.2409)
Outbound Call X Government 2.0149∗∗∗ 0.6839 2.2600∗∗∗ 1.0501
(0.3733) (0.5634) (0.3679) (0.5808)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan 2.1639∗∗∗ 0.5864 3.0530∗∗∗ 1.3807∗∗
(0.4017) (0.4656) (0.3941) (0.5035)
AssetType Gov −0.3351 −0.5857∗ −0.1123 −0.5491 −0.4950 −0.7052∗
(0.3331) (0.2948) (0.2950) (0.3154) (0.3050) (0.3047)
current balance −0.0704 0.0975 −0.0530 0.2068∗∗ 0.0390 0.2699∗∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0730) (0.0460) (0.0719) (0.0453) (0.0751)
orig ltv −0.0126∗∗ 0.0021 −0.0142∗∗∗ −0.0016 −0.0127∗∗ −0.0068
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.0050)
original fico −0.0021∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0015∗ −0.0018∗∗ −0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
current rate −18.6557∗∗∗ −10.7210∗∗ −21.8364∗∗∗ −9.2600∗ −20.9353∗∗∗ −9.3156∗
(5.3494) (4.0850) (5.2717) (4.3092) (5.0597) (4.3302)
currentratetype new −0.2190 0.2646 0.0120 0.2879 −0.0680 0.2741
(0.2559) (0.2304) (0.2353) (0.2315) (0.2177) (0.2257)
Borrower Noted Unemployment 0.5279∗ 0.6688∗∗ 0.8085∗∗ 1.0197∗∗∗ −0.6248∗∗ −0.5150∗∗
(0.2410) (0.2323) (0.2666) (0.2733) (0.1914) (0.1845)
Borrower Noted Income Curtailment 2.0100∗∗∗ 1.9669∗∗∗ 2.9142∗∗∗ 2.9683∗∗∗ −0.1915 −0.1544
(0.1959) (0.2055) (0.2487) (0.2634) (0.1273) (0.1301)
AIC 3245.3400 2528.2219 3954.6566 3029.6796 4354.0823 3269.9377
BIC 3398.0575 4081.9212 4481.3469
Log Likelihood −1604.6700 −1962.3283 −2162.0412
Fixed Effects None County None County None County
Num. obs. 35750 35750 35750 35750 35750 35750
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
124
Table 24: Differences in Differences, Gov for IB and NonGov for OB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Loans Inbound Outbound
Communications Communications
After March 2020 X Gov 6.6243∗∗∗ 6.6480∗∗∗ 6.5795∗∗∗ 6.2790∗∗∗
(0.5883) (0.9369) (0.5832) (0.6014)
After March 2020 X NonGov 4.7099∗∗∗ 4.5125∗∗∗
(0.9804) (1.0035)
Inbound Call 2.4607∗∗∗ 3.2348∗∗∗ 3.0057∗∗∗ 3.8570∗∗∗
(0.2536) (0.3597) (0.2728) (0.4061)
Outbound Call 0.7644∗∗ 2.5906∗∗∗ 2.6076∗∗∗ 3.8210∗∗∗
(0.2735) (0.5492) (0.1788) (0.4421)
AssetType n −1.3161∗∗ 0.7332 −0.1727 0.6966 −1.1151∗ 0.0564
(0.4404) (0.5443) (0.2966) (0.3644) (0.4413) (0.5347)
Gov −8.2762∗∗∗ −6.6097∗∗∗ −6.6315∗∗∗ −5.5770∗∗∗
(0.7661) (1.2329) (0.6573) (0.7222)
NonGov −3.5564∗∗ −2.4699∗
(1.1291) (1.1568)
corporate adv −0.1832∗∗∗ −0.1012∗∗∗ −0.1616∗∗∗ −0.0884∗∗∗ −0.1009∗∗∗ −0.0695∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0187) (0.0248) (0.0198) (0.0163) (0.0182)
Inbound Call X Government 0.8808∗∗∗ −0.0461 1.0352∗∗∗ 0.2352
(0.2460) (0.3158) (0.2407) (0.3278)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan 0.8933∗∗∗ 0.1936 1.2170∗∗∗ 0.6775∗∗
(0.1928) (0.2096) (0.2222) (0.2409)
Outbound Call X Government 2.0149∗∗∗ 0.6839
(0.3733) (0.5634)
Outbound Call X Non-Government −0.5191 −1.2545∗
(0.5188) (0.5718)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan 2.1639∗∗∗ 0.5864 3.0772∗∗∗ 1.8117∗∗∗
(0.4017) (0.4656) (0.3239) (0.4992)
AssetType Gov −0.3351 −0.5857∗ −0.1123 −0.5491 −0.6606 −0.4843
(0.3331) (0.2948) (0.2950) (0.3154) (0.3557) (0.2914)
current balance −0.0704 0.0975 −0.0530 0.2068∗∗ −0.0704 0.2702∗∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0730) (0.0460) (0.0719) (0.0399) (0.0735)
orig ltv −0.0126∗∗ 0.0021 −0.0142∗∗∗ −0.0016 −0.0183∗∗∗ −0.0069
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0050)
original fico −0.0021∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0015∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0015∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
current rate −18.6557∗∗∗ −10.7210∗∗ −21.8364∗∗∗ −9.2600∗ −29.0106∗∗∗ −14.5034∗∗
(5.3494) (4.0850) (5.2717) (4.3092) (5.2108) (4.6068)
currentratetype new −0.2190 0.2646 0.0120 0.2879 −0.0420 0.3452
(0.2559) (0.2304) (0.2353) (0.2315) (0.2006) (0.2303)
Borrower Noted Unemployment 0.5279∗ 0.6688∗∗ 0.8085∗∗ 1.0197∗∗∗ −0.7835∗∗∗ −0.7555∗∗∗
(0.2410) (0.2323) (0.2666) (0.2733) (0.1741) (0.1777)
Borrower Noted Income Curtailment 2.0100∗∗∗ 1.9669∗∗∗ 2.9142∗∗∗ 2.9683∗∗∗ −0.2202 −0.2116
(0.1959) (0.2055) (0.2487) (0.2634) (0.1163) (0.1227)
AIC 3245.3400 2528.2219 3954.6566 3029.6796 5683.7921 4454.4821
BIC 3398.0575 4081.9212 5811.0567
Log Likelihood −1604.6700 −1962.3283 −2826.8960
Fixed Effects None County None County None County
Num. obs. 35750 35750 35750 35750 35750 35750
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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Table 25: Differences in Differences, removing 2 or less observations per county
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Loans Inbound Outbound
Communications Communications
Interaction 6.6137∗∗∗ 6.0908∗∗∗ 6.5615∗∗∗ 6.1486∗∗∗ 6.2421∗∗∗ 6.0306∗∗∗
(0.5889) (0.6775) (0.5836) (0.5832) (0.5819) (0.5895)
Inbound Call 2.4870∗∗∗ 3.2611∗∗∗ 3.0545∗∗∗ 3.8719∗∗∗
(0.2544) (0.3632) (0.2731) (0.4094)
Outbound Call 0.8978∗∗ 2.7987∗∗∗ 1.2758∗∗∗ 3.3759∗∗∗
(0.2761) (0.6108) (0.2694) (0.6615)
AssetType n −1.1251∗∗ 0.9906 −0.1293 0.7092 −1.2550∗∗∗ 0.6351
(0.4225) (0.6250) (0.2973) (0.3661) (0.3579) (0.6374)
Gov −8.4231∗∗∗ −6.1146∗∗∗ −6.6397∗∗∗ −5.4512∗∗∗ −7.7384∗∗∗ −6.2794∗∗∗
(0.7716) (1.0131) (0.6591) (0.7063) (0.7239) (0.9009)
corporate adv −0.1796∗∗∗ −0.0982∗∗∗ −0.1565∗∗∗ −0.0863∗∗∗ −0.2108∗∗∗ −0.1617∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0188) (0.0252) (0.0199) (0.0230) (0.0209)
Inbound Call X Government 0.8981∗∗∗ −0.0417 1.0470∗∗∗ 0.2370
(0.2480) (0.3166) (0.2426) (0.3284)
Inbound Call X Performing Loan 0.8637∗∗∗ 0.1867 1.1701∗∗∗ 0.6665∗∗
(0.1941) (0.2117) (0.2212) (0.2436)
Outbound Call X Government 2.1255∗∗∗ 0.7326 2.3564∗∗∗ 1.0845
(0.3725) (0.5739) (0.3712) (0.5900)
Outbound Call X Performing Loan 1.9753∗∗∗ 0.3248 2.8769∗∗∗ 1.2012∗
(0.3899) (0.5570) (0.3858) (0.6010)
AssetType Gov −0.2769 −0.5593 −0.0672 −0.5356 −0.4618 −0.6863∗
(0.3335) (0.2954) (0.2968) (0.3159) (0.3057) (0.3059)
current balance −0.0755 0.0985 −0.0522 0.2081∗∗ 0.0343 0.2693∗∗∗
(0.0549) (0.0733) (0.0469) (0.0721) (0.0465) (0.0753)
orig ltv −0.0129∗∗ 0.0022 −0.0146∗∗∗ −0.0015 −0.0130∗∗∗ −0.0068
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.0050)
original fico −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0015∗ −0.0020∗∗ −0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
current rate −18.5651∗∗∗ −10.7232∗∗ −21.7854∗∗∗ −9.2273∗ −20.2961∗∗∗ −9.2813∗
(5.4535) (4.0943) (5.3461) (4.3101) (5.1844) (4.3247)
currentratetype new −0.1930 0.2655 0.0388 0.2873 −0.0412 0.2747
(0.2594) (0.2307) (0.2378) (0.2316) (0.2216) (0.2257)
Borrower Noted Unemployment 0.5562∗ 0.6916∗∗ 0.8448∗∗ 1.0553∗∗∗ −0.6066∗∗ −0.5051∗∗
(0.2434) (0.2329) (0.2697) (0.2734) (0.1926) (0.1840)
Borrower Noted Income Curtailment 2.0476∗∗∗ 1.9879∗∗∗ 2.9676∗∗∗ 2.9624∗∗∗ −0.1738 −0.1503
(0.1988) (0.2086) (0.2510) (0.2664) (0.1283) (0.1299)
AIC 3149.8709 2519.4062 3858.9352 3020.5540 4241.1855 3263.9657
BIC 3302.1351 3985.8221 4368.0724
Log Likelihood −1556.9354 −1914.4676 −2105.5928
Fixed Effects None County None County None County
Num. obs. 34861 34861 34861 34861 34861 34861
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Table 27: In-Sample Confusion Matrices for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale using Loan Data
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
NPL 0.03 1 0.02 1
PIF 0.04 1 0.08 1
PL 0 0 0 0
ShortSale 0.01 1 0.04 1
126
Table 28: Variable Importance using DRF for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale with Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 intrst payment due 1334526.88 1 0.13
2 next pay duedate 1193423.12 0.89 0.11
3 loan type 1008397.88 0.76 0.10
4 fc stage 971392.25 0.73 0.09
5 fc flag 548978.38 0.41 0.05
6 state 483539.28 0.36 0.05
7 rem term 473346.88 0.35 0.05
8 cutoff date 415253.38 0.31 0.04
9 legal grade 394640.56 0.30 0.04
10 bk flag 343188.91 0.26 0.03
11 loan purpose 292739.31 0.22 0.03
12 fc start date 282192.66 0.21 0.03
13 jr lien balance 189844.38 0.14 0.02
14 current rate 189190.47 0.14 0.02
15 reo flag 188070.17 0.14 0.02
16 current fico date 180391.91 0.14 0.02
17 current balance 152752.38 0.11 0.01
18 original fico 151196.14 0.11 0.01
19 loan age 146700.42 0.11 0.01
20 mths in fc 146056.75 0.11 0.01
21 current fico 131127.70 0.10 0.01
22 orig ltv 105868.62 0.08 0.01
23 bk dq delay 97435.91 0.07 0.01
24 value 75367.45 0.06 0.01
25 bk file date 70044.45 0.05 0.01
26 original rate 67839.54 0.05 0.01
27 original appraisal 66309.92 0.05 0.01
28 original balance 65674.52 0.05 0.01
29 property type 62172.73 0.05 0.01
30 current pi 60741.72 0.05 0.01
31 mod date 59569.18 0.04 0.01
32 original pi 59540.11 0.04 0.01
33 doc type 59156.05 0.04 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
49 balloon flag 3466.04 0 0
Table 29: Variable Importance using Lasso for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale with Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 loan type.NULL 0.86 1 0.45
2 cutoff date 0.66 0.76 0.34
3 legal grade.NI 0.09 0.11 0.05
4 rem term 0.08 0.09 0.04
5 original fico 0.08 0.09 0.04
6 jr lien balance 0.05 0.06 0.03
7 loan type.CONV 0.05 0.06 0.03
8 loan age 0.02 0.02 0.01
9 mortgage ins 0.02 0.02 0.01
10 current rate 0.02 0.02 0.01
11 pmts1 0 0 0
12 current fico 0 0 0
13 value 0 0 0
14 intrst payment due 0 0 0
15 next pay duedate 0 0 0
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Table 30: Variable Importance using DNN for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale with Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 pmts1 1 1 0.02
2 pmts6 0.71 0.71 0.01
3 pmts3 0.70 0.70 0.01
4 pmts12 0.66 0.66 0.01
5 state.DE 0.49 0.49 0.01
6 legal grade.NI 0.46 0.46 0.01
7 state.OK 0.45 0.45 0.01
8 state.AR 0.45 0.45 0.01
9 current rate type.FIX 0.45 0.45 0.01
10 legal grade.A 0.45 0.45 0.01
11 state.HI 0.44 0.44 0.01
12 doc type.None 0.44 0.44 0.01
13 io flag..N 0.44 0.44 0.01
14 state.FL 0.43 0.43 0.01
15 state.NC 0.43 0.43 0.01
16 state.NV 0.43 0.43 0.01
17 occupancy type.Investment Property 0.43 0.43 0.01
18 property type.PUD 0.42 0.42 0.01
19 occupancy type.Owner Occupied 0.42 0.42 0.01
20 state.AZ 0.42 0.42 0.01
21 original rate type.FIX 0.42 0.42 0.01
22 doc type.Full 0.42 0.42 0.01
23 loan type.HELOC 0.42 0.42 0.01
24 doc type.Stated 0.42 0.42 0.01
25 state.VA 0.41 0.41 0.01
26 occupancy type.NULL 0.41 0.41 0.01
27 bk file date 0.41 0.41 0.01
28 mortgage ins 0.41 0.41 0.01
29 state.PA 0.41 0.41 0.01
30 state.KS 0.41 0.41 0.01
31 bk fc delay 0.41 0.41 0.01
32 state.WA 0.41 0.41 0.01
33 balloon flag.Y 0.41 0.41 0.01
34 state.TN 0.40 0.40 0.01
35 bk flag.N 0.40 0.40 0.01
36 mod flag.Y 0.40 0.40 0.01
37 state.OR 0.40 0.40 0.01
38 state.AK 0.40 0.40 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
158 state.WY 0.27 0.27 0
Table 31: Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale with Loan Data
I provide the misclassification errors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing Loan), PIF (Paid-in-Full),
PL (Performing Loan), ShortSale from the Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices in Table 31 only using loan
performance data.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
NPL 0.03 1 0.02 1
PIF 0.07 1 0.09 1
PL 0 0 0 0
ShortSale 0.08 1 0.08 1
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Table 32: In-Sample Confusion Matrix for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, Servicer Comments, Loan Data
(Loan left join tfidf): I first provide the misclassification errors for the four classes NPL (Non-Performing
Loan), PIF (Paid-in-Full), PL (Performing Loan), ShortSale from the In-Sample Confusion Matrices in
Table 32 using loan performance data with servicer comments.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
NPL 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.07
PIF 0.06 1 0.08 0.08
PL 0 0 0.01 0.01
ShortSale 0.02 1 0.04 0.04
Table 33: Variable Importance using DRF for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, Servicer Comments, Loan
Data (Loan left join tfidf).
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 next pay duedate 1512022.12 1 0.12
2 intrst payment due 1463559.88 0.97 0.11
3 loan type 1255022.12 0.83 0.10
4 fc stage 1234660.25 0.82 0.10
5 fc flag 804520.25 0.53 0.06
6 state 637637.50 0.42 0.05
7 rem term 619736.06 0.41 0.05
8 legal grade 510212.69 0.34 0.04
9 bk flag 392216.34 0.26 0.03
10 fc start date 329544.81 0.22 0.03
11 original fico 290480.78 0.19 0.02
12 jr lien balance 261891.11 0.17 0.02
13 current rate 260584.06 0.17 0.02
14 loan purpose 258598.89 0.17 0.02
15 current fico date 246395.77 0.16 0.02
16 reo flag 223863.62 0.15 0.02
17 loan age 199507.52 0.13 0.02
18 mths in fc 187982.50 0.12 0.01
19 current balance 173566.98 0.11 0.01
20 current fico 159067.14 0.11 0.01
21 orig ltv 132592.11 0.09 0.01
22 bk dq delay 126313.82 0.08 0.01
23 value 120004.49 0.08 0.01
24 original rate 119893.46 0.08 0.01
25 current pi 98654.03 0.07 0.01
26 original appraisal 96831.14 0.06 0.01
27 original balance 91224.95 0.06 0.01
28 original pi 86224.37 0.06 0.01
29 bk file date 85650.62 0.06 0.01
30 doc type 84533.49 0.06 0.01
31 mod date 81525.81 0.05 0.01
32 mths since mod 69582.52 0.05 0.01
33 miss 67608.87 0.04 0.01
34 pmts12 65172.74 0.04 0.01
35 mths in bk 65073.76 0.04 0.01
36 property type 63111.77 0.04 0
37 mortgage ins 62803.14 0.04 0
... ... ... ... ...
84 activemilitary 0.01 0 0
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Table 34: Variable Importance using Lasso for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, Servicer Comments, Loan
Data (Loan left join tfidf).
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 bk flag.Y 0.56 1 0.20
2 fc flag.Y 0.55 0.99 0.20
3 fc stage.NULL 0.28 0.50 0.10
4 loan type.NULL 0.27 0.48 0.10
5 next pay duedate 0.13 0.23 0.05
6 intrst payment due 0.13 0.23 0.05
7 loan type.CONV 0.11 0.19 0.04
8 original fico 0.09 0.16 0.03
9 legal grade.NI 0.09 0.16 0.03
10 current fico 0.09 0.16 0.03
11 legal grade.C+ 0.08 0.14 0.03
12 jr lien balance 0.07 0.13 0.03
13 reo flag.Y 0.07 0.13 0.03
14 bk dq delay 0.06 0.11 0.02
15 rem term 0.04 0.06 0.01
16 mths in fc 0.03 0.06 0.01
17 mortgage ins 0.03 0.06 0.01
18 miss 0.02 0.03 0.01
19 legal grade.B 0.02 0.03 0.01
20 fc 0.01 0.02 0.01
21 loan age 0.01 0.02 0
22 current fico date 0.01 0.02 0
23 reo 0.01 0.01 0
24 bk 0.01 0.01 0
25 current rate 0 0.01 0
Table 35: Variable Importance using GBM for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, Servicer Comments, Loan
Data (Loan left join tfidf).
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 intrst payment due 442743.75 1 0.31
2 fc stage 248945.55 0.56 0.18
3 loan type 143038.84 0.32 0.10
4 jr lien balance 142050.20 0.32 0.10
5 rem term 121786.64 0.28 0.09
6 bk flag 90131.88 0.20 0.06
7 reo flag 48947.54 0.11 0.03
8 state 41900.22 0.09 0.03
9 fc flag 37033.07 0.08 0.03
10 next pay duedate 12802.30 0.03 0.01
11 legal grade 9607.75 0.02 0.01
12 loan purpose 8994.52 0.02 0.01
13 mths since mod 6792.25 0.02 0
14 orig ltv 4395.98 0.01 0
15 current rate 4346.65 0.01 0
16 current fico 4285.89 0.01 0
17 original fico 3988.37 0.01 0
18 loan age 3329.74 0.01 0
19 current fico date 2793.37 0.01 0
20 pmts1 2546.16 0.01 0
21 mortgage ins 2544.43 0.01 0
22 mod date 1812.83 0 0
23 original pi 1719.88 0 0
24 current balance 1702.25 0 0
25 doc type 1679.66 0 0
26 original appraisal 1621.78 0 0
27 original rate 1542.15 0 0
28 occupancy type 1537.92 0 0
29 original balance 1461.04 0 0
30 property type 1295.35 0 0
31 pmts12 1178.78 0 0
32 fire 1126.52 0 0
33 pmts3 1086.13 0 0
34 bk dq delay 981.81 0 0
35 value 959.16 0 0
36 pmts6 861.37 0 0
37 bk file date 650.64 0 0
38 io flag. 602.64 0 0
... ... ... ... ...
63 insuranceclaim 0.18 0 0
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Table 36: Variable Importance using DNN for PL, NPL, PIF, ShortSale, Servicer Comments, Loan
Data (Loan left join tfidf).
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 bk flag.Y 1 1 0.01
2 jr lien balance 0.83 0.83 0.01
3 intrst payment due 0.82 0.82 0.01
4 next pay duedate 0.81 0.81 0.01
5 loan type.NULL 0.75 0.75 0.01
6 reo flag.Y 0.73 0.73 0.01
7 fc flag.Y 0.72 0.72 0.01
8 bk flag.N 0.59 0.59 0.01
9 fc flag.N 0.56 0.56 0.01
10 fc stage.F0 - Removed 0.55 0.55 0.01
11 loan type.CONV 0.54 0.54 0.01
12 loan type.PMI 0.53 0.53 0.01
13 fc stage.F1 0.51 0.51 0.01
14 state.DC 0.51 0.51 0.01
15 state.NC 0.51 0.51 0.01
16 mod flag.Y 0.51 0.51 0.01
17 state.NH 0.50 0.50 0.01
18 loan type.USDA 0.49 0.49 0.01
19 loan purpose.Home Improvement 0.48 0.48 0.01
20 loan type.VA 0.47 0.47 0.01
21 doc type.NULL 0.47 0.47 0.01
22 io flag..N 0.47 0.47 0.01
23 loan type.FHA 0.47 0.47 0.01
24 deedlieu 0.47 0.47 0.01
25 occupancy type.Second Home 0.46 0.46 0.01
26 fc stage.F1 - File Referred 0.46 0.46 0.01
27 fc stage.F3 0.46 0.46 0.01
28 doc type.Stated 0.46 0.46 0.01
29 state.VA 0.46 0.46 0.01
30 state.CO 0.46 0.46 0.01
31 state.ME 0.45 0.45 0.01
32 fc stage.F2 - First Legal Filed 0.45 0.45 0.01
33 loan type.HELOC 0.45 0.45 0.01
34 state.IN 0.45 0.45 0.01
35 balloon flag.N 0.45 0.45 0.01
36 io flag.Y 0.45 0.45 0.01
37 state.NE 0.45 0.45 0.01
38 condemn 0.45 0.45 0.01
39 state.AK 0.44 0.44 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
200 original rate 0.11 0.11 0
Table 37: Out-of-Sample Misclassification Errors for Loan Data and Servicer Comments.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
NPL 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.08
PIF 0.05 1 0.08 0.09
PL 0 0 0 0
ShortSale 0.06 1 0.02 0.04
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Table 38: In-Sample Confusion Matrices for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
B120D 0.04 0.51 0.04 0.15
BK 0.01 0.02 0 0.02
FC 0.01 0.03 0 0.02
PIF 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.13
REO 0 0.04 0 0.01
ShrtSal 0 0.41 0.02 0.16
W0 30D 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
W30 60D 0.60 1 0.45 0.7
W60 90D 0.40 1 0.25 0.67
W90 120D 0.29 1 0.25 0.62
Table 39: Variable Importance using DRF for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 next pay duedate 613035.06 1 0.09
2 reo flag 605082.88 0.99 0.09
3 fc stage 544768.25 0.89 0.08
4 intrst payment due 505585.44 0.82 0.07
5 bk flag 449212.62 0.73 0.06
6 state 411984.72 0.67 0.06
7 fc flag 367797.50 0.60 0.05
8 loan type 349388.12 0.57 0.05
9 bk dq delay 233447.95 0.38 0.03
10 legal grade 197225.72 0.32 0.03
11 rem term 170722.06 0.28 0.02
12 original fico 158756.31 0.26 0.02
13 fc start date 153712.53 0.25 0.02
14 current balance 138749.39 0.23 0.02
15 jr lien balance 133924.64 0.22 0.02
16 current fico 130835.15 0.21 0.02
17 bk file date 117151.84 0.19 0.02
18 mths in bk 115025.51 0.19 0.02
19 current fico date 113643.59 0.19 0.02
20 loan purpose 110146.92 0.18 0.02
21 current rate 105895.52 0.17 0.02
22 loan age 102130.12 0.17 0.01
23 value 97924.15 0.16 0.01
24 orig ltv 95359.88 0.16 0.01
25 mths in fc 88330.61 0.14 0.01
26 original balance 81280.03 0.13 0.01
27 original appraisal 79568.83 0.13 0.01
28 original pi 79296.91 0.13 0.01
29 current pi 79163.44 0.13 0.01
30 original rate 76294.62 0.12 0.01
31 mths since mod 58970.69 0.10 0.01
32 mod date 46266.05 0.08 0.01
33 pmts12 46205.67 0.08 0.01
34 pmts6 45511.46 0.07 0.01
35 doc type 44127 0.07 0.01
36 mortgage ins 42250.52 0.07 0.01
37 pmts3 40947.18 0.07 0.01
38 pmts1 35087.26 0.06 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
48 balloon flag 3142.38 0.01 0
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Table 40: Variable Importance using Lasso for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 bk flag.Y 11.49 1 0.10
2 reo flag.Y 11.34 0.99 0.10
3 loan type.NULL 11.15 0.97 0.10
4 fc stage.NULL 6.62 0.58 0.06
5 next pay duedate 5.66 0.49 0.05
6 intrst payment due 5.66 0.49 0.05
7 fc flag.Y 5.50 0.48 0.05
8 jr lien balance 3.88 0.34 0.03
9 fc flag.N 3.50 0.30 0.03
10 fc stage.F1 - File Referred 3.45 0.30 0.03
11 loan purpose.CASH OUT 3.43 0.30 0.03
12 original fico 2.80 0.24 0.02
13 legal grade.NI 2.72 0.24 0.02
14 mod flag.Y 2.55 0.22 0.02
15 loan type.CONV 2.41 0.21 0.02
16 mod flag.N 2.36 0.21 0.02
17 fc stage.F0 - Removed 1.88 0.16 0.02
18 loan type.USDA 1.75 0.15 0.02
19 mths since mod 1.58 0.14 0.01
20 doc type.None 1.14 0.10 0.01
21 mortgage ins 1.08 0.09 0.01
22 fc start date 0.93 0.08 0.01
23 rem term 0.90 0.08 0.01
24 bk dq delay 0.89 0.08 0.01
25 current fico date 0.88 0.08 0.01
26 current fico 0.87 0.08 0.01
27 legal grade.C- 0.82 0.07 0.01
28 legal grade.B+ 0.77 0.07 0.01
29 orig ltv 0.74 0.06 0.01
30 legal grade.C+ 0.74 0.06 0.01
31 legal grade.C 0.73 0.06 0.01
32 lien position 0.70 0.06 0.01
33 mod date 0.64 0.06 0.01
34 bk file date 0.63 0.05 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
84 state.FL 0.01 0 0
Table 41: Variable Importance using GBM for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 intrst payment due 143950.55 1 0.21
2 bk flag 109717.62 0.76 0.16
3 reo flag 89517.88 0.62 0.13
4 fc flag 84128.67 0.58 0.12
5 jr lien balance 74688.28 0.52 0.11
6 loan type 39176.86 0.27 0.06
7 next pay duedate 24229.26 0.17 0.04
8 state 23780.70 0.17 0.03
9 fc stage 17169.37 0.12 0.02
10 mortgage ins 10481.79 0.07 0.02
11 rem term 9947.15 0.07 0.01
12 loan purpose 9337.47 0.06 0.01
13 pmts1 7182.65 0.05 0.01
14 legal grade 6116.16 0.04 0.01
15 current balance 5038.95 0.04 0.01
16 pmts6 3144.23 0.02 0
17 current fico 3118.81 0.02 0
18 mths since mod 2318.51 0.02 0
19 pmts3 2260.23 0.02 0
20 pmts12 2115.03 0.01 0
21 original fico 1853.44 0.01 0
22 current fico date 1847.31 0.01 0
23 orig ltv 1775.01 0.01 0
24 current rate 1687.95 0.01 0
25 loan age 1652.90 0.01 0
26 original balance 1546.06 0.01 0
27 value 1387.33 0.01 0
28 doc type 1236.83 0.01 0
29 original pi 1224.34 0.01 0
30 original rate 1185.96 0.01 0
31 original appraisal 1067.47 0.01 0
32 mod date 977.69 0.01 0
33 bk dq delay 797.64 0.01 0
34 bk file date 539.07 0 0
35 fc start date 528.87 0 0
36 mths in bk 490.36 0 0
... ... ... ... ...
48 io flag 0 0 0
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Table 42: Variable Importance using DNN for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 bk flag.N 1 1 0.02
2 intrst payment due 0.89 0.89 0.02
3 reo flag.Y 0.86 0.86 0.02
4 reo flag.N 0.84 0.84 0.01
5 next pay duedate 0.76 0.76 0.01
6 bk flag.Y 0.73 0.73 0.01
7 fc flag.N 0.73 0.73 0.01
8 fc flag.Y 0.70 0.70 0.01
9 jr lien balance 0.66 0.66 0.01
10 loan type.NULL 0.57 0.57 0.01
11 fc stage.F2 - First Legal Filed 0.50 0.50 0.01
12 io flag.N 0.49 0.49 0.01
13 loan type.CONV 0.48 0.48 0.01
14 loan type.HELOC 0.48 0.48 0.01
15 state.CT 0.48 0.48 0.01
16 state.RI 0.47 0.47 0.01
17 fc stage.F1 - File Referred 0.46 0.46 0.01
18 state.ND 0.45 0.45 0.01
19 fc stage.F1 0.45 0.45 0.01
20 fc stage.F3 - Judgment Entered 0.45 0.45 0.01
21 occupancy type.Owner Occupied 0.45 0.45 0.01
22 fc stage.F3 0.44 0.44 0.01
23 loan purpose.Home Improvement 0.44 0.44 0.01
24 fc stage.F0 - No FC 0.44 0.44 0.01
25 fc stage.F2 0.44 0.44 0.01
26 state.WV 0.43 0.43 0.01
27 legal grade.D 0.43 0.43 0.01
28 state.WI 0.43 0.43 0.01
29 pmts3 0.42 0.42 0.01
30 io flag..Y 0.42 0.42 0.01
31 state.IN 0.42 0.42 0.01
32 state.PR 0.42 0.42 0.01
33 state.MD 0.42 0.42 0.01
34 current rate type.ARM 0.41 0.41 0.01
35 mod flag.N 0.41 0.41 0.01
36 legal grade.D- 0.41 0.41 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
152 current balance 0.14 0.14 0
Table 43: Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices for Granular Classes using Loan Data.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
B120D 0.08 0.51 0.06 0.15
BK 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
FC 0 0.02 0.01 0.03
PIF 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.13
REO 0.01 0.03 0 0.01
ShrtSal 0.08 0.42 0.05 0.2
W0 30D 0 0.01 0.01 0.02
W30 60D 0.74 1 0.51 0.71
W60 90D 0.62 1 0.51 0.68
W90 120D 0.49 1 0.36 0.62
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Table 44: In-Sample Confusion Matrices for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer Com-
ments.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
B120D 0.06 0.5 0.04 1
BK 0.01 0.02 0 1
FC 0.01 0.03 0.01 1
PIF 0.08 0.17 0.06 1
REO 0 0.03 0 1
ShrtSal 0.01 0 0.03 1
W0 30D 0 0.01 0.01 0
W30 60D 0.65 1 0.44 1
W60 90D 0.47 1 0.41 1
W90 120D 0.36 1 0.27 1
Table 45: Variable Importance using DRF for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer Com-
ments.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 fc stage 465347.91 1 0.09
2 reo flag 436792.97 0.94 0.08
3 intrst payment due 429502.91 0.92 0.08
4 next pay duedate 388325.16 0.83 0.07
5 bk flag 335261.22 0.72 0.06
6 state 306916.88 0.66 0.06
7 fc flag 298051.41 0.64 0.06
8 loan type 253430.25 0.54 0.05
9 bk dq delay 183503.30 0.39 0.03
10 legal grade 136493.88 0.29 0.03
11 rem term 123691.41 0.27 0.02
12 original fico 110465.33 0.24 0.02
13 current balance 99567.46 0.21 0.02
14 current fico 95718.16 0.21 0.02
15 bk file date 92567.76 0.20 0.02
16 fc start date 88275.17 0.19 0.02
17 jr lien balance 81285.50 0.17 0.02
18 current rate 76209.28 0.16 0.01
19 current fico date 75858.84 0.16 0.01
20 loan age 73657.98 0.16 0.01
21 mths in bk 72002.57 0.15 0.01
22 mths in fc 71213.42 0.15 0.01
23 value 69008 0.15 0.01
24 orig ltv 68509.26 0.15 0.01
25 loan purpose 67997.71 0.15 0.01
26 original balance 59834.68 0.13 0.01
27 current pi 58469.17 0.13 0.01
28 original appraisal 58350.36 0.13 0.01
29 original pi 57792.35 0.12 0.01
30 original rate 57703.61 0.12 0.01
31 mths since mod 43540.52 0.09 0.01
32 mod date 36252.40 0.08 0.01
33 doc type 33028.20 0.07 0.01
34 pmts12 32731.72 0.07 0.01
35 pmts6 32389.83 0.07 0.01
36 mortgage ins 30166.88 0.06 0.01
37 pmts3 28953.71 0.06 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
85 manufacturehouse 0.01 0 0
Figure 38: Servicer Comment as a channel.
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Table 46: Variable Importance using Lasso for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer Com-
ments.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 reo flag.Y 11.84 1 0.10
2 loan type.NULL 11.16 0.94 0.10
3 bk flag.Y 11.01 0.93 0.09
4 fc stage.NULL 6.72 0.57 0.06
5 next pay duedate 5.66 0.48 0.05
6 intrst payment due 5.66 0.48 0.05
7 fc flag.Y 5.63 0.48 0.05
8 jr lien balance 3.77 0.32 0.03
9 loan purpose.CASH OUT 3.35 0.28 0.03
10 fc flag.N 3.34 0.28 0.03
11 fc stage.F1 - File Referred 3.30 0.28 0.03
12 original fico 2.79 0.24 0.02
13 legal grade.NI 2.62 0.22 0.02
14 mod flag.Y 2.59 0.22 0.02
15 mod flag.N 2.33 0.20 0.02
16 loan type.CONV 2.11 0.18 0.02
17 fc stage.F0 - Removed 1.83 0.15 0.02
18 mths since mod 1.47 0.12 0.01
19 loan type.USDA 1.28 0.11 0.01
20 doc type.None 1.14 0.10 0.01
21 mortgage ins 1.06 0.09 0.01
22 rem term 0.90 0.08 0.01
23 fc start date 0.89 0.08 0.01
24 current fico date 0.86 0.07 0.01
25 bk dq delay 0.86 0.07 0.01
26 current fico 0.85 0.07 0.01
27 legal grade.C- 0.78 0.07 0.01
28 legal grade.B+ 0.77 0.07 0.01
29 lien position 0.75 0.06 0.01
30 orig ltv 0.74 0.06 0.01
31 legal grade.C+ 0.73 0.06 0.01
32 legal grade.C 0.71 0.06 0.01
33 reo 0.70 0.06 0.01
34 bk file date 0.68 0.06 0.01
35 fc 0.63 0.05 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
113 hurricanedamage 0.01 0 0
Figure 39: Opportunities in EBO in 2020
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Table 47: Variable Importance using GBM for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer Com-
ments.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 intrst payment due 143319.83 1 0.21
2 bk flag 109700.21 0.77 0.16
3 reo flag 88941.77 0.62 0.13
4 fc flag 84212.17 0.59 0.12
5 jr lien balance 74120.73 0.52 0.11
6 loan type 39102.08 0.27 0.06
7 next pay duedate 24199.80 0.17 0.04
8 state 22955.12 0.16 0.03
9 fc stage 17683.63 0.12 0.03
10 mortgage ins 10940.99 0.08 0.02
11 rem term 9655.52 0.07 0.01
12 loan purpose 9092.03 0.06 0.01
13 pmts1 7104.02 0.05 0.01
14 legal grade 5958.43 0.04 0.01
15 current balance 4809.61 0.03 0.01
16 current fico 2925.20 0.02 0
17 pmts6 2754.50 0.02 0
18 mths since mod 2202.12 0.02 0
19 original fico 1960.34 0.01 0
20 current fico date 1940.18 0.01 0
21 pmts3 1844.07 0.01 0
22 orig ltv 1829.55 0.01 0
23 pmts12 1825.18 0.01 0
24 current rate 1674.95 0.01 0
25 loan age 1674.73 0.01 0
26 mths in fc 1654.59 0.01 0
27 original balance 1517.98 0.01 0
28 value 1291.51 0.01 0
29 doc type 1283.80 0.01 0
30 fc 1279.58 0.01 0
31 original rate 1222.97 0.01 0
32 mod flag 1151.75 0.01 0
33 original pi 1134.77 0.01 0
34 original appraisal 1085.89 0.01 0
35 mod date 987.81 0.01 0
36 fc start date 945.30 0.01 0
37 bk dq delay 724.05 0.01 0
38 lien position 566.66 0 0
39 shortsale 496.73 0 0
40 bk file date 496.59 0 0
41 property type 441.45 0 0
42 mths in bk 404.50 0 0
43 io flag. 289.98 0 0
44 occupancy type 209.18 0 0
45 fcl 195.96 0 0
46 foreclosure 194.11 0 0
47 bk 137.10 0 0
48 fire 136.27 0 0
49 balloon flag 117.66 0 0
... ... ... ... ...
72 deedlieu 0.03 0 0
Figure 40: Resolution of Early-Buyout loans
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Table 48: Variable Importance using DNN for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer Com-
ments.
variable relative importance scaled importance percentage
1 divorce 1 1 0.01
2 rem term 0.99 0.99 0.01
3 reo flag.N 0.98 0.98 0.01
4 fc stage.F3 - Judgment Entered 0.97 0.97 0.01
5 pmts3 0.94 0.94 0.01
6 state.MA 0.94 0.94 0.01
7 bk flag.N 0.92 0.92 0.01
8 state.AR 0.91 0.91 0.01
9 state.LA 0.91 0.91 0.01
10 bk flag.Y 0.90 0.90 0.01
11 fraud 0.90 0.90 0.01
12 property type.Condo 0.90 0.90 0.01
13 state.AL 0.89 0.89 0.01
14 current rate 0.89 0.89 0.01
15 property type.Modular Home 0.89 0.89 0.01
16 fc stage.F0 - Removed 0.89 0.89 0.01
17 loan purpose.Cash Out 0.89 0.89 0.01
18 lienstrip 0.88 0.88 0.01
19 doc type.Reduced 0.88 0.88 0.01
20 loan type.CONV 0.88 0.88 0.01
21 state.OK 0.88 0.88 0.01
22 doc type.Limited 0.88 0.88 0.01
23 legal grade.D- 0.87 0.87 0.01
24 orig ltv 0.87 0.87 0.01
25 state.PA 0.87 0.87 0.01
26 state.NM 0.87 0.87 0.01
27 legal grade.D+ 0.87 0.87 0.01
28 bankruptcy 0.87 0.87 0.01
29 state.CA 0.87 0.87 0.01
30 value 0.87 0.87 0.01
31 state.NJ 0.86 0.86 0.01
32 occupancy type.Second Home 0.86 0.86 0.01
33 state.WY 0.86 0.86 0.01
34 damage 0.86 0.86 0.01
35 legal grade.B+ 0.86 0.86 0.01
... ... ... ... ...
196 fcl 0.46 0.46 0
Table 49: Out-of-Sample Confusion Matrices for Granular Classes using Loan Data and Servicer
Comments.
DRF Lasso GBM DNN
B120D 0.06 0.45 0.04 1
BK 0 0.02 0 1
FC 0 0.01 0 1
PIF 0.04 0.16 0.06 1
REO 0.01 0.02 0 1
ShrtSal 0.08 0.42 0.05 1
W0 30D 0 0.01 0.01 0
W30 60D 0.72 1 0.49 1
W60 90D 0.57 1 0.43 1
W90 120D 0.43 1 0.27 1
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Figure 41: Dendogram of Keywords.
139
Table 50: Categories and Corresponding Words
Category Corresponding Words
NATURAL DISASTER SANDY, IRENE, HURRICANE, TORNADO, HAZARD POL, HAZARD/FLOOD INSURANCE, HAZARD LINE,
HAZARD DEC PAGE, HAZARD MONTHLY STATEMENT, HAZARD MONTHLY AMOUNT, HAZARD DECLARATION,
HAZARD DOC , OBRT FIRE, STATE FARM FIRE, FIRE INSURANCE, FIRE POLICY, NON-FLOOD,
FLOOD PANEL, FLOOD CERT, ESCROW SET UP AND FLOOD FOR MODIFICATION, FLOOD AUDIT, FEMA, SINK HOLE.
MILITARY ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPLOY, SCRA, MILITARY+SERVICE, SOLDIER, ACTIVE MILITARY, SAILOR,
BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY, CRAM DOWN
TITLE ISSUE TITLE ISSUE RESOLVED, CONTESTED FORECLOSURE, VENDOR’S LIEN, HOMESTEAD DEED, %INSTR%TAKING% ,
%CERT%SALE%, %TAX CERT%, %VENDOR LIEN%, %TAX%DEED%, %TAX%SALE%, %QUIET%TITLE%,
%ORDER OF NOTICE%, INTENDED JUNIOR, CONTRACT FOR DEED, AGREEMENT FOR DEED, LAND SALE
CONTRACT, REAL ESTATE INSTALLMENT AGREEMENT, LAND CONTRACT, CONTRACT SALE, BOND FOR TITLE,
INSTALLMENT SALES, CONTRACT, NOT RELEASE, HOLD, SERVICE RELEASE, RELEASE FUNDS, INFORMATION
RELEASE, RELEASE FORM, CHAIN, CLAIM, COMMERCIAL, ENCROACH, JUDGEMENT, SATISFACTION, QUIT CLAIM
DEED, OWNERSHIP TRANSFER, PENDING, TAX LIEN, LIEN ISSUE, LIEN STRIPPING, REPURCHASE, WIPED OUT
OCCUPANCY ABANDON, UNSECURED, VACANT LAND, VACANT LOT, MISSING, NOT SECURE,
LOSS MITIGATION CHARGE-OFFS/COLL ON CBR, CHARGE OFF OR COLLECTIONS, COLLECTIONS/CHARGE-OFFS/JUDGMENTS/LIENS,
CURTAILMENT OF INCOME, DEED IN LIEU, FORECLOSURE, REO
PROPERTY CONDITION CONDEMNATION, CONTAMINATION, DESTROY, DAMAGE, TORN DOWN, TEAR DOWN, COLLAPSE, DOMAIN,
EMINENT, ENVIRONMENTAL, EXPOSED WIRING, INFEST, INHABITABLE, SECURITY, VANDALISM, SMOKE
DAMAGE, STORM DAMAGE, STRUCTURAL, TERMITE, WATER DAMAGE, WIND DAMAGE, WINTERIZE, GROUND,
HAIL DAMAGE, HURRICANE DAMAGE, HAZARD LOSS, FREEZE, FOUNDATION, BURN/BURNT/BURNED, DEMOLISH,
UNINHAB%, VACANT LAND, VACANT LOT, UNSAFE, ROOF, REPAIR, %GAS%TANK%, CASUALTY+LOSS,
LEAK, HISTORICAL LANDMARK, MOLD, OIL, ORDINANCE, POISON,
PROPERTY TYPE MOBILE HOME, MANUFACTURED HOME, MANUFACTURED HOUSING, MODULAR HOME, TRIBAL LAND, INDIAN LAND,
TRIBAL LOAN, INDIAN LOAN, RURAL LAND, MULTIFAMILY, APARTMENT, CONDOMINIUM, PRE%FAB
LIFE EVENT SICK, ILL, PASSED AWAY, MARITAL, DIVORCE, EMPLOYMENT TRANSFER, UNEMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS+FAILURE,
DEATH, DECEASED, CANCER, EMERGENCY, HOSPITAL, MOVE
CRIME INCARCERATED/INCARCERATE/INCARCERATION, FRAUD, IDENTITY THEFT, ILLEGAL, INVALID, JAIL,
THEFT, VANDAL, PRISON.
LEGAL COMPLIANCE, DEFENSE, DELAY, DISPUTE, DISTRESS, ERROR, INSURANCE CLAIM, SETTLEMENT, SEIZE,
SKIP, VIOLATION, ZONING, SERVICING + PROBLEM, UNABLE+TO+CONTACT, PAYMENT ADJUSTMENT,
PAYMENT DISPUTE, COLLECTIONS/CHARGE-OFFS/JUDGMENTS/LIENS, CURB APPEAL, FDCPA, COUNTER
CLAIM, COUNTERSU%, SANCTIONS, LITIGIOUS, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BARRED BY LIMITATIONS,
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT, LAWSUIT, LIABILITY, PREDATORY, PROBATE, REAFFIRMED, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
LOCATION SALE DATE, SALES PRICE, INABILITY+TO+SELL, INABILITY+TO+RENT, LISTED,
COMPLIANCE TEXAS 50(A)(6), TEXAS 50A6, TEXAS 50(A), TEXAS 50A, ARTICLE 50(A),
CONST. ARTICLE 50(A), CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 50, HIGH COST LOAN,
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Figure 42: Key Delinquency States.
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Figure 43: Key Delinquency States and Legal Keyword.
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Figure 44: Key Delinquency States and Life Event-related Keywords.
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Figure 45: Key Delinquency States and Military Keyword.
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Figure 46: Key Delinquency States and Natural Disasters-related Keywords.
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Figure 47: Key Delinquency States and Occupancy-related Keywords.
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Figure 48: Key Delinquency States and Property Condition-related Keywords.
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Figure 49: Key Delinquency States and Title-related Keyword.
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Figure 50: Coronavirus Unemployment Forbearance.
149
Figure 51: Corona Foreclosure Bankruptcy.
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Figure 52: Key 12 Topics and related wordcloud.
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Figure 53: Relative weights and word counts of topics
In Figure 53 I plot the relative weights of words in each topic and also their frequencies for topics 1-6 and a
similar analysis for topics 7-12 in Figure 54.
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Figure 54: Relative weights and word counts of topics
In Figure 53 I plot the relative weights of words in each topic and also their frequencies for topics 1-6 and a
similar analysis for topics 7-12 in Figure 54.
153
Figure 55: Topic 1 and related word frequencies and weights.
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